

"Cruelty as Policy": The Anti-Infiltration Campaign of the Communist Party of the Philippines

A Translation of "Mga Aral Mula sa Naganap na Impiltrasyon sa Hangganang Quezon-Bicol" (Lessons from the Infiltration Incident in the Quezon-Bicol Border), by the Melito Glor Command, New People's Army, Communist Party of the Philippines (February 1983)

Translated by Veronica Alporha and Patricio N. Abinales



Center for Southeast
Asian Studies
**University of Wisconsin-
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“Cruelty as Policy”: The Anti-Infiltration Campaign of the Communist Party of the Philippines

Veronica Alporha and Patricio N. Abinales¹

Introduction


When the Communist Party of the Philippines' (CPP) issued a decree ordering its legal organizations to boycott the February 1986 “snap elections” because it believed that the election was a fight between two reactionary forces, it showed everyone how formidable the revolutionary movement had become. The memorandum exuded confidence over the CPP’s progress. It was now a nationwide force, something its older rival, the *Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas*, had never achieved. With this unprecedented political influence, it felt it had reached a point where it believed that within a few years it could seize power. The “boycott policy” turned out to be costly. Marcos’ manipulation of the election results led to an attempted coup by a “reformist” group inside the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The coup failed, and the plotters were saved by a million people who surrounded the camps where they retreated. That human shield would turn into the “people power, ” forcing Marcos to abandon the palace and flee to Hawaii. The Party watched history unfold on the sidelines.

¹ We thank Robert Francis Garcia for the phrase “Cruelty as policy.”



Philippines communist insurgency 50 years on

The New People's Army launched its rebellion to create a Maoist state on March 29, 1969



*Scores of troops died during the 5 month siege of Marawi, triggered by an Islamic militant take over

According to official figures, the Maoist insurgency has killed up to 40,000 people

At its peak in the 1980s the NPA had some 26,000 fighters in its ranks, but the number is now around 4,000, the military says

Source: Armed Forces of the Philippines © AFP

February 1986 was that moment when the revolution began to unravel. First came the internal debate over the “boycott policy,” which was followed by more intense exchanges over the utility of the Maoist strategy of a protracted struggle where communist forces gradually “encircle the cities from the countryside” (Mao 1965: 317). Then amidst these debates, the Party leadership received reports of military infiltrations nationwide and began to launch a series of investigations that brought about what Dominique Caouette called the Party’s “darkest moments.” The Party launched a nationwide investigation (codename *Olympia*), but the most brutal were those conducted by its regional organizations. The first was in the provinces south of Manila (also called Southern Tagalog region), where the Party’s Operation Missing Link in 1985 which led to the arrest of 112 suspected spies and the execution of sixty. The second was in July 1985, on the southern island of Mindanao, where the CPP’s Mindanao Regional Committee’s (Mindacom) island-wide *Operasyong Kampanyag Ahos* (Operation

Campaign Garlic, *Kahos*) to purge the organization of suspected spies.²

There were numerous indications that the investigations involved torture, and those “judged” guilty were not given any chance to appeal and summarily executed. A major reason for this was the considerable latitude given by Party leaders to those leading the investigations. Alex De Jong pointed out the Party’s

“Political Officers” in charge of the collectives members were organized in, received permission to use ‘hard tactics’ (a euphemism for torture) to obtain information. The PO’s were given the role of judge, jury and executioner. Accused had no right of appeal. It was easy to come under suspicion: being named once in a ‘confession’ meant being placed under surveillance, being mentioned twice was ground for arrest (De Jong, 2016).

As the investigations spread, so did the paranoia, and the more investigators became paranoid, the more prone they were to employ torture and executions. The leadership finally stopped all these bloody inquiries by the end of 1988, but the damage had been done. Over 1,500 cadres and activists were arrested and 800 of them executed. Much worse was what these investigations had done to organizational unity and cadre morale. According to Caouette:

Internal purges profoundly “damaged” the moral and social norms and trust within the revolutionary movement. The various “anti-DPA campaigns” left profound wounds within the movement, undermining the precious and essential social network that had previously existed, and that had provided much safety and cohesion (Caouette, 2004, p. 533).

For example, before *Kahos*, Mindacom was the most pow-

² Filipino folktales attribute garlic with the power to repel vampires preying on the community. Suspected military spies were likened to these ghoulish figures for their sinister plans and actions.

erful of the Party's regional organizations. It was launching some of the more dramatic "people's strikes" that nearly paralyzed the road systems of the country's second largest islands. The NPA was staging one spectacular ambush after another against government forces, all in part of a plan to transform the guerilla army into a conventional force. In the three months, it was implemented, the Mindacom's membership declined from 9,000 to 3,000 as cadres, guerrillas and mass activists abandoned the movement. NPA squadrons were reduced from sixteen companies to two (Abinales, 1996, pp. 156-157).³ Only the guerilla bases in northeastern Mindanao survived; the rest were abandoned especially after the military and anti-communist vigilante groups (this time with the blessings of a popular President Corazon Aquino) counter-attacked (DelaCruz et al., 1987).

There was hardly anything coming out of the Party save for general statements that condemned the purges and pointed the accusing finger at cadres who lost the factional battles of the late 1980s. This was the case until a former cadre gave us a copy of "*Mga Aral Mula sa Naganap na Impiltrasyon sa Hangganang Quezon-Bikol*," henceforth "Mga Aral" the memorandum prepared by the leadership of the NPA's Melito Glor Command on how its members should deal with military spies. We have reprinted and translated it here as this is the only internal document from the Party that addresses the issue of infiltration control, including the question of torture and of the executions of those judged guilty.

Oplan Takipsilim (Operation Twilight) killed around 30 suspected spies in the towns of Lopez, General Luna, and Calauag in Quezon Province (249 miles southeast of Manila). Based on the table prepared by De Jong (Table 1), *Mga Aral* became the guide for the anti-infiltration campaign in the area a year later. However, *Mga Aral* appeared ineffective

³ Readers can find a summary of these "dark moments" in a compilation of news accounts by journalist Juan V. Sarmiento, in the online encyclopedia www.marxist.org (Sarmiento, 2003).

when the anti-infiltration campaign turned nationwide. Why it failed as a guidepost remains unexplained to this very day. We hope that by reprinting and translating the document, our readers can infer some possible answers.

Table 1. "Anti-Infiltration" Campaigns (De Jong, 2016)

Campaign/ Operation	Year(s)	Areas	CPP Organiza- tions involved	Number of Victims
<i>Kadena de Amor</i>	1981-82	Quezon- Bicol Area	CPP-NPA-NDF	Around 30 dead
<i>Oplan Takipsilim</i>	1984	Calauag, Lopez, General Luna towns, Quezon Province	CPP-NPA-NDF	Around 30 dead
<i>Kampa- nyang Ahos (Kahos)</i>	July 1985-86	Mindanao (Misamis Oriental, Davao del Norte, Davao del Sur, Cotabato provinces; Cagayan de Oro and Davao City)	Mindanao Re- gional Command and Central Visayas Regional Party Committee	Over 1,500 arrested and tortured; over 800 killed
<i>Oplan Missing Link (OPML)</i>	1988	Quezon, Laguna, Cavite and Batangas provinces	Southern Tagalog Regional Par- ty Committee; Southern Tagalog Commission; NPA Melito Glor Command; Maria Lorena Barros Brigade.	112 arrested and tortured; 66 killed

<i>Olympia</i>	1988-89	Metro-politan Manila but involved national organizations	Regional Party Committees	No data
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The original memorandum and an English translation follow this extended introduction. We were working on a document that appeared to have been photocopied several times. Therefore there are certain words that we found hard to decipher and we have inserted a question mark alongside these words. We close this essay with an interview that Vec Alporha did with a survivor of the anti-spy campaigns in the Quezon-Bicol area. Robert Francis Garcia joined the NPA in the late 1980s, was accused of being a military infiltrator, interrogated, tortured, and threatened with execution, before he was suddenly freed. He left the guerrilla zone, resigned from the Party and as part of his effort to recover from his trauma, wrote the extremely popular book *To Suffer thy Comrades: How the Revolution Decimated its Own*.

VA
PNA

Acronyms

16 th IB	16 th Infantry Batallion
45 th IB	45 th Infantry Batallion
232 PC Coy	232 Philippine Constabulary Company
242 PC Coy	242 Philippine Constabulary Company
AFP-IB	Armed Forces of the Philippines-Infantry Brigade
BHB	Bagong Hukbong Bayan (New People's Army)
BI	Background Investigation
BP	Bicol Province
CN	Camarines Norte (Province)
COY	Company
CPP	Communist Party of the Philippines
CS	Camarines Sur (Province)
GI	Grupong Interogador (Investigators' Group)
GYG	Ganap Yunit Gerilya (Full-time Guerilla Unit)
ICHDF	Integrated Civilian Home Defense Force
IK	Istap ng Komunikasyon (Communication Staff)
IS	Istap sa Seguridad (Security Staff)
ISAFP	Intelligence Services of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
IT	Investigation Team(s)
KD	Komiteng Distrito (District Committee)
*KIA	
KLA	Komiteng Larangan (Front Committee)
NDF	National Democratic Front
NISA	National Intelligence Service Agency
NPA	New People's Army
NT	Nasyonal na Tagapagtanggap (National Committee)
OP-CD	Operasyon Pinta-Operasyon Dikit (Operation Revolutionary Graffiti-Operation Stickers)
PAKUM	Pangkalahatang Kursong Mass (Comprehensive Mass Course)
PC	Philippine Constabulary
PK	Pangkat ng Kadre (Cadre Corps)
PC-INP	Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National

	Police
PK	Pangkat ng Kadre (Cadre Corps)
QBZ	Quezon-Bicol Zone
R-2	Region-2
RKT	Rehiyonal Komiteng Tagapagtanggap (Regional Executive Committee)
SC	Security Check
SYP	Sandatahang Yunit Propaganda (Armed Propaganda Unit, smallest unit of the New People's Army)
US-Marcos	United States-Marcos

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*Meaning of acronym undetermined. We will add this once we get information from resource persons.

Part 2. The Memorandum

The Original

Ang hangganang Quezon-Bikol ay naging tudlaan ng isang malawakan at maramihang impiltrasyon mula noong huling kwarto ng 1979 hanggang unang kwarto ng 1982. Sa kasaysayan ng rebolusyonaryong kilusan sa rehiyon, ito ang pinakamalawak, pinakamalalim at pinakasistematikong pakana ng kaaway na pasukin at wasakin ang Partido, hukbong bayan at rebolusyonaryong organisasyong masa.

Hindi ito mapapantayan nang nangyari noong 1976 ng nakapuslit ang isang action agent sa isang SYP at sa naganap na sunog noong 1977.

Naganap ang malawakang impiltrasyong ito sa panahon na bumubungad ang ating digmang bayan sa abanteng sub-yugto ng estratehikong depensiba. Nais ng kaaway na pigilin ang mabilis na pagsulong ng armadong pakikibaka at rebolusyonaryong kilusang masa sa rehiyon. Sa kasaysayan, hindi nasagkaan ng estado ang ating pagsulong sa pamamagitan ng mga matitinding operasyon at kampanyang militar. Gumagamit sila ng iba't ibang paraan upang makamit ang buktot nilang layunin. Hibang ang ambisyon ng diktadurang US-Marcos na tapusin ang Partido, hukbong bayan at rebolusyonaryong kilusang masa sa hangganan sa pamamagitan ng magkasabay na matinding pag-atakeng militar at buktot na pananabotahe sa loob ng rebolusyonaryong kilusan.

Hindi maihihiwalay na may malaking kaugnayan ang impiltrasyon sa malawakan at intensibong kampanyang anti-insurgency na kasalukuyang inilulunsad ng kaaway sa hangganang Quezon-Bikol. Ibinunyag mismo ng mga nasukol na pusakal na impiltrador na magdadagsaan sa rehiyon ang mga panlabang yunit ng AFP tulad ng 16th IB at 45th IB. Sa kasalukuyan, aktibong inibwelto ang mga ito sa matinding kampanyang militar sa rehiyon bilang bahagi ng kampanyang anti-insurgency.

Nailatag ng kaaway ang lambat ng mga bayarang impiltrador mula sa batayang antas ng organisasyon ng Partido sa baryo, sa dalawang komite sa seksyon at isang komite sa distrito. Naikalat din nila ang mga bayarang ahente sa mga yunit ng hukbong bayan mula sa ilang SYP at mga ganap na yunit gerilya sa larangan at distrito. Naabot din nila ang teknikal istap ng namumunong komite sa larangan at naipasa ang isa pang ahente sa teknikal istap ng komite ng Partido sa karatig na rehiyon.

Bukod sa madugong misyon nilang banatan ang mga namumunong kadre ng Partido at kumander ng Bagong Hukbong Bayan sa rehiyon at gumawa ng pananabotahe sa ating gawaing pampolitika; layon din nilang magpuslit ng mahahalagang impormasyon hinggil sa galaw ng Partido, hukbong bayan at rebolusyonaryong masa upang pagbayan ng kanilang planong militar.

Huling dako ng 1981, nang matuklasan ng Partido sa rehiyon ang pakanang ito ng kaaway. Kagyat na inilunsad ang kampanya ng paglilinis sa organisasyon ng Partido at hukbong bayan, at pagpapagpag ng alikabok ng impiltrasyon. Bago pa man makapinsala ang mga bayarang ahente ng kaaway sa Partido at hukbong bayan, maagap na naparusahan ang mga pusakal at kumpirmadong impiltrador.

Bagama't nawasak natin ang lambat ng impiltrasyon sa rehiyon di maikaila na nakapasok ng maramihan ang kaaway sa ating hanay. Ang isang dekadang pagsisikap natin na ipundar at isulong ang armadong pakikibaka at rebolusyonaryong kilusang masa sa hangganang Quezon-Bikol ay nalagay sa panganib. Kung naging matagumpay ang kaaway, tiyak na bibilang tayo ng taon sa ating pagpupunyagi na muling ibangon ang ating nasimulan.

Kailangang paghanguan natin ng mahalagang aral ang pangyayaring ito. Sisikapin ng dokumentong ito na mailarawan ang buong pangyayari mula sa pagpapalano ng kaaway at sa ganap na pagkawasak ng kanilang pakana. Ipapakita ang mga kahinaan, limitasyon at kamalian ng Partido na nasasamantala ng kaaway. Ilalahad din ang mga

matitingkad na aral sa pag-aaresto, pagbinbin, interogasyon at pagpaparusa ng mga napatunayang ringleader o utak ng naganap na impiltrasyon.


Dapat at kailangang pag-aralan ng buong organisasyon ng Partido at hukbong bayan sa rehiyon ang documenting ito. Ayaw na nating maulit ang pangyayaring, dahil sa kawalan ng sistematikong kaalaman kung paano ginagamit ng kaaway ang impiltrasyon para wasakin tayo ay nakapamayagpag sa mahahahaba ring panahon ang mga impiltrador. Samantalang sa maraming pagkakataon ay krudo at lantana ang ginagawa nilang pananabotahe.

Proseso ng Pagbubuo ng Network ng Impiltrador sa Organisasyon

Ilalahad natin ang kasaysayan ng paglalatang ng impiltrasyon ayon sa pagkasunod-sunod ng mga pangyayari. Ito ay sang-ayon sa resulta ng interogasyon sa mga pinarusahang ahente ng kaaway.

Taong 1978, kinalkula na ang kaaway na maka-kaabot ang pagpapalawak ng Bagong Hukbong Bayan sa ibabang bahagi ng Ragay, Camarines Sur. Kagyat nila itong pinaghandaan. Binuo noong Hunyo 1979 ang kampanya sa paniniktuk (ISAFP Team Campaign) para sa buong Quezon-Bikol. Tinagurian nila itong Lipulin ang Rebolusyonaryong Pilipino (LRP). Pinamumunuan ang kampanyang ito ni Col. Nicasio Cordova. Nahahati ito sa ISAFP Team Campaign sa Camarines Sur Code Name: Operasyong Libogs, at ISAFP Team Campaign ng Quezon-Del Gallego.

Narito ang kanilang balangkas pang-organisasyon:



Noong panahong ito, abala ang Partido sa pagsasaayos ng organisasyon dulot sa kaguluhang nilikha ni Apolinario at sa sunog na naganap sa panrehiyong sentro noon 1977. Naglulunsad noon ng Kilusang Pagwawasto laban sa maling kaisipang naipalaganap ni Apolinario. Dahil sa kakitiran ng teritoryo, nanawagan ang Partido ng mabilis na pagpapalawak. Maging ang mga aktibistang masa mula sa baryo ay tumugon sa panawagang ito ng Partido. Nasamantala ng kaaway ang suhetibong pagnanais ng Partido na mabilis na pagpapalawak at mga limitasyon ng mga aktibistang masa upang maipaslit nila ang mga bayarang ahente ng kaaway sa loob ng rebolusyonaryong kilusan.

Mula 1977-1980, nagrekluta na ang kaaway ng mga taga-baryo ng magtetreyning sa Army. Matapos ang kanilang treyning, binigyan ng oryentasyon at muling itinanim sa baryo upang paghandaan ang pagpapalawak ng BHB. Sila'y sinwelduhan ng kaaway at pinangakuan na magiging regular at/o bibigyan ng ranggo kung tutupad sa kani-kanilang misyon.

Karaniwan, ang mga nireklutang impiltrado ay yaong may masasamang rekord, iresponsable sa baryo, dating treyni sa army at yaong may malapit na kamag-anak o kaibigan sa reaksyonaryong militar.

Nang maabot ng rebolusyonaryong kilusan ang mga baryo sa kinatatalagahan ng mga impiltrador ay ganoon na

lang ang kanilang pagpapanggap na masigasig. Nasaman-tala ng kaaway ang mabilis na pagpapalawak na ginawa ng mga aktibistang masa mula sa karatig na baryo. Matapos ang 1981, mayroon ng sampung impiltrador na nakaabot at nakapamuno sa mga sangay ng Partido sa kani-kanilang baryo, at anim naman ang nakaabot sa komiteng pang-organisa sa baryo bago sila nagpultaym. Samantala, 3 impiltrador ang nakapuslit nang hindi dumaan sa anumang organisasyong masa. Kalagitnaan ng 1980 ay may tatlong impiltrador na kumikilos na ng pultaym sa isang Pangkat ng Kadre (PK). Mula noon nakabwelo ang mga ito sa paglalata ng kanilang network sa mga baryo sa nasasabing erya. Huling bahagi ng 1981 ay nakapasok na ang 26 na impiltrador sa sangay ng Partido sa lokalidad at sa PK.

Upang makakakilos ng pultaym sa mga yunit ng hukbo at mga PK, ginamit nila ang rekomendasyon ng sangay ng Partido sa baryong pinanggalingan nila. Binigyan din ng rekomendasyon ang mga impiltrador na nauna nang magpultaym.

Para kagyat na makasampa, idinadahilan ng karamihan sa kanila laluna yaong wala sa paman-tayan ang pagiging mainit sa kaaway. Mangyari pa, taktika nila ang kunwaring pagkubkob sa kanilang bahay; pagpapatampok ng kanilang pangalan bilang kumander ng NPA; at masyadong malapit at mapag-asikaso sa mga namumunong kadre upang lalong higit na tumatag ang katayuan nila sa rebolusyonaryong kilusan bilang mga tunay na rebolusyonaryo.

Unang kwarto ng 1982, nakapuslit na ang mga impiltrador sa dalawang komite ng seksyon at isang komite sa distrito. Nakapaglatag din sila na ilang SYP at sa dalawang ganap na yunit gerilya. Ilang mga impiltrador ay naitalaga sa tatlo pang distrito. Nagsisimula na rin silang maglatag ng network ng sila'y ating matuklasan.

Bukod sa nangyari sa Hilagang CS, nagpursigi din ang ibang intelligence community tulad ng NISA, R-2, at mga local na pwersa ng PC-INP na mag-impiltra sa ating

hanay. Bago mahati ang 1982, natuklasan ng komite ng Partido sa distrito ng BP ang dalawang mandirigma na, mga impiltrador na noon pang sila'y "makatakas" mula sa kamay ng kaaway. May malalim silang oryentasyon mula kat Capt. Rudy Rudolfo ng 232 PC Coy. Isang ahente naman ng NISA na galing sa isang mainit na baryo sa Ragay ang lumipat at nasalo at pinakilos ng mga kasama sa CN. "Pinatakas" naman ng 242 PC Coy na may dalang ripleng M-16 ang isang dating organisadong kabataan upang makasampa lang sa hukbong bayan. Nagtanim din ang kaaway ng mga ahente sa hanay ng mga manggagawa sa trosohan upan manmanan ang kilos ng mga kasama sa lugar. Maging ang peti-burges sa mga sentrong bayan ay hindi nakaligtas sa pakana ng kaaway. Si Col. Jose Reyes Dasal ng NISA at si Tenyente Eduardo Claro ng ISAFP ay mga matataas na opisyal ng intelligence na nakisalamuha sa ating mga alyado. Tiniktikan nila ang paglawak ng rebolusyonaryong kilusan sa hanay ng petiburgesya habang minomonitor nila ang nangyayaring impiltrasyon sa loob.

Oryentasyon ng Impiltrador

Ang impiltrasyon ay nagsisilbing paghahanda para sa isang malakihang kampanyang militar. Lubhang napakagastos para sa reaksyonaryong sandatahang lakas ang malalaking operasyong militar kaya't inilatag muna ng mga impiltrador ang mga impormasyon bago nila simulan ang kampanyang militar.

Lahat nga mga impiltrador ay binigyan ng pangkalahatang oryentasyon sa kanilang tungkulin at paraan ng pagkilos. Ang mga indibidwal na misyon ay isinapartikular na lamang batay sa naging disposisyon ng mga impiltrador.

Ang pangkalahatang oryentasyon ay ang sumusunod:

1. Alamin ang mga namumunong kadre ng Partido sa rehiyon, larangan, distrito at seksyon. Kunin ang tunay na pangalan kasaysayan at lugar na pinanggalingan.

2. Alamin ang mga kasapi ng Partido sa baryo, mga saligang organisasyong masa, poste at kuryer sa bawat baryong kinikilusan at saan-saang punto sumi-simpatiya sila sa rebolusyonaryong kilusan.
3. Alamin ang lakas tauhan, lakas pamutok, komand, mga teknika at taktikang militar na ginagamit at mga plano sa operasyon ng mga yunit ng Bagong Hukbong Bayan.
4. Alamin ang mga dinadaanang ruta at linya ng transportasyon sa dagat.
5. Alamin ang pagkilos sa hanay ng estudyante, guro at iba pang panggitnang pwersa sa kanayunan at mga sentrong bayan. Alamin ang mga nagbibigay sa kilusan at anu-anong suporta ito.
6. Sikapin na makapagnakaw ng mga mahahalagang dokumento para maibigay sa militar.
7. Magrekluta ng mga maniniktik sa hanay ng mga pultaym at mga taga-baryo.
8. Mag-ulat ng mga pulong/konsentrasyon laluna ng mga namumunong organo at mga planong militar upang mabanatan ito.
9. Manabotahe sa mga programa ng pagkilos ng Partido at hukbong bayan.
10. Magmungkahing madisposisyon sa mga ganap na yunit gerilya at iba pang estratehikong yunit/organo.

Angkaramihan sa mga impiltradorna nakapasok ay mga "deep penetration agent." May oryentasyon sila na huwag tuwirang babanat sa mga kasama at sa halip ay kagyat na iulat ito para ang mga tropa ng kaaway ang bumira. Mahalaga ito sa pagpapanatili nila ng mga matagal sa loob ng rebolusyonaryong kilusan, maliban lamang sa mga kasong may pagkakataon silang makabanat ng mga namumunong kadre nang hindi nabibisto. Samantala, may mga "action agent" din na may partikular na misyon at target sa namumunong kadre. Kapag nakita niya at nagkaroon ng pagkakataon ay babanatan niya at kagyat na tatakas.

Kakaiba naman ito sa misyon ng isang impiltrador ng NISA. Ang oryentasyon sa kanya ay magbuo ng kahiwalay na hukbo mula sa kanyang marereklutang pultaym na kadre at mandirigma na magsasagawa ng krimen at pananabotahe sa hukbong bayan at masa.

Batay sa planong kaaway, darating ang mga panlabang yunit ng AFP sa hangganang Quezon-Bikol sa buwan ng Enero-Abril 1982. Ito ang magiging hudyat ng pagtakas ng mga impiltrador para epektibong magamit ng militar sa kanilang pagdurog sa rebolusyonaryong pwersa. Ang iba sa kanila ay babanat muna ng mga responsableng kadre bago bumaba. Ipopropaganda ang kanilang pagtakas bilang mga sumukong NPA at ang iba muling magsasanay bago sumanib sa pwersa ng kaaway. Ititip ang mga konsenstrasyon ng mga ganap na yunit gerilya at mga pulong ng mga namumunong kadre para makubkob ng kaaway. Pipilitin lang mga tukoy na kasap ng Partido at mga organisasyong masa na sumukop para sa kanilang kilusang balik loob. Ang mga ito ay epektibong gagamitin sa kanilang psychological operations (psy-ops). Malawakan ding magbubuo ng mga yunit ng ICHDF sa mga poblasyon at mga baryo.

Grandyoso ang plano ng kaaway sa QBZ. Hibang na ambisyon nila ang padapain ang Partido at Hukbong Bayan sa rehiyon.

Paglalatag ng Network ng Impiltrasyon Mula sa Hanay ng mga Kadreng Pultaym at mga Tagabaryo

Nang makapuslit ang mga impiltrador, sinikap nilang magrekluta mula sa hanay ng mga kadre at mandirigmang pultaym. Inilatag din ang kanilang network sa mga baryong kanilang kinikilusan. Mahalaga ito upang maging malawak at mabisa ang kanilang paniniktik at mapabilis ang pasahan ng impormasyon na nagmomonitor na kaaway.

Karaniwan sa kanilang nirekluta ay yaong mga kasamang bagong sampa; may hinanakit sa pamunuan; may

problema sa pamilya, kasintahan at kalusugan; at may mga kamag-anak sa militar. Dinidikitan sila nang husto at intensibong pinopropagandahan upang higit na bumagsak ang moral. Idinidiin nila ang mga kahirapang dinadanas sa rebolusyonaryong kilusan samantalang napapabayaan naman ang kani-kanilang mga pamilya sa kanilang propaganda, ipinamamarali na maliit ang posibilidad na magtatagumpay ang demokratikong rebolusyon ng bayan. Sinusuhulan nila ng pera, damit, pantalon at relo. Sa mga tiyak nilang nakuha, hihikayatin nilang huwag nang umalis sa rebolusyonaryong kilusan, manapa'y bibigyan nila ng trabaho at sweldo bilang mga ahente ng gobyerno na maniniktik sa loob ng rebolusyonaryong kilusan.

Sa kanilang mga nalinlang, tiniyak nilang makasama-sama parati upang maalalayan at mahigpit na binabalaan na hindi magpapaabot sa mga kasama sukdulang patayin kapag nalagay sila sa panganib.

Ang kanilang nireklutang impormer sa mga baryo ay yaong mga kumontra sa rebolusyon; mga problemado sa baryo at matamlay makipagtalakayan sa mga kasama. Kapag may tumanggi sa kanilang makipagsabwatan ay nagiging panganib sa kanilang seguridad, kanilang pinapatay at pina-paratangang masamang elemento o impormer sa baryo.

Sa bawat impiltrador ay may kani-kanilang linya kung saan ipapasa ang mga ulat. Sa umpisa, karaniwang ipinapasa nila sa pangunahing nagrekluta sa kanila sa pamamagitan ng "rebolusyonaryong sulatan." Malimit kumustahin ang kanilang mga "espesyal na kadre" at idinadaan pa sa poste ng rebolusyonaryong kilusan. Kung minsan ay nilalakipan nila ng isa pang sulat para sa militar. Ang mga pangunahing impiltrador naman ay may tiyak na poste at kuryer patungo sa kampo ng kaaway.

Habang nagtatagal ay nailatag nila ang "relay" ng mga ulat sa lahat ng baryong kanilang nararating. Nitong huli, sinikap nilang mahimok ang mga kapitan at mga guro sa baryo na maging poste at kuryer.

May mga pagkakataon na tuwiran silang nakapag-ulat

sa mga kampo ng militar sa pamamagitan ng nag-iisang “pagdalaw” sa kanilang pamilya at “pagpapagamot.”

Upang madali silang makilala ng mga tropa ng kaaway, gumagamit sila ng mga “password” at senyas. Nang mapalaban ang yunit ni Mark, nagsisigaw siya ng “M-14, M-14!” Kapansin-pansin din ang pagusuot ng unipormeng patig ng isang impitrador gayong matagal na ipinagbabawal ito sa mga pulang mandirigma.

Pagkilos at Pananabotahe ng mga Impitrador

Nabisto ng Partido ang mga impitrador sa pagpanggap nilang mga rebolusyonaryo. Pag-aralan natin ang mga kahina-hinalang kilos at ang karaniwang paraan ng pananabotahe nila sa ating rebolusyonaryong gawain.

1. Lantarang nilabag ng mga impitrador ang ating maka-uring linya sa kanayunan. Ang karaniwang inugnayan, dinidikitan at inorganisa ay matataas na saray, lumpen sa baryo at mga may kamag-anak sa militar. Ang masasamang impluwensiya ng mga elementong ito ay nagdulot ng kaguluhan at karaniwang humantong sa pagkabuwag ng mga saligang organisasyong masa.

2. Sa mga pangkat ng kanilang pinamumunuan, pinigil nila ang atas ng namumunong organo na maglunsad ng malawakang propaganda tulad ng OP-CD. Maging ang mga rebolusyonaryong pahayagan at babasahin ay hindi ipinamahagi sa masa. Nitong kamakailan lang, natuklasan ng mga kasama ang mga sakong babasahin na nakatago sa lalao.

3. Matingkad ang hindi pag-unlad ng mga gawain. Karaniwang nakikita ang mga pangkat na impluwensyado ng impitrador na nakabase sa iilang bahay ay walang ginagawa. Ang pag-aaral ng PAKUM ay kahit papaano na lamang ibinibigay. Matingkad din ang hindi pag-lutas sa mga suliranin ng masa at mga saligang organisasyong masa hanggang sa paglala ng suliranin.

4. Sa mga lugar na kanilang kinikilusan, pinipigil ang paglulunsad ng rebolusyonaryong agraryo laluna doon sa mga malalaking panginoong maylupa. Ipinatigil ang pagpapalusot at ang pagkuha ng porsyento para sa hukbo mula sa pakinabang ng masa. Gayunman, sa mga lupa ng maliliit na panginoong maylupa at ilang popesyonal, pinursigi naman nila ang pagpapalusot kahit hindi gasinong organisado ang masa.

Naglatag ng ganitong kondisyon upang maantagonisa at mapahiwalay ang kilusan sa panggitnang pwersa; Samantala, inilulong naman ang masa sa ekonomismo. Malaki ang nakuha nilang pera mula sa tinakdang buwis sa panginoong maylupa at negosyante ng hindi naman isinangguni at isinesentralisa sa mga kasama.

5. Sinabotahe ng mga impiltrador ang mga planong militar ng BHB. Ang mga inirekomenda nilang tao para sa paglalatag ng lambat ng paniniktik para sa operasyong militar ng hukbong bayan ay pawang mga impormer at may kaugnayan sa militar. Kaya paltos lahat ng mga plano ng ganap na yunit gerilya na bumanat sa tropa ng kaaway. May pagkakataon pang nalagay sa panganib ang mga pangunahing yunit sa kubkob ng kaawa

6. Madugong krimen nila ang pagpapatip sa ilang yunit partisan na ikinasawi ng isang mandirigma. Pananagutan nila ang mga bulilyasong kubkob ng kaaway sa mga konsentrasyon ng mga yunit gerilya at ilang pag-aral ng mga kasama. Sila rin ang may pakanang maramihang hulihan at pagpaslang ng mga susing masa sa mga baryong kanilang panamugaran.

7. Ninakaw na mga impiltrador ang mga mahahalagang sulat. Kung minsan ay mabasa muna bago ipasa sa kinaukulan.

8. Mahilig sila sa pagkilos ng nag-iisa nang walang kolektibong pagkakaisa. Maluwag sa seguridad at malimit lumabag sa disiplina at alituntunin ng Hukbong Bayan. Mal-

akas ang kanilang liberalism at hindi mahusay ang aktitud sa punahan.

Mga Hakbangin ng Partido sa Pag-aayos ng Problema sa Seguridad

Huling kwarto ng 1981 nang matuklasan ng Partido ang buktot na pakana ng kaaway sa rebolusyonaryong kilusan ng QBZ. Nagsimula ito nang madulas ang isang “aktibista” mula sa panggitnang pwersa na kasama sa itatayong legal na organisasyon sa isang distrito na siya’y ISAFP agent. Nalaman agad ito ng mga gumagabay na kadre subali’t hindi nabigyan ng mahalagang pansin.

Nang malaman ito ng namumunong organo sa larangan, kagyat na pinalalim ang pagsisiyasat at kinuha ang kanyang rekord ng pagkatao at pampulitika. Nakumpirma siyang miyembro ng ISAFP na nais mag-impiltra sa legal na organisasyong ating itinatayo. Gayunman, umabot pa ng ilang buwang pag-aaral bago pinagpasyahan ang pag-aresto at pag-iinteroga sa kanya. Nagbuo ng isang espesyal na grupo na kinabilangan ng mga responsableng kadre ng larangan at distrito para isagawa ito. Walang nakuhang mahalagang impormasyon maliban sa pinagdiinan niya na alam ng kasama ang pagpasok niya sa ISAFP at ang layunin niya ay upang alamin din ang kilos ng kaaway bilang dobol agent.

Ang “hiningian niya ng pahintulot” upang pumasok sa ISAFP at mga pultaym na naging malapit sa kanya ay inilagay sa mahigpit na pagsusuri. Sa mga naihanay, dalawa ang natukoy at pinarusahang impiltrador at dalawa ang tumakas at tuwirang nakipagtulungan sa kaaway.

Inakala ng Partido sa QBZ na nalansag na ang impiltrasyon. Gayunman, ipinagpatuloy pa rin ang maging pagsusuri at pag-aaral sa hanay ng mga pultaym laluna sa mga kadre at mandirigma na nanggaling sa lugar na pinamugaran ng mga pinarusahang impiltrador. Kaalinsabay nito ay nagbuo ng isang “Task Force Ragay

Aid” upang banatan ang mga tropa ng militar at ang isa ng impiltrador na nakatakas at nangunguna sa mga operasyong militar. Namahagi rin ng manipesto sa mga kasamang pultaym at nasa baryo ukol sa ating tagumpay sa muling pagbigong balak ng kaaway na wasakin ang kilusan sa lugar, sa pamamagitan ng impiltrasyon. Nananawagan din tayo na sumuko na sa atin ang iba pang mga kasabwat nila sa kalagayang nabanatan na ang mga utak nila. Sa praktika walang kusang lumpait upang sumuko.

Noong Pebrero 1982 ay nasukol ang isa na namang ahente ng kaaway mula sa istap sa kabataang-estudyante ng isang distrito. Sa pamamagitan ng matiyaga at mahusay na interogasyon at pakikitungo sa kanya, ibinulgar niya ang isang susing impiltrador na nasa panlarangang yunit gerilya. Sasusing impiltradornaito, nakuha ang pinakamalaking bahagi ng operasyon ng impiltrasyon sa rehiyon. Ipinamukha sa ating ng mga pangyayaring ito na suhetibo ang naging pag-aakala na nalansag na ang impiltrasyon. Bagama’t nabanatan ang puno mismo ng Operasyon Libogs na si Lt. Eddie Claro (Marsha) at isang kasabwat niya, marami pa palang ringleaders na nakapasok at napakaraming dapat isagawa para masabing nalansag na natin ang impiltrasyon sa rehiyon. Isang matinkad na aral ang mahahango natin mula dito. Sa bawat kaso ng impiltrasyong madidiskubre dapat maglunsad agad ng Background Investigation (BI) o Security Check (SC) sa lahat ng mga pultaym at mga kasapi sa baryo, lalo na yaong sa iba’t ibang paraan, pagkakataon at kadahilanan ay nagkaroon ng ugnayan sa nadiskubrenang impiltrador. Mahalagang malalim na masuri ang lalim at lawak nang naganap na impiltrasyon. Higit na kapakipakinabang para sa atin ang mga maging ekstrang mapagmatyag, matiyaga at lihim na magsuri habang inaangkuhan ang lahatang panig na rebolusyonaryong kilos kaysa maging kampante at magkasya na lamang sa suhetibong pag-aakala. Sa mga ganitong usapin lagi nating isaisip na ang nakataya dito ay ang seguridad ng Partido, BHB at rebolusyonaryong masa na sinumpaan natng pangalagaan, buhay man nati’y iaalay kung

kinakailangan.

Dahil sa lalim at lawak nang nadiskubrengh impiltrasyon batay sa itinuga ng mga pinarusahang impiltrador, itinakda ng nakakataas na organo ang mga hakbangin sa pagsasaayos ng problema sa seguridad ng rehiyon. Ang mga hakbanging ito ay ang mga sumusunod:

1. Pagbubuo ng mga espesyal na investigation team (IT) sa bawat distrito upang gawing puspusan, malaliman at malawakan ang mga hakbangin sa paglansag ng impiltrasyon, habang patuloy na ginagampanan ang lahatang panig na rebolusyonaryong gawain.

2. Paglilinis sa hanay ng mga pultaym na kasapi ng Partido at BHB.

3. Paglalagom ng resulta sa paglilinis sa hanay ng mga pultaym at pagiisa ng buong kasapian ng Partido at BHB ukol dito.

4. Paglilinis sa hanay ng mga kasama't masa sa baryo.

5. Paglalagom ng pagsasakatuparan ng mga hakbanging itinakda sa paglansag ng impiltrasyon at ang pagsasadokumento't pagpapalaganap nito.

Alinsunod dito, itinayo ang mga IT sa bawat distrito. Pangunahing binigyang diin ang isang distrito na siyang nakakasaklaw sa mga baryo ng naging launching pad o lunsaran ng impiltrasyon. Binuo ang bawat IT ng mga kagawad ng KD, ilang myembro ng KLA at RKT. Ang mga pamantayang itinakda sa pagpili ng mga kagawad ng IT ay ang mga sumusunod:

1. Tiyak na malinis ang rekord o di-kasangkot sa nadiskubrengh impiltrasyon.

2. May kaalaman sa pangkasaysayang pag-unlad ng naging pagkilos sa mga lugar na sinusuri.

Tiniyak ang mahigpit na pagpapatupad ng mga pamantayang ito sa pamamagitan ng malalalimang pagtalakay sa rekord ng pagkatao at pampulitika ng mga napili.

Kaalinsabay ng pagtayo ng mga IT ay binuo rin ang mga taktikal na sentro sa bawat distrito. Sila ang pangsaman-

talang nangasiwa sa pang-araw-araw na gawain sa teritoryo, habang di pa natatapos ang isinasagawang paglilinis sa hanay ng mga pultaym. Binuo ang mga ito ng mga nasuring malinis ang rekord ng mga kagawad at iba pang kadre mula sa kagyat na nakakababang organo na pinamumunuan nito.

Ang tungkulin ng IT ay ang mga sumusunod:

1. Siyasatin ang rekord ng pagkatao at pampulitika ng lahat ng pultaym na kasapi ng Partido, pinuno at mandirigma ng BHB.

2. Tukuyin ang mga impiltradong nalalang na yaong mga nasa baryo, mga pag-aralang kaso at iba pang katulad nito at magrekomenda sa komite sa larangan ng angkop na parusa.

3. Alamin ang aktwal na lawak sa lalim ng impiltrasyon. Laluna ang kalaman ng rebolusyonaryong pwersa ng kaaway at magharap ng mga hakbangin.

4. Buuin ang padron ng impiltrasyon at tukuyin ang mga kamalian at kahinaan ng Partido na nasamantala ng kaaway. Mahalagang matukoy din ang baryo o mga baryong naging launching pad o lunsaran ng impiltrasyon. Ipinakita ng karanasan na ang karamihan sa mga nagpultaym na mula sa mga baryong ito sa saklaw ng panahon ng operasyong ng mga impiltradador ay mga nareklutang ahente ng kaaway.

Ang bawat IT ay nagbuo ng kanya-kanyang istap sa seguridad (IS) at istap ng komunikasyon (IK). Ang mga ipinaloob dito ay yaong mga nasuri na ang rekord at napatunayang walang kinalaman sa nadiskubreng impiltrasyon. Ang IS ay kalimitang binuo ng mga kumander at pulang mandirigma ng mga Ganap na Yunit Gerilya (GYG). Tungkulin nitong pangalagaan ang seguridad ng IT at tumulong sa pag-aresto, pagbimbim, paginteroga at pagpaparusa sa mga impiltradador. Tinutugunan din nila ang pagsasaayos ng mga teknikal sa pangangailangan tulad ng kampo, mga pagkain at iba pa. Ang IK naman ang tumitiyak sa mabilis at ligtas na daloy ng komunikasyon sa pagitan ng RKT at taktikal na sentro ng distrito sa isang dulo at sa IT sa kabila. Dapat

mabigyan ng oryentasyon lang mga istap ukol sa proseso ng gagawing paglilinis at ang partikular na papel na gagampanan nila dito. Ang mahusay na pagkasapol ng mga istap sa batayan at paraan ng isinasagawang paglilinis ay mahusay na kondisyon para mapawi ang pagduduhan at kumilos nang nagkakaisa batay sa kumpas na itinatakda ng IT. May mga karanasang ang kakulangan sa puntong ito ay nagbunga ng pagdududahan at panghihina ng ilan sa paggampan ng gawain.

Ang mga IT ang pangunahing nagsagawa ng pag-aaral, pagtukloy sa mga kompirmadong impiltrador, pag-aaresto, interogasyon at pagpaparusa sa mga ringleader at mga aktibong ahente ng kaaway. Ang KLA at RKT ang nagpapasya kung parurusahan o nyunyutralisahin (bibigyan ng amnesti) ang isang impiltrador batay sa ulat at rekomendasyon ng IT.

Malinaw sa Partido na ang mga napatunayang impiltrador sa kalahatan ay kaaway. Ang kanilang kawalang katapatan, paglilihim ng kanilang pagkatao at pananabotahе sa organisasyon ng Partido, hukbong bayan at rebolusyonaryong masa ay subersyon sa kasaysayan ng pagsulong ng pakikibaka sa rehiyon.

Gayunman, hinati natin sa dalawa ang pagturing sa mga impiltrador. Inilagay natin sa pangunahing target na gagawaran ng rebolusyonaryong kaparusahan yaong higit na mapanganib tulad ng mga ringleaders at/o myembro ng AFP, aktibong rekruter ng mga ahente sa loob sa labas ng organisasyon o nareklutang aktibo at may nagawang pinsala o nagsikap na maminsala sa ating hanay.

Pumapangalawa ay yaong nasa labas ng unang kategorya tulad ng mga bagong rekluta o di aktibong nagpapagamit sa kaaway. Ang ating naging patakaran sa kanila ay pagnyunyalisa. Matapos komprontahin ukol sa kanyang kinalaman sa impiltrasyon ay itiwalag sila sa Partido at maaring isagawa ang mga sumusunod batay sa kabigatan mng kaso:

1. Panatilihin sa yunit ngunit di bibigyan ng mapag-

pasyang posisyon at sandata, mahigpit na babantayan at ng diin ang kondisyon para makaugnay sa sentro ng kaaway.

2. Ibalik sa baryo at hindi na isasama sa mga saligang organisasyong masa.

3. Palayu in na sa larangang gerilya at di na pabalikin.

Sa mga nyinutralisa o binigyan ng amnesti sinikap natin na magkaroon ng garantiya na di na siya magpapagamit sa kaaway at di gagawa ng pinsala sa Partido, hukbong bayan at masa. Pinakapektibong garantiya ang mismong pag-amin ng kanyang krimeng ginawa bilang impiltrador. Pumapangalawa lamang ang garantiya ng mga kamag-anak na may mabuting katayuan sa kilusan.

Matapos ang unang bugso ng paggagawad ng rebolusyonaryong kaparusahan sa mga impiltrador noong Disyembre 1981, sunod-sunod na nagbabaan ag iba nilang kasamahan. Nauna sa kanila ang mga mahihina ang loob habag ang marami'y naghihintay pa ng tyempo. May ilan rin sa kanila ang naghihinayang dahil di pa sila napasususpetsahan ng Partido. May pinabalik pa ang militar na dalawang impiltrador upang alamin ang nangyari sa kanilang mga nawalang kasamahan. Samantala, dalawa pa ang sumampa upang ipagpatuloy at maglatag ng panibagong network ng kaaway.

Maingat at masinop na natukoy ng IT ang mga pakanang ito at kagyat na inaresto, initeroga at ginawaran ng kaparusahan ang mga pusakal ng impiltrador. Mula Disyembre 1981 hanggang Hulyo 1982, 32 na impiltrador ang pinarusahan, 15 ang nyinutralisa at 9 ang nakatakas. Ang mga pinarusahan ay mga ringleaders na may malalim at masaklaw na oryentasyon sa militar hinggil sa operasyon ng mga impiltrador kasama na yaopng mga rekluta lang nila pero aktibong nanabotahe.

Karamihan sa mga pinarusahan ay mga ahente na bago pa man maugnayan at makapagpultaym sa kilusan. Mayroon na silang masaklaw at malalim na oryentasyon mula sa militar. Marami sa kanila ang nakapagtreyning bilang army at/o ahente. Halos lahat ay mahigpit na dalawang taong

nauugnayan o napapakilos sa baryo hanggang, magpultaym at mabisto.

Mga Matitingkad na Aral sa Pag-Aresto, Pagbimbim, Interogasyon at Pagparusa sa mga Napatunayang Utak ng Impiltrasyon

Unang isinagawa ng mga IT ang pagkuha ng lahat na nakasulat na talambuhay (rekord ng pagkatao at pampulitika) ng lahat ng kasapi ng Partido at BHB na pultaym at yaong mga nasa baryo. Naglabas ng detalyadong gabay para dito. Reorganisasyon ang ginawang dahilan ng pagpapasumite ng talambuhay. Di dapat malantad na ang pagkuha ng talambuhay ay kaugnay ng isinasagawang paglilinis.

Batay sa mga impormasyong itinuga ng mga pinarusahang impiltrador at sa tulong ng mga inipong talambuhay at mga datos mula sa mga responsableng kasama ay inihanay-hanay ang mga sinusuri sa mga sumusunod na klasipikasyon:

1. Pangunahing itinuga ng 2 o higit pang mga impiltrador, tukoy na ringleader o utak, aktibong nanabotahe, rekruter ng mga ahente.
2. Pumapangalawa – itinuga ng isa pa lang na impiltrador, tukoy na kasangkot pero di utak, maraming malalabong datos ukol sa kanyang pagkatao at pagkilos.
3. Pumpapangatlo – di itinuga at di-utak pero nagkaroon ng ugnayan sa iba't ibang kadahilanan at pagkakataon sa mga impiltrador at maraming malalabong datos ukol sa kanyang pagkatao.

Sa pagsusuri ng mga datos, iniliwanag gawing pangunahing batayan ang mga haka-haka at mga datos na sirkumstansyal. Tinitiyak na ang mga datos ay kumpirmado at nakakatindig sa sarili. Isa sa pinagkaisahang maaring pagbatayan ng pagkukumpirma kung impiltrador o hindi ay kung itinuga na siya ng 2 o higit pang impiltrador na nasusuportahan ng mga kumpirmado at nakakatindig na datos.

Sa pagpipinal ng desisyon ng IT kaugnay ng rekomendasyon sa RKT at KLA sa mga parurursahang impiltrador ay lagging sinisikap na maging unanimous o nagkakaisa ang lahatang kagawad.

Kailangan ang ekstrang pagmamatyag, paglilihim at pag-iingat sa isinasagawang paglilinis. Itinatakdang matapos na ang buong kaparaanan ng paglilinis bago ipabatid ang naging resulta nito sa mga di nasangkot sa impiltrasyon. Gayunman, sa praktika di naiwasang makahalata o maapektuhan ang ilan kaya nagtatanong sila at kapag di malinaw na nasagot ay lumilikha ng pagdududahan mismo sa ating hanay. Sa ganitong kalagayan, mas nakakabubuting sa kaparaanan pa lamang ng paglilinis ay agad nang ipabatid sa mga nasuring malinis ang rekord ang mga pinakahuling resulta nang isinasagawang paglilinis, lalong lalo na kung ang sinusuri o pinarusahan ay kilala nila o nakasa-kasama nila sa pagkilos. Mas pinahalalagan natin sa puntong ito ang positibong dulot ng ganitong paraan, tulad ng makakatulong pa ang mga dagdag na makakaalam sa pagpapalalim ng pagsusuri sa mga ipinaialalim sa BI o SC. Gayunman, dapat na mahigpit na isaalang-alang ang negatibong aspeto nito tulad ng di kinakailangang pagpalaganap ng isinasagawang paglilinis na maaring makaabot sa kaalaman ng kumpirmadong impiltrador, at makalikha pa sila ng mga pinsala o makatakas kaya bago pa man natin siya madakip o maparusahan.

Pag-aresto

Walang aarestuhin na di kolektibong pinagdedesisyunan ng NT at RKT o KIA. Ang pangunahing layunin ng pag-aresto ay hindi na upang suriin kung impiltrador o hindi kundi upang makunan na lamang ng impormasyon dahil tiyak na tayo. Kaya nga't ang mga inaaresto ay yaong mga dinisyunan nang gawaran ng rebolusyonaryong pasya kung tumuga man o hindi. Ganoon pa man, bukas ang

Partido na baguhin ang desisyon kung mapapasubalian ang mga datos na pangunahing pinagkabatayan ng paggawad ng kaparusahan.

Sa aktwal na pag-aresto dapat isaalang-alang ang mga sumusunod:

1. Sa pagkuha sa implitador mula sa lugar na kanyang kinikilusan patungo sa pook-bimbina para interogahin bago parusahan, mahalagang gumamit ng kapaniwalang dahilan tulad ng "kakausapin ng nakakataas ng organo para sa panibagong disposisyon kaugnay ng reorganisasyon." Ang dapat sumundo sa kanya ay ang kadreng talagang nangangasiwa sa kanyal. Iwasang GYG ang sumundo, dahil sa karanasan ay naaalarma ang aarestuhin at agad nagtatangkang tumakas. Kaya ang nangyayari ay di na naiinteroga dahil napipilitan nang barilin. Mas mahusay na ipaiwan na sa kinabibilangang yunit ang nakaisyung sandata sa kanya sa pamamagitan ng pagsasabing "sa katatalagahang bagong yunit na lang siya muling iisyuhan." Kailangang mapalabas na matagal-tagal na di makaksulat o makakabalik sa dating lugar na kinikilusan sa pamamagitan ng pagpapalaganap na "tuluy-tuloy na sya sa tatalagahang bagong yunit." Ito ay para di maalerto ang iba pang mga kasapakat niya. Siempre marami pang ibang mga panlalansing maaaring mapanlikhang gamitin, basta ang mahalaga'y dis-armado na ang aarestuhin at di makaalerto sa mga iba pa.
2. Bago pa dumating ang impitador na aarestuhin sa pook-bimbina, dapat tukoy na ang lugar kung saan siya padadapain at gagapusin. Gayundin, nakaayos na dapat ang posisyon ng mga kasama upang walang matakbuhan ang impitador sakaling magtangka siyang tumakbo. Dapat ay handa na rin ang tali at tata-li. Kung tutuusi'y maliliit na usapin na lamang ito pero minamahalaga pa ring banggitin dahil may mga karanasang di mahusay ang tali o pagkakatali kaya naka-

takas ang ilang bihag.

3. Tiyaking wala na sa impiltrador ang kanyang sandata bago aktwal na padapain at gapusin pagdating sa pook-binbinan. Iniiwasan nating makapanlaban pa siya. Karaniwang karanasan bago padapain ay hinihiram muna ng isang kasama ang baril upang kunwari'y tingnan o gamitin sa "pagtae" habang ang kapalit na baril ay nasa lugar na di niya kayang makuha agad.

Pagbimbin

Sa kalagayang ang pangunahing layunin ng pagaresto ay mainteroga muna ang impiltrador bago parusahan, naging mahalagang usapin ang pagbimbin sa kanya habang iniinteroga. Pangunahing nilutas sa usaping ito ang suliranin kung paano matitiyak na di makatakas ang isang bihag.

Para matiyak na di makatakas ang isang bihag habang siya'y nakabimbin at iniinteroga, mahusay na ipatupad ang mga sumusunod:

1. Mahigpit na bantayan ang bihag sa loob ng 24 oras. Dapat tandaan walang iniisip at minamatyagan ang bihag kundi kaunting paglingap natin para makatakas siya o di kaya'y makalikha pa ng pinsala.
2. Tiyaking ang tali ay di nakakalag. Dapat itali ang paa at kamay sa paraang di naabot ng kanyang kamay ang paa kahit bumaluktot.
3. Mahigpit na ipatupad ang patakarang, "Huwag pagmalupitan ang mga bihag." Malaking tulong sa pagpapalambot sa mga bihag para tumuga ang mabuting pagtrato sa kanila.
4. Kung kinakailangang magkasabay na bimbini ang 2 o higit pang mga bihag, tiyaking di sila magkakaalaman. Magkakaahap lang sila kung hinihingi ng pangangailangan kaugnay ng interogasyon.

5. Walang dapat makapasok na ibang kasama o masa sa pook-bimbina para maiwasan ang pagkabulgar ng mga gawaing isinasagawa dito. Mas mahusay kung mayroong mga nahahandang alternatibong pook-bimbina para agad malipatan kung mabulgar o malagay sa pangani ang ginagamit na pook.

Interogasyon

Matapos arestuhin ihaharap na sa interogasyon ang bihag. Pangunahing layunin nito na makuha ang mga mahahalagang impormasyon na makakatulong sa lubusang paglansag sa impiltrasyon. Matingkad na usapin dito, kung paano mapatutuga ang iniinteroga.

Itinuro ng karanasan ang mga sumusunod na paraan para mapatuga ang isang impiltrador:

1. Magtalaga ng isang pangkat na mag-iinteroga (GI, grupong interogador). Sila ang mamumuno ng interogasyon mula umpisa hanggang katapusan.
2. Mahalaga ang masusing pag-aaral ng GI sa lahat ng mga datos ukol sa kaso ng bihag bago simulan ang interogasyon. Titiyakin ng ganitong paraan ang koordinado, matiyaga at makabukuhang interogasyon. Koordinado dahil matitiyak ang suportahan ng bawat interogador sa kaparaanan ng interogasyon; matiyaga dahil maitatagda nito ang kahalagahan ng mga dapat makuhang impormasyon kaya mapanlalabanan ang kapusukan at pagkainip sa tuluy-tuloy na maligoy na pag-iinteroga; at makabuluhan dahil matututukan na lamang sa interogasyon ang mahahalagang punto at maiwasan ang pagkalulong sa mga di-kinakailangang detalye. Kaya't dapat ay handa na rin at

pinagkaisahan na ang mga puntong didiinan sa interogasyon at ang papel na gagampanan ng bawat kagawad ng GI, kung sino ang aasang “mabait na ninong” at ang magpapanggap na “kilabot (magpapakita ng pagkainip o lag-ing magmumungkahing banatan na ang bihag kapag ayaw magtuga o nagmamatigas)” sa harap ng bihag. Ang pagtatakda kung sinu-sino ang mga ito ay batay sa pagkakakilala sa mga kagawad ng GI ng iinterogahing bihag. Ang pagksapol ng GI sa buong larawan ng ginagawang interogasyon ay makakatulong ng malaki sa mabilis na pagtatapon ng mga tanong at komentaryo sa mga inilalahad ng iniinteroga.

3. Dapat may nakahandang balangkas ng mga paksang sasaklawin ng interogasyon, tulad ng mga sumusunod:
 - a. rekord ng pagkatao at pampulitika
 - b. petsa at dahilan ng pagpasok bilang ahente, misyon, rekruter, paraan ng pagkilos o pagtupad ng misyon, sweldo at rango sa AFP.
 - c. network na ginamit at mga impomasyong ipinaabot sa kaaway.
 - d. mga alam na plano ng kaaway laban sa kilusan
 - e. mga narekluta at nirerekluta
 - f. mga kilalang impiltrador at at impormer sa baryo
 - i. pangalan at rekord ng pagktao at pampulitika
 - ii. petsa at dahilan ng pagpasok bilang ahente, rekruter
 - iii. misyon at paano ipinatupad ito, sweldo at ranggo
 - iv. mga pangyayaring kinasasangkutan

- v. mga narekluta at nirerekluta
 - vi. mga impormasyong ipinaabot sa kaaway.
4. Pinakamahalaga ang tiyaga at kahusayan sa psywar ng interogador. Karaniwang hindi agad tumutuga ang bihag. Ang mga sumusunod na paraan ang napatunayang epektibo para mapatuga ang isang iniinteroga:
- a. Kumbinsihing “palalayain” sabihin lang ang lahat ng kanyang nalalaman. Idini-diin na di na ang pag-amin niya ang ating kailangan dahil tiyak na tayong impilitrador siya. Kundi ang pagtatapat na lamang ng lahat ng alam niya (na sa katunayan ang ilan ay alam na rin natin).
 - b. Pagtukoy ng ilang utak na bistado na niyang naaresto at sinasabi nating itinuga na siya nito at sa katunaya’y nakikipagtulungan na sa atin ang nasabing tumugang utak nila kaya binuhay at kasalukuyang binibigyan ng reedukasyon.
 - c. Pagtapon ng mga matitibay na datos na sapat para masukol siya at mapilitang magtapat. Maaaring ibato rin sa kanya ang kumpirmado nating mga datos na tiyak nating alam niya. Masusubok natin kung nagsasabi siya ng katotohanan lalo na’t nagsimula siyang tumuga ng maraming impormasyon.
 - d. Pagharap sa nagtuga sa kanya para kumbinsihin siya mismo nito na magtuga na rin. Sa praktika ay malaki ang naitulong nito para madaling mapatuga ang bihag dahil nasusukol agad siya at nagsisilbing halimbawa pa sa kanya na binubuhay ang mga nagtutuga at nakiki-

- pagtulungan.
- e. Paglalahad ng mga magagandang pangako kapag pinalaya na natin siya matapos magtuga. Halimbawa nito ang reedukasyon, paglalayo ng tirahan, susulatan ang pamilya para sumunod sa kinalalagyan niya, bibigyan ng pamasahe, paglalantad sa kaaway na nakipagtulungan siya para di na siya gambalain pa uli ng kaaway at muling gamitin.
 - f. Pagdala sa hukay, bilang pagdidiin sa kanyang talagang babanatan natin siya kapag di pa tumuga. Habang nasa hukay kinukumbinsi pa ring tumuga na. Kapag nangakong tutuga na ay ibinabalik uli sa lugar ng interogasyon para kunin ang mga itutuga niyang impormasyon. Kapag di pa nagtapat di na paaalisin sa hukay at diretso nang banatan.
5. Rebolusyonaryong panlalansi ang pinakapektibong paraan ng pagpapatuga. Mahigpit na ipinagbabawal ang paggamit ng pambubugbog at anumang porma ng pananakit bilang paraan para mapilitang tumuga ang bihag. Sa karanasan, lalong tumitigas ang isang bihag kapag sinaktan dahil sumasaksak sa isip niya na papatayin rin naman siya kahit tumuga at tayo mismo ang nagdududa sa katotohanan ng kanyang mga itinutuga. May karanasang ginamitan ng pambubugbog ang ilang bihag para tumuga, nagtuga naman, pero sa kalaunan napatunayan nating gawa-gawa lang niya ang mga itinuga niya at di totoo.
 6. Sa kaparaanan ng interogasyon, iwasan ang pagsawsaw ng iba liban sa GI sa pag-iinteroga. Kalimitan ay nakakasira sa mahusay na takbo ng interogasyon ang pagsawsaw ng iba dahil

- di naman nila alam ang buong larawan ng kaso at pag paghahandang ginawa para sa interogasyon.
7. Karaniwang nagpapalipas ng gabi bilang alawans sa bihag na makapagisip-isip matapos ang isang buong araw na tuluy-tuloy na interogasyon. Karaniwang kinabukasan ay napapagtuga na ang bihag. Gayunman, may bihag na pinatagal nang halos 5 linggo at paulit-ulit na isinailalim sa interogasyon at ginamit na pagpapatuga ng mga kasabwat niya.
 8. Sa mga madaling makumbinsing magtugatingnan ang posibilidad na magamit siya para mapaahon ang militar para mabanatan natin makumpiskahan ng armas.
 9. Kailangang pormal na nakasulat at kung kakanayan ay nakateyp-record ang buong proseso ng interogasyon. Mahalaga ito para sa masinop na pagsusuri ng lahat ng mga impormasyong itinuga kaugnay ng pagtukoy ng padron ng impiltrasyon at iba pang kaugnay na usapin. Maagap na ipaabot sa mga apektadong yunit at organo na nasuring nanganganib ang seguridad batay sa mga impormasyong tinuga ng iniinteroga.

Aktwal na Pagparusa

Matapos mapiga ang lahat ng mga mahahalagang impormasyon at di naman nakikitang maari siyang gamitin para magpaahon ng kaaway na pwedeng mabanatan ay pina-parusahan na ng kamatayan ang impiltrador. Mahalagang maisaalang-alang ang mga sumusunod sa aktwal na pagparusa:

- a. Kailangang maging lihim na lihim ang gagawing pagpaparusa at paglibing. Malinaw na di dapat ilan-

- tad ang bangkay ng pinarusahang impiltrador.
- b. Tinitiyak na ayos na ang hukay bago pa man banatan ang impiltrador. Ito ay para makatiyak na maayos ang gagawing paglilibing. May karanasang kinatatamaran na ang gawaing ito.
 - c. Mahigpit na ipinagbabawal ang sadistang paraan ng pagpatay. Hindi dahil ang pagiging impiltrador ng papatayin para pakawalan ng ilan ang mga mabuting gawi.

Nagkaroon din ng ilang kalabisan sa pagpaparusa ng mga impiltrador. May isang kaso na naparusahan ng walang sapat na batayan. Ang tanging pinagbatayan ay itinuga siya ng isang gustong humingi ng damay na impiltrador. May kaso nang sumuko at malayang naglahad ng kanyang nalalaman sa pakana ng mga kaaway. Maaaring pinatawad na lang ito at nyinutralisa. May kaso ring binanatan agad ang isang rekomendado ng IT na banatan na di pa nakukumpirma ang ilan pang mga datos na dapat kumpirmahin bago banatan.

Kaugnay nito, naging matingkad na usapin kung bibigyan ng aksyong disiplina ang mga kasamang nagrekomenda at nagdesisyon sa mga kalabisang ito. Nakitang kaso por kaso pa rin ang pagtingin dito. Kung ang naging batayan ng desisyon ay simpleng pagganti lamang ng mga nagdesisyon sa binanatan dahil sa ilang personal na alitan, tiyak na may kabigatan ito at dapat bigyan ng karampatang aksyong disiplina. Kung usapin lang naman ng suhetibong pagtaya at bumabatay pa rin sa sa mga impormasyong pinanghahawakan mula sa pagsusuri, kailimitan ay mabigat na pinupuna ang mga ganitong tipo ng suhetibismo na naging dahilang ng kalabisan.

Paglansag ng Network ng Impiltrasyon sa mga Baryo

Sa kaparaanan ng paglinis sa hanay ng mga pultaym ay natutukoy na rin ang mga impiltrador at impomer sa baryo. Sa karanasan mas mahusay kung maagapang mabanatan

agad ang mga natutukoy na utak lalung-lalo na yaong mga maaaring makunan ng makabuluhang impormasyon para higit na makumpirma ang lalim ng pagkasangkot ng isang impiltrador na nagpultaym. Naging mahalagang usapin ito sa isang distrito dahil may mga nasuring alyado na kabilang sa mga ringleader o aktibong nanabotahe sa kilusan. Gayunman ang karamihan sa mga pinarusahan at sinikap parusahan ay isinagawa matapos ang malaking bahagi ng paglilinis sa hanay ng mga pultaym.

Sa paglansag ng network ng impiltrasyon sa baryo, pangunahing atupagin ang pagpaparusa sa mga natukoy na utak o susing ahente na aktibong nangangalaga ng network. Kalimitan sila ang mga dugong-utang at aktibong nakikipagtulungan sa kaaway laban sa atin. Sa pagpaparusa sa kanila, dapat gawing lihim (o estilong missing) kapag di lantad na ahente at di pa hiwalay sa masa. Maaaring ilantad ang pagbanat sa mga lantad na ahente at hiwalay na sa masa basta't kakayaning saluhin ang mga kasama't masa sa baryo ang ganting-aksyon ng kaaway.

Ang mga kasangkot sa impiltrasyon na di naman utak at wala pang dugong utang ay nyunyutralisahin na lang matapos komprontahin at matiyak ang garantya na di sila makakapaminsala o muling paggamit sa kaaway. Dapat din silang bigyan ng mahigpit na babala.

Kaugnay nito ang mga pamilya at kamag-anak ng mga pinarusahang impiltrador na kalimitan namang naka-kaalam ng ginagawang impiltrasyon ng kanilang kamag-anak o kapamilya na impiltrador ay kakausapin at ipapabatid sa kanya ang ginawa nating pagparusa at mga batayan kung bakit natin ginawa iyon. Bukod sa malilina sa kanila ang pangyayari ay manyunyutralisa sila para di magamit ng kaaway laban sa atin.

Mga Kamalian at Kahinaan ng Partido ng Nasamantala ng Kaaway

Nabigo natin ang kaaway sa pakana nilang wasakin mula sa loob ng rebolusyonaryong kilusan sa QBZ. Gayunman, mahalagang matukoy natin at mahanguan ng aral ang mga kahinaan at kamalian ng Partido na sinamantala naman ng kaaway upang sila'y makapuslit sa ating hanay.

1. Sa pagtugon sa panawagan ng Partido na magpalawak, pinalarga natin ang mga aktibistang masa sa pagbutas sa mga baryong karatig na ating kinikilusan. Dahil sa kakulangan ng kadre, tumagal ng ilang buwan bago napuntahan ng yunit ng BHB ang mga baryong pinapalawakan ng mga aktibista. Dahil sa kasalatan sa karanasan, kaalaman at paraan ng pagkilos; mabilis at walang pagsasaalang-alang ang kanilang pag-ugnay at pag-oorganisa. Madaling nakapuslit ang mga bayarang ahente sa ating mga organisadong masa sa pamamagitan ng pagpapanggap nilang "masigasig na masa na matagal nang nag-aantay sa pagdating ng BHB."

Dapat balansihin ng namumunong organo ang ating pagpapalawak sa konsolidasyon. Wasto lamang na magpakilos tayo ng mga aktibistang masa sa pag-ugnay subali't kailangan nating mahigpit silang gabayan at subaybayan. Kung sapat na ang lawak ng lugar, pwedeng pasukin na ito ng yunit ng hukbong bayan upang sila na ang magpatuloy ng gawaing pampulitika. Sa puntong ito'y laging tandaan ang panawagang, "Buong tapang na magpalawak nang walang pinapapasok kahit isa man lang na di kanais-nais na elemeto."

2. Hindi tayo nakapagsagawa nang tuluy-tuloy na panlipunang pagsisiyasat at pagkilala sa pagkatao ng mga nasa saligang organisasyong masa at sangay ng Partido sa baryo laluna yaong mga ipinasa ng mga aktibistang masa. Nagkasya tayo sa

paimbabaw na kaalaman at napaniwala tayo sa “kasi-gasigan” ng mga bayarang ahente. Sapagkat masa ang siyang kadluan ng ating mga kadre at mandirigma, dapat nating makilala sila bago isanib sa alin-mang organisasyong masang ating pinamumunuan.

Matingkad sa nangyari ang hindi pagkilala ng mga kadre at yunit ng BHB sa masang kanilang kinikilusan. Sa naganap na impiltrasyon, 15 ang nakapagtreyning sa Army bago sila kumilos ng pul-taym. Kailangang maging masikhay sa pagsisiya-sat sa organisasyong masa at sangay ng Partido sa baryo maging kung ito’y sa antas ng konsolidasyon.

Kaugnay pa rin ng pagsisiyasat, naging mababaw ang pag-alam natin sa mga naganap na kubkuban, bulabugan at salvaging at “pagtakas” ng mga kasamang nahuli. Kung nabigyan natin ng mahalagang pansin ang mga ito upang malalim na masi-yasat at mapag-aralan, noon pa sana ay nagkaroon na ng linaw ang mga “misteryo” at maaga nating natuk-lasan ang impiltrasyon.

3. Naging liberal tayo sa pagpapasampa ng mga kadre at pulang mandirigma. Karamihan sa mga impiltra-dor na napasampa ay dumaan sa kaparaanan at ini-rekomenda ng Pangkat Kadre at sangay ng Partido sa baryo. Ang naging kahinaan ng komiteng distri-to sa siyang nagtitibay sa pagpapasampa ay ang hindi malalim na pagsusuri sa pagkatao at rekord pampulitika ng mga pinahihintulang magpultaym.

Bukod sa nakapagtreni, karamihan sa kanila ay kamag-anak ng militar, lumpen at lasenggero sa baryo. Kung nasuri lamang ito nang madalian, hindi sila papasa sa mga pamantayan na itinakda ng KLA sa mga nagnanais magpultaym. Mahalagang mag-diin tayo sa pagpapasampa mula sa batayang masa at may mahusay na rekord at respetado sa baryo.

Ilan din sa mga napasampa ang wala sa pamantayan. Nakapagpultaym sila dahil sa

“mainit sa kaaway.” Gumawa ang militar ng kondisyon upang sila’y uminit sa pamamagitan ng “pagkubkob” sa kanilang bahay, pagpapatampok ng kanilang pangalan bilang kumander ng BHB at “pagtakas” at pang-aagaw baril mula sa kampo militar.

Tandaan natin na ang rebolusyonaryong paninindigan ay iniluwal at higit na pinatatatag ng rebolusyonaryong praktika. Mahalagang dumaan sa wastong kaparaanan at pagsubok ang mga nagnanais magpultaym. Kung mainit na sila sa baryo at wala pa sa pamantayan para magpultaym ay idisposisyon muna sila sa ibang baryo at subukan sa mga SCM doon.

Hindi dapat isama-sama ang mga masang mainit sa buong erya na kinikilusan ng yunit ng hukbo at pangkat ng kadre. Sa ganitong sistema nagsimula ang mga impiltrador. Nalalantad sa kanila ang ating saligang organisayong masa at mga sangay ng Partido sa baryo ng hindi naman kinakailangan.

4. Bukod sa pagpupursigi ng ibang intelligence community na makaimpiltra sa organisasyon sa ibang distrito ng QBZ, lumalaganap ang sunog ng impiltrasyon sa pamamagitan ng paglilipat ng mga kadre at mandirigma sa ibang distrito. Mula sa isang distrito, narating ng mga impiltrador ang tatlo pang distrito.

Hindi tayo naging maingat sa pagtatalaga ng kadre at mandirigma para sa iba’t ibang lugar at larangan ng gawain. Dahil dito, naabot pa ng mga impiltrador ang dalawang GYG at napasok din ang panlarangan at isang pandistritong istap sa komunikasyon. Nakapagpasa pa tayo ng isang impiltrador sa istap ng komite ng Partido sa karatig na rehiyon. Hindi dapat bigyan nang masaklaw at maselang gawain ang mga bagong pultaym at mga di pa subok na kasama.

Pansinin natin ang pagod at sinayang panahon ng mga ganap na yunit gerilya sa paglulunsad ng mga taktikal na opensiba na laging nabubulilyaso dahil sa

pananabotahe ng mga ahente ng kaaway na nasa loob ng yunit gerilya. Nalagay din sa panganib ng kubkob ng kaaway ang ating mga pangunahing yunit gerilya.

Hindi rin maitatatwa na nalagay din sa panganib ang mga namumunong kadre dahil nakasama-sama nila ang impiltrador na naitalaga sa mga istap ng sentro. Kung tutuusin, sila ang pangunahing target ng mga impiltrador.

5. Naging maluwag tayo sa muling pagtanggap ng mga diumano'y nakatakas na mga kasama mula sa kamay ng kaaway. Gayundin sa mga nanggaling sa ibang lugar na nagsasabing dati na silang kumilos o pinakilos ng mga kasama doon. Epektibong nasamantala ng kaaway ang kaluwagang ito para madaling makapasok bilang impiltrador ang mga kusang pinatakas nang bumaligtad na mga dating kasama at ang mga ahenteng nagpanggap na dati silang kumikilos sa pinanggalingang lugar.
6. Sa mga nakatakas mula sa kamay ng kaaway at dapat agad ipailalim sa mahigpit na BI o SC. Magpalalim tayo ukol sa naging sirkumstansya ng kanyang pagkahuli, ginawa sa kanya ng kaaway, rekord sa loon ng bilangguan at kung paano nakatakas. Ganito rin ang dapat gawin sa mga nagsasabing dati na silang kumilos o pinakilos sa pinanggalingang lugar. Maagap na sulatan ang mga kasamang kumikilos sa lugar na sinasabi niya ukol sa katotohanan ng kanyang mga sinasabi. Habang lihim na sinisiyasat sila ay ipagkatiwala muna ang mahigpit na pagsubaybay at pagsubok sa kanila sa ilang piling kasama sa baryo.
7. Ang kawalan ng nakasulat na paglalagom sa mga nakaraang kaso ng impiltrasyon noon 1976 at 1977 ay naging salik upang di sistematikong maipalaganap ang mga aral na nahango mula sa mga ito. Dahil dito't naging inosente ang karamihan sa mga kadre at kasapi sa usapin ng impiltrasyon bilang pakana na ginagamit ng kaaway para wasakin tayo. Ang ka-

inosentehang ito ang isa sa mga naging salik kung bakit maluwag na nakapagmaniobra ang mga nakapasok na impiltrador sa kabila ng kakrduhan ng pananabotahe ng ilan sa kanila. Di naging mapagmatyag ang mga kasapi san kadreng inosente sa usapin ng impiltrasyon at sa katunaya'y naging kam-pante nang may napupunang kakaiba at kahinahinalang ikinikilos ang kanikang kasakasama ay binabalewala na lamang o sinasabing, "magtiwala sa kasama" para di problemahin ang mga nabubong pagdududa.

Mahalagang mabigyan ng komprehensibong kaalaman ang lahat ng kadre at kasapi ng partido't BHB ukol sa impiltrasyon bilang pakanang ginagamit ng kaaway para wasakin tayo mula sa loob. Sa ganito'y higit silang magiging mapagmatyag. Ang paglalagom na ito ay pagtiyak na mapunuan ang nakaraang pagkukulang at matugunan ang pagbibigay ng komprehensibong kaalaman ukol sa impiltrasyon.

M-GLOR
Pebrero
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English Translation

The Quezon-Bicol border was the target of multiple massive infiltrations from the last quarter of 1979 until the first quarter of 1982. This was the enemy's most massive, profound, and systematic plot to infiltrate and destroy the Party, the people's army, and the revolutionary mass organization in the history of the revolution in the region.

This was incomparable to what happened in 1976

when an active agent got himself into an armed propaganda team and in the waves of arrests in 1977.

This widespread infiltration happened when our people's war shifted towards the advanced sub-stage of the strategic defensive. The enemy wanted to suppress the rapid advance of the armed struggle of the revolutionary mass movement in the region. In the past, the state could not impede our advance through intense operations and military campaigns. They used different tactics to train to attain their evil aims. It is the delirious ambition of the US-Marcos dictatorship to end the Party, the people's army, and the revolutionary mass movement through fierce military attacks and infiltration among the ranks of the revolution.

We cannot separate this infiltration issue from the extensive and intense counter-insurgency operations the enemy is conducting on the Quezon-Bicol border. This was confirmed by captured spies who moved into the region as part of the Armed Forces of the Philippines' 16th and 45th Infantry Battalion. This is the ongoing tactic of the fierce military operations that are part of the counter-insurgency campaign.

The enemy had set up a vast network of paid infiltrators who wormed into basic Party cells at the barrio (village) level, in two committees at the section level and one committee at the district level. The enemy has also sent paid agents to infiltrate the New People's Army (NPA) from the armed propaganda units to the guerilla platoons and companies at the front and district levels. They also reached the technical staff at the field and admitted another agent to the technical staff of the Party in the neighboring region.

Apart from the assassination of the region's leading Party cadres and NPA commanders, the spies also sabotaged our political work, the purpose of which was to gather intelligence information about Party movements, NPA operations, and activities of the revolutionary masses. These become the bases for subsequent military plans.

The Party discovered this plot of the enemy in late 1981. We immediately launched a cleansing campaign for

the Party and the people's army. We were able to promptly stop the operation of these paid agents of the enemies in the Party and the people's army and punish these felons and confirmed infiltrators.

Despite breaking this network of infiltrators in the region, we must also recognize that a multitude of them have successfully joined our ranks. They have endangered our decade-long effort to establish and move the armed struggle of the revolutionary masses. If the enemy succeeded, it would retake years of work before we could get back to where we started.

Critical lessons must be learned from this event. This document will try to tell the story of what happened, starting with how the enemy planned the infiltration until the plot's demolition. It will show how the enemy took advantage of the Party's weaknesses, limitations and mistakes. It will also lay out the primary lessons we learned from arresting, imprisoning, interrogating, and punishing the ring leaders, or brains, behind this infiltration operation.

The entire Party organization and the people's army must learn from this document. We cannot allow a repeat of what happened just because we did not have any systematic knowledge of how the enemy had used infiltration to destroy us and thus was able to be all over the place, lording it over with flourish and braggadocio for an extended period. Meanwhile, on many occasions, they were able to sabotage operations crudely and openly.


The Process of Building a Network of Infiltrators inside the Organization

We will present here the history of the infiltration program based on a series of events. We culled this from the interrogation of punished enemy agents.

In 1978, the enemy calculated that the New People's Army would be able to expand to the lowlands of Ragay,

Camarines Sur. They prepared for this immediately. In June 1979, the Intelligence Services of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) launched a team campaign covering the entire Quezon-Bicol region. They named the campaign “Crush the Philippine Revolution (“Lipulin ang Rebolusyonyang Pilipino”).⁴ An ISAFP campaign team was assigned in Camarines Sur (Code Name: Operation Libogs) and another in Quezon del Gallego.⁵ The campaign leader was Colonel Nicasio Cordova.

Below is the organizational structure of the campaign:



Around this time, the Party was occupied with reorganizing after the troubles caused by Apolinario and the “fire” that affected the regional center in 1977.⁶ It had launched this rectification movement to correct the mistaken ideas being spread by Apolinario. Confronted also with a very nar-

4 This might have been a play at the *Lipunan at Rebolusyong Pilipino* (Philippine Society and Revolution), a book penned by Amado Guerrero (*nom de guerre* of CPP founding chair, Jose Maria Sison), which served as the “textbook” of the Party and the movement.

5 Libog is a district in Albay Province, while Del Gallego is a municipality of Camarines Sur province

6 The “fire” here refers to sweeping AFP operations that either led to the arrests or deaths of many in the top leadership.

row area of operations, the Party called for a fast expansion. Everyone, even the mass activists from the barrios (villages), responded to the Party's appeal. The enemy could exploit this "subjective desire" of the Party to expand fast and the limitations of the mass activists and sneak in several paid enemy agents inside the revolutionary movement.

From 1977 to 1980, the enemy recruited people from the barrios and provided them with Army training. The enemy paid them wages and promised they would be made regular soldiers with appropriate ranks if they could accomplish their mission. The training was followed by a briefing, after which they were sent back to their barrios to prepare for the expansion of the NPA. Majority of these recruits were those with criminal records, the village black sheep, former military trainees, and those who had relatives or friends in the reactionary military.

Once the revolutionary movement reached the barrios where the infiltrators were assigned, the latter actively executed their con. The enemy was able to exploit the rapid expansion achieved by mass activists in the neighboring barrios. By the end of 1981, 10 infiltrators became heads of the party branch in their respective barrios, while six had become members of the barrio organizing committees before going full-time. Meanwhile, three infiltrators could sneak in without joining any mass organization. In the middle of the 1980s, three infiltrators were operating full-time as part of the cadre corps (Pangkat ng Kadre). They were able to expand their network in barrios in the area. By the end of 1981, 26 had infiltrated the Party Branch in the locality and among the ranks of cadres.

They would use the recommendations of the Party branch, which then came to be able to operate as full-time members of NPA and Party units. They also used the recommendations from fellow infiltrators who came ahead of them. For them to be able to rise to the ranks, many of them, without providing any evidence, used the excuse that the military was onto them. Their tactic included claiming that

the military had trapped them in their homes, that they were tagged as NPA commanders, or that they desired to be close and take care of senior cadres to cement their commitment to the revolutionary movement as true revolutionaries.

In the first quarter of 1982, two infiltrators had become members of two section committees and one district committee. They also set up several armed propaganda units (sandatahang yunit pampropaganda) and two full-time guerilla units. Some of these infiltrators were able to get themselves assigned at the district level. They also started to set up and spread their networks until they were discovered. Apart from what happened in the northern CS, other military intelligence services like the NISA, Region-2 and local units of the PC-INP infiltrated our ranks.⁷ Before the middle of 1982, the BP district's Party committee discovered two guerrillas who were infiltrators who claimed they were able to "escape" from the hands of the enemy. They were thoroughly briefed by a Captain Rudy Rudolfo of the 232 PC company. A NISA agent from Ragay, a barrio suspected by the military of being a pro-guerrilla community, was transferred and rescued by comrades at the CN and activated again. The 242 PC company made up the "escape" of a former activist, who brought an M-16 rifle to prove his "sincerity" in joining the NPA. The enemy had also managed to deploy infiltrators among workers in the timber industry to monitor the movement of comrades in the area. Even the petty bourgeois in many town centers could not escape the enemy's plot. Col. Jose Reyes Dasal of the NISA and Lt. Eduardo Claro of the ISAFP were some senior officers who could mingle with our allies. They kept watching the expansion of the revolution among the petty bourgeoisie while monitoring the progress of the infiltration campaign.

⁷ NISA stands for the National Intelligence Security Agency, while PC-INP is the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police.

The Infiltrator's Perspective

Infiltration was a necessary step for a wide-ranging military campaign. This major operation was quite expensive for the reactionary armed forces, which is why it was important for the infiltrators' network as a precondition for initiating the military campaign.

All the infiltrators were given a general orientation of their responsibilities and operating methods. Individual missions were mainly based on which positions they ended up with as infiltrators. The following are the features of this general orientation:

1. Create a profile of the leading Party cadres of the region, the front, districts, and sections. Get their real name, biographies, and places of origin.
2. Collect information about the Party members in a barrio, the basic mass organizations, lookouts and couriers in the barrio they were operating, and how the barrio folks sympathized with the revolutionary movement.
3. Determine the human resources, firepower, commands, military techniques and tactics used, and plans of operation of NPA units.
4. Gather intelligence on the water and sea routes of the area;
5. Investigate the status of Party organizing among the students, teachers, and other middle forces in the countryside and the town centers. Find out those who provide for the movement and the kinds of support that they provide.
6. Try to steal primary Party documents, which can be passed on to the military
7. Recruit spies among the barrio full-timers.
8. Report meetings of senior cadres or instances where they are in one place so that the military can plan an attack;
9. Sabotage activities of the Party and the NPA

10. Request to be assigned to regular guerilla units and other strategic units or organs.

Most of the infiltrators were "deep penetration agents." Their modus operandi was not to attack comrades directly but to report them to troops who will then take care of them. This was essential because their mission was to stay inside the revolutionary movement for extended periods. Of course, if the opportunity was there and did not compromise their cover, the agents were given the go-ahead to kill a senior cadre. There were also "active agents" whose mission included eliminating leading cadres. If he saw a chance to do so, he was to kill the cadre and then escape.

NISA had a different strategy. This was to form a separate NPA unit consisting of full-timers the agent had successfully recruited and then engage in criminal acts and sabotage the NPA and the masses. The enemy planned to deploy Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) combat units at the Quezon-Bicol border between January and April 1982. This will signal the infiltrators to leave the area so that the military can effectively destroy the revolutionary forces. Some of them will eliminate leading cadres first before escaping. Those who escaped would be declared rebel returnees, having returned, allegedly, to the fold of the law as military propaganda. Soon, some would return to military training before formally integrating into enemy forces. They would also tip the military to where guerrilla units were concentrated or where NPA meetings were so the enemy could attack them. They would also try to convince specifically targeted Party members and organized masses to surrender as part of their *balik-loob* campaign. All these will be tactics that the enemy's psychological operations (say-ops) team will use. Finally, the military would also set up different units of the Integrated Civilian Home Defense Force (IDF) in the municipalities and the barrios.

The enemy had grand plans for the Quezon-Bicol Zone (QBZ). Their enthusiastic ambition was to destroy the Party and the People's Army in the region.

Establishing the Infiltration Network among the Ranks of Full-Time Cadres and Barrio People

Once inside, the infiltrators began to try to recruit people from the ranks of the cadres and the Red Fighters. They also set up the networks in the barrios where they were operating. These were essential measures for them to be able to engage in espionage and quickly transmit as much information as possible to their coordinators.

They usually recruited members who recently joined the revolutionary movement; those who held a grudge or two against the leadership; those who had family, love, and health problems; and those who had military relatives. They stuck to these people as close as possible and subjected them to intense propaganda to break down their morale. As propaganda, they reminded their recruits of the difficulties they experienced in the revolutionary movement that also resulted in their neglect of their families. They also hinted to these potential recruits that the victory of the national democratic revolution was improbable. They bribed their targets with money, clothes, pants, and watches. They encouraged those they had recruited not to leave the revolutionary movement, with the promise of employment and salary as government agents who would keep a close eye on the movement.

They kept those they managed to deceive close to them, giving them advice and repeated warnings not to reach out to their comrades or be killed if they put their handlers in danger.

The informers they recruited in the barrios were against the revolution, had troubles in the community, and were unenthusiastic in their engagements with comrades. Those potential recruits who refused the military were threatened. The military murdered them and labeled them harmful elements or military informants in the barrio. Each infiltrator had the means of sending back reports. At first, they usually handed these to their first recruits in the form of a "revolutionary letter." They often asked about the status of

“special cadres,” and they sent messages through mail drops of the revolutionary movement. At other times they added one more letter specifically addressed to the military. The primary infiltrator, in turn, had access to a secure post and the enemy’s allies.

After a while, they could lay out a system of “relays” for reports about the barrios they had reached. They recently tried to convince the barrio captains and teachers to act as conduits or couriers. There were even instances where they could directly report to the military by pretending to be visiting their families or getting treatment at the town center. In order that enemy troops would not mistake them for rebels, they agreed to use “passwords” and signals. When Mark’s unit was involved in a military encounter, he kept shouting, “M-14! M-14! M-14!” Comrades noticed the fatigue uniforms that an infiltrator wore, even if this was already long prohibited for the red fighters.

Acts of Sabotage by Infiltrators

The Party could blow the cover of the infiltrators who pretended to be revolutionaries. Let us study their suspicious actions and usual methods to sabotage our revolutionary work.

1. The infiltrators brazenly violated our class line in the rural areas. They often linked up, directed, and organized the upper ranks of the lumpen in the barrios and relatives of the military. The evil influence of these elements brought about confusion and often led to the destruction of basic mass organizations.
2. In units under their control, they blocked the directives of the higher organs to launch area-wide propaganda like that of the OP-OD. They did not share revolutionary newspapers and readings with the masses. Just recently, comrades discovered one sack of reading materials hidden under their midst.

3. The non-progress of their work was evident. Groups influenced by infiltrators often stay in a few houses doing nothing. PAKUM education was applied willy-nilly. Their refusal to solve the problems of the masses and the basic mass organizations was also very evident.

4. In areas where they were operating, they were thwarting efforts to launch the agrarian revolution, especially in areas where there were big landlords. They deter the collection of the percentage for the people's army from the contribution of the masses. However, they tried their best to collect percentages from the ranks of small landlords and some professionals even if the masses needed to be sufficiently organized.

They created these conditions to antagonize and alienate the movement from the middle forces. Meanwhile, they immersed the masses in economism. They were able to collect vast amounts of taxes collected from the landlords and businesses, which they did not report nor remit to the comrades

5. The infiltrators sabotaged the NPA's military plans. They recommended fellow informers with military experience to be part of an intelligence network for military operations. This was the reason why all the plans of our guerillas against the enemy failed. There were times when leading NPA units were in danger of enemy attacks.

6. One of their bloody crimes was to tip the military about the movement of an armed partisan unit which led to the death of one fighter. They would be held responsible for the failed enemy siege on some guerrilla units, and some of the lessons comrades culled from these [experiences]. They were also responsible for the mass arrests and murder of key members of the masses in the barrios they stayed in.

7. The infiltrators also stole sensitive letters. Some-

times they would read these reports before passing these to comrade addresses.

8. They liked to act individually and did not have a sense of collective unity. They were highly liberal and did not do well during criticism-self-criticism. They were loose with security protocols and often violated the discipline and rules of the people's army.

Steps the Party took to Correct Security Problems

The Party discovered this evil plot of the enemy against the revolutionary movement at the Quezon-Bicol border in the late quarter of 1981. It all began when an "activist" from the middle forces who were part of a planned district legal organization slipped into revealing that he was an ISAFP audience. Cadre advisers learned of this but did not treat this as necessary.

But once the front's leading organ heard of this, it immediately launched an investigation and acquired his personal and political record. It confirmed that the activist was indeed a confirmed ISAFP member who wanted to infiltrate this legal organization we were forming. However, the inquiry still took a couple of months before the decision was made to arrest and interrogate him. We set up a special group consisting of the most responsible cadres from the front and the district to pursue the investigation further. No critical information was acquired save for his insistence that comrades knew he was joining ISAFP to turn himself into a double agent.

The group then turned its attention to the comrades whom "he asked permission from" to join the ISAFP and other full-time cadres who became close to him. Two more infiltrators were discovered and readily punished, but two managed to escape and were now openly aiding the enemy.

The Party at the Quezon-Bicol Border thought that the infiltration scheme was broken with their discovery.

However, comrades continued to investigate closely and monitor the movement of full-time cadres and guerrillas from where the exposed infiltrators operated. At the same time, the Party also set up the "Task Force Ragay Aid" to attack military units where one of the escaped infiltrators was playing a leading role. A manifesto was distributed to full-time cadres and those operating in the barrios, informing them of the Party's success in foiling the plots of the enemies to destroy the movement in their place by infiltrating their ranks. We also called on those who collaborated with them to surrender, telling them we had already eliminated the masterminds. Of course, no one approached us to surrender.

Last February 1982, we were able to arrest one more enemy agent operating in the youth-student groups in one district. Thanks to our patience and effective interrogation, he gave away the name of a key infiltrator who was part of a front guerrilla unit. This key infiltrator gave away the largest network of the region's infiltrators. These incidents showed us that the assumption that the infiltration network was demolished was subjective. While we were able to kill Lt. Eddie Claro (Marsha) and several of his companions, we realized that there remained many ringleaders operating inside who must be dealt with before we can say we destroyed the network. We had to set up background investigations (BI) or security checks (SC) for every case of infiltration discovered among full-timers and comrades in the barrio, especially for those who were determined, through various means, opportunities, and motives to be engaged with exposed infiltrators. It would be helpful for us to be extra vigilant, patient, and critical while maneuvering around our all-sided revolutionary action rather than being complacent and simply relying on our intuition. In these issues, let us all be reminded that the security of the Party, the New People's Army, and the revolutionary masses is paramount and that we vowed to protect their well-being, even if it calls for offering our lives.

Due to the depth and spread of the infiltration, as

shared with us by the interrogated spies, the higher organ laid out the steps needed to improve the region's security. These were the following steps:

1. Set up special investigation teams at the district level to pursue a sustained, in-depth, and extensive effort to destroy the infiltration. We continue to pursue the struggle stridently.
2. Conduct cleansing operations in the ranks of the full-time cadres of the Party and the New People's Army.
3. Assess the results of cleansing spies among the full-timers and unifying the entire Party membership and the NPA.
4. Undertake the cleansing of spies in the ranks of comrades and the masses in the barrios
5. Assess and implement the steps to destroy the infiltration, its documentation, and its proliferation.

Soon after, the investigating teams (ITs) were set up in the districts. Attention was first directed at a district of the barrios where the infiltrators were first discovered. Each IT consisted of heads of the district committees, certain members of the KLA, and the RKT. The requirements for being appointed to the IT were as follows:

1. Those with clean records and were not linked to any of the uncovered infiltrations.
2. Familiar with the personal and political records of those being investigated.
3. Knew the history of the movement in the area being investigated.

We made sure that these requirements were strictly followed by a systematic discussion of the personal and political records of those selected. We also set up tactical centers in the districts to work alongside the ITs. These oversaw daily work in the territory on an ad hoc basis until the cleansing operations among the full-timers were completed. The members of these tactical centers were members of district committees and those who were leaders of lower

organs determined to have clean records. The responsibilities of the IT were as follows:

1. Review the personal and political records of all the full-time members of the Party and NPA leaders and fighters.
2. Identify the infiltrators operating in the barrios, investigate them and their collaborators and recommend the appropriate penalty to the front committee.
3. Determine the extent and the depth of the infiltration, mainly how much the enemy knew about the revolutionary movement and what steps were needed.
4. Come up with a complete picture of the infiltration and determine the mistakes and weaknesses of the Party that the enemy exploited. Knowing which barrio or barrios served as the launching pad or jump-off point for the infiltrators is vital. Experience showed that enemy agents recruited many full-timers from these barrios covered by the anti-infiltration campaign.

The IT set up their security staff (IS) and the communications staff (IK). These consisted of cadres known not to know about the infiltration. The IS was often composed of the commanders and red fighters of the full-time guerilla units (ganap na unit gerilya, GYG). Its responsibility was to provide security for the IT and assist in the arrest, detention, interrogation, and punishment of infiltrators. They also took care of the technical arrangements and needs like setting up camp, food, etc. The IK ensured that communications were speedy between the RKT and the district tactical centers at one end and the IS at the other. The staff must be given the appropriate orientation on how the purges will work and their role in making that possible. The staff's firm grasp of the basis and methodology of the clean-up operations are necessary to eradicate all sense of doubt and mistrust of each other. They will enable concerted action as dictated by IT. There had been instances where the failure to understand this orientation entirely had led to doubts and a weakening of

resolve among comrades tasked to accomplish the mission.

The ITs will be the lead group in investigating, exposing confirmed infiltrators, arresting and interrogating them, and punishing the ringleaders and those who are active enemy agents. The KLA and the RKT will decide whether an infiltrator will be punished or neutralized (be given amnesty) based on the IT's recommendations. The Party is definite in its belief that a confirmed infiltrator is generally an enemy. Their false, clandestine identities and sabotaging of the Party organization, the people's army, and the revolutionary masses are attempts to sabotage the historical advancement of the struggle in the region.

However, there are also two ways in which we regard infiltrators. Our prime targets for revolutionary retribution are those we consider the more dangerous, like the ringleaders and members of the AFP, those actively recruiting inside and outside the organization, or those who are active recruiters. They have committed or attempted to commit harm among our ranks.

The second are those who do not fall under the first category, including recruits and those rarely used by the enemy. Our policy is to neutralize them. After we confront them on what they know about the infiltration, we expel them from the Party and may impose the following on them based on the gravity of their offense.

1. Retain them in their units but not be appointed to critical positions nor be given any arms, be closely watched, and prevent being put in a situation where the suspect could reestablish contact with the enemy.
2. Return the suspect to the barrio and disallow them from being a part of the basic mass organization.
3. Ordered them to leave the guerilla zone permanently.

We made sure that those who were neutralized or granted amnesty would not allow themselves to be exploited by the enemy and not commit any acts of sabotage against the Party, the people's army, and the masses again. The best

guarantee is the admission of the crimes they committed as infiltrators. The guarantee of their relatives in the movement with a clean record is only secondary.

After the first series of revolutionary retributions were meted out in December 1981, we witnessed a steady withdrawal of their co-conspirators from the guerilla zone. The first to flee were weak-willed, and the others were waiting for the right opportunity to escape. Several of them dithered because they believed they had not yet aroused suspicions. The military also sent back two infiltrators to determine what happened to their disappeared comrades. Meanwhile, two entered the guerilla zone to form a new network of spies.

The IT had carefully and systematically exposed these plans and immediately arrested, interrogated, and punished these confirmed infiltrators. From December 1981 to July 1982, we were able to punish two infiltrators and neutralize 15. However, 9 were able to escape. Those punished were the ringleaders who were briefed intensively and comprehensively by their military handlers on the infiltration program and were actively involved in acts of sabotage.

Many of those punished were already agents before they were recruited and turned into full-time cadres of the movement. They were among those who were already intensively and comprehensively briefed by the military. Many of them had already undergone training in the army and intelligence. Until we exposed them, they operated in two-person teams that coordinated with each other from the time they started working in the barrios to becoming full-timers.

Essential Lessons from the Arrest, Detention, Interrogation, and Punishment of Confirmed Ringleaders

The first thing the ITs did was to collect all the written life stories (the personal and political records) of all full-time Party cadres and NPA guerillas and those who were based in

the barrios. A detailed guideline was issued for this undertaking. The move was supposed to help reorganize the regional command, and all care was taken not to reveal the reason behind the directive asking everyone to submit their life stories.

Using the information gotten from the infiltrators who were punished and with the help of a select set of life stories and other data from responsible comrades, the following classification was used regarding those being investigated:

1. Pinpointing at least who among two or more of the infiltrators were the ringleader or the brains, the ones who were actively sabotaging the movement, and those recruited by military agents.
2. Second, identifying those identified by the infiltrators, especially those involved but who were not the ringleaders, and the vast ambiguous information about them and their activities.
3. Third, those not identified as the brains behind the network but with connections to others for various reasons, opportunities to infiltrate, and several suspicious features of their personalities.

One mutually agreed basis for determining whether someone was an infiltrator was whether the suspect had been identified by two or more other infiltrators who were themselves confirmed as spies based on irrefutable data. When we analyzed the data, we made it clear that the most critical factors were circumstantial assumptions and data. We made sure that the information was unassailably confirmed and could stand on its own independently. The IT would reach a final decision regarding their punishment based on the recommendations of the RKT and KLA. This would be either unanimous or agreed upon by all secretaries.

The purges must be conducted with the utmost vigilance, secrecy, and care. It was agreed upon that their results would only be announced after the purges were completed among those not part of the infiltration plot. However, we also recognize that in practice, we cannot avoid

rousing suspicions and even affecting the well-being of some people, prompting them to ask questions. When provided with vague answers, doubts were sown among our ranks. In such instances, it would be more appropriate that we tell those with clean records the latest updates on the purges early in the purging, especially if those investigated and punished are people they know or had worked together. At this point, we ought to give more importance to the positive effect of doing it this way; for example, having more people know about these investigations may help us in further assessing those who underwent BI or SC. However, we must also keep in mind the negative aspects of this process like the possibility that as they expand, word of the purges would reach the ears of confirmed infiltrators who could then commit to more acts of sabotage or will be able to escape before their arrests and punishment.

Arrest

No one should be arrested without the collective decision of the IT, RKT, or NIA. The primary purpose of arresting someone is not to determine if he is an infiltrator but to get information because we are sure of his status by then. Thus, all those who were arrested were already those to whom revolutionary retribution was already meted out. As such, we will not be concerned about whether they are telling the truth. That said, the Party is open to changing its decision if the principal information that led to the punishment needs to be reviewed.

In making the actual arrest, we must consider the following:

1. There is a need to come up with a plausible reason (like "the higher organ needs to discuss matters relating to new positions due to the reorganization") when taking the infiltrator out of his area of operations to the detention camp where he will be interrogated before punished. The cadre who supervises him must

be the one to bring him to the camp.

Please avoid using the GRG as the one to pick the infiltrator up, as our past experiences have shown that this would unduly alarm them, prompting them to try to escape. As a result, we ended up killing them instead of getting the chance to interrogate them. It would also be better if the weapon issued to the spy be left with his unit, telling him that "he would be given another weapon once he joins his new unit."

It should be intimated that the infiltrator would be absent for quite some time and would not be able to correspond and return to the area he was operating in by insinuating that "he would go straight to his new assigned unit." We do this so that the other infiltrators would not be alerted as to what happened. We can devise more creative ways to dupe the spies, so long as we disarm them, effect their arrests, and not draw the suspicion of the others.

2. There should be an assigned location where the infiltrator can be made to kneel and manacled before bringing him to the camp. Comrades should also position themselves strategically to prevent the infiltrator from escaping. The ropes and the one assigned to tie the infiltrator must also be ready. These may be minor points to raise here, but it is necessary to mention them because there were instances where the mishandling of the manacled allowed the infiltrator to escape.

3. We must ensure that the infiltrator no longer has his weapon before ordering him to kneel and be manacled as the team nears the detention camp. We should also avoid giving him a chance to resist. There were episodes in the past where a comrade borrowed another's gun to check or use when defecating, leaving his gun in a place he could not quickly get at immediately if the infiltrator attempted to fight or escape.

Detention

Since the main reason behind an infiltrator's arrest is to interrogate him before retribution befalls him, it is imperative to give the appropriate concern over his place of detention while waiting to be interrogated. We must make sure that the captive cannot escape. To guarantee that a captive will not be able to escape while in detention and interrogation, we should follow these procedures:

1. A 24-hour close watch of the captive. We must remember that all that concerns the captive now is to take advantage of a relaxing of our vigilance so that he may either escape or cause more damage.
2. Make sure that the rope to bind the captive is tight. The captive must be tied in his arms and legs, ensuring that he cannot reach his legs even when in a contorted position.
3. Keep true to the principle, "Do not be cruel to the prisoners." This compassionate approach has helped us a lot in making the captive tell the truth.
4. If the detention cell has two or more captives, make sure they do not get a chance to know more about each other. They would only get the chance to face each other when the prime interrogator deems it necessary.
5. No other comrades are allowed into the detention cell to avoid exposing the activities happening inside. It would be advisable to have an alternative detention cell where the captives can easily be moved in case the current one is exposed or placed in danger.

Interrogation

After the arrest, the captive must immediately be interrogated. This procedure is very critical if we are to get the truth out of the investigation. The aim is to obtain critical

information that can help us dismantle the infiltration. Again, experience has taught us to follow these procedures to get the truth out of the infiltrator.

1. Appoint a group of principal interrogators (*grupong interogador, GI*). They will lead the interrogation process from the beginning to the end.
2. The GIs must immediately investigate all the information regarding the captive's case before starting the interrogation. This way, the interrogation can be coordinated, patient, and meaningful. It will be coordinated because each interrogator is familiar with the techniques; patient because it values the importance of information that needs to be generated, thereby avoiding the kind of interrogation that is reckless, tedious, and circuitous; and meaningful because the interrogation process is focused on producing what is important, thereby avoiding getting trapped in lesser details.

This is the reason why we must also be ready and agree as to what critical issues the interrogations must focus on and the role that each GI member must assume when it comes to who would play the "good uncle" and who would go rogue in front of them (pretend to be impatient with a prisoners' answers and be ready to beat them up if they refuse to tell the truth or play hardball). The assignment of these roles will depend on how much the GI members know about their prisoners. Suppose they can grasp the entire picture regarding the interrogation process firmly (hit the bull's eye). In that case, this will significantly help facilitate the questions and comments that will be asked and said during the interrogation.

3. There should be a prepared outline of the issue that will be covered by the interrogation, which would include the following
 - a. personal and political records.
 - b. date and reasons behind their infiltration

as agents, the mission, their recruiter(s), their methods of work and means of achieving their mission, salaries, and their military ranks.

c. the networks they used (or created) and the information they provided the enemy.

d. enemy plans against the movement that they know.

e. their recruits and potential recruits.

f. the list of known infiltrators and informers in the village:

1. their names and personal and political records.

2. dates and reasons behind their infiltration as agents or recruiters.

3. their mission and how they plan to achieve this; their salaries and ranks.

4. activities they have/had been involved in.

5. recruits (actual and targeted).

6. information passed on to the enemy.

4. The investigator must be patient and good at psywar tactics. The prisoners are expected not to reveal anything during the first interrogation session. The following techniques have been proven to be effective in making the prisoner confess:

- a. Convince the prisoners that they will be "released" if they reveal everything that he/she knows. It should be made clear to the prisoners that the only option left for him/her is to confess since we already know they are infiltrators. All that was needed was to admit all the information in their possession since we were already privy to some of them.

- b. Point to several "brains" of the infiltration program who were arrested and who had already informed on them and who, because they have been helping us in the investigation,

were undergoing political re-education.

c. Lay out enough compromising evidence that leaves them no choice but to confess. We can also show verified information that we know he/she already knows. By doing this, we will determine if they are telling the truth, especially once they begin sharing as much information as they have.

d. Show the prisoners the revelations of his/her co-conspirators to convince them they might as well confess. This approach effectively convinced them how compromised they were, so the only option was to confess. Revealing to them whatever information we have would also serve as examples of how those who confessed or collaborated could avoid death.

e. Promise them with additional remunerations after they are freed and returned to pre-detention lives. For example, apart from their re-education, we will inform their families about their conditions, provide them with transportation, and inform the enemy that he/she has been compromised so that the military will stop exploiting them.

f. Bring the prisoners to a grave site to show how serious we are about executing them. We continue to work to convince them to confess even when we place them on the burial grounds and that if they confess, we will bring them back to the interrogation site to record their confessions. If they still refuse our pleas, then they will promptly be executed.

5. Revolutionary cunning has been the most effective means of getting prisoners to confess. The physical beating of prisoners and other forms of coercion are prohibited. We have come to realize from experience that prisoners' resolve became more robust when they

were subjected to bodily harm because they believed that even if they did confess, we would still execute them, particularly if we remained doubtful of the reliability of the information they gave us. There were incidents where we tortured prisoners, and while this ended in confessions, we belatedly realized that these were all made up.

6. Only members of the GI should conduct the interrogation. In certain instances, the attempt by non-GI members to insert themselves in the interrogation often disrupts the process, especially since they need to become more familiar with the larger picture and the preparations necessary to ensure an effective investigation.

7. We often let a whole night pass after the interrogation to allow the prisoners to reassess their options after a day of relentless questioning. Moreover, it is often the case that prisoners end up confessing the next day. There were also instances where prisoners were interrogated for five weeks or used as "bait" to get other prisoners to confess.

8. We should also explore using those who immediately confess to lure the military into a position where they can be ambushed and their weapons confiscated.

9. We must write down and record as much as possible the entire interrogation process. We must do this to systematize all the information we have collected and determine the people behind the infiltration and other additional data we can cull from the recordings. We must also immediately alert the affected units and party organs whose security had been compromised based on the data we have collected.

Actual Punishment

After extracting as much important information from

the prisoners and realizing they are so compromised that we cannot use them to lure and attack the enemy, we can proceed with their execution. Once the decision to execute is made, we must follow these procedures:

- a. The executions and the burials of those killed must be made in secret. We must try not to reveal the body of the deceased.
- b. We must make sure that the grave is dug correctly before executing the prisoners to make sure that we bury them properly. There were instances in the past when comrades failed to do this out of laziness.
- c. We vehemently prohibit any form of sadistic execution. There being infiltrators should not be made as an excuse for sadism.

There were again instances where the executions had gone too far. In one case, a prisoner was executed despite the flimsy evidence against him/her. The only proof was that another prisoner implicated him/her as the other infiltrator. There was also another case where it was clear that the military had coerced this prisoner to work for them after the latter readily surrendered and shared all the information he/she had about military operations. The prisoner should just have been forgiven and neutralized instead of executed. Yet there was another case where the GI team immediately recommended the prisoner's execution even if some of the information gathered from the latter had yet to be confirmed.

These incidents sparked an intense discussion over whether to inflict disciplinary action on the comrades who recommended and decided to favor these egregious actions. We realized that these had to be addressed on a case-to-case basis. If the decision to execute was based solely on a desire for revenge over personal slights, then the disciplinary action must reflect the grievousness of these petty motives. Suppose the decision is based on a subjective assessment or still-limited information collected at the onset of the investigation. In that case, the decision is often to criticize severely these subjective evaluations as evidence of the excess.

Destroying Spy Networks at the Barrio Level

We were also able to weed out the infiltrators and informers among those working full-time in the barrios. Our experience has shown that it is better to pinpoint who the brains are early, particularly those who can divulge the necessary information that would confirm the extent to which these full-timers are involved in the infiltration plot. This was the central issue of contention in one district after we discovered that an ally was one of the ringleaders who actively sabotaged the movement. However, we only punished or were in the process of penalizing most of those found guilty after we did the cleansing among the ranks of the full-timers.

The punishment of the brains of the critical agents who actively maintain the infiltration network should be prioritized. They are usually the ones who owe us blood and who actively cooperate with our enemies. The punishment of those whose infiltration status is unknown yet should be done in secret (or "the missing style"), especially if the agent is still immersed with the masses. The punishment of those whose infiltrator status was known can be made known to others as long as our comrades and the masses can deal with the enemy's vengeance.

It would be better if we neutralize those implicated in the plot who were not its brains or who had no blood on their hands. This would ensure that they will do no more harm, nor will they be exploited by the enemy. They should also be strongly warned not to participate again in the plot.

We should also explain this to the families and relatives of arrested infiltrators who knew of their kin's involvement in the plot, and the punishment meted out to the latter and the reasons for such penalties. In doing so, we not only provide them with a clear explanation of our actions but also prevent them from being used by the enemy against us.

Weaknesses and Mistakes of the Party that the Enemy Exploited

We successfully foiled the enemy's attempts to destroy the revolutionary movement in the QBZ from within. However, we must also ascertain our weaknesses and mistakes to draw lessons from these and better understand how the enemy was able to infiltrate our ranks.

1. In response to the Party's call for expansion, we mobilized our mass activists to infiltrate and begin organizing barrios adjacent to our zone of operations. It took some time before NPA units could visit these places because we needed more cadres to undertake the work. Further, because of their lack of experience, expertise and skills, their organizing was hasty and reckless. It was, therefore, easy for paid agents of the state to penetrate the mass organizations that were formed simply by pretending that they were "enthusiastic members of the masses who had been waiting for the NPA's arrival."

Leading party organs must be able to strike the proper balance between expansion and consolidation. We did it right when we mobilized mass activists to help coordinate our work, but we must also make sure that we supervise and guide them closely. Only if we are confident that the expansion area is adequate will we allow an NPA unit to enter it to continue its political work. When doing this, we must constantly remember the mantra, "With utmost courage do we expand ourselves and make sure not a single undesirable element can get in (our ranks)."

2. We could not conduct a relentless social investigation and acquaintance of those in the basic mass organizations and Party branches, particularly those passed on to us by the previous mass organizers. We were content with the superficial knowledge we received and were made to believe in the "energy"

of those who turned out to be paid military agents. Because the masses are the base of our cadres and fighters, we should have gotten to know them more closely before recruiting them to any of the mass organizations under our leadership.

A major factor behind these mistakes was the failure of the cadres and the NPA unit failure to know the community they were organizing. This allowed fifteen of the army trainees to infiltrate the community as full-timers. We must be assiduous in our investigation of a barrio's mass organizations and the Party branch, even at the consolidation phase of our expansion.

Our investigation was additionally affected by our lack of information about military raids, arrests, salvaging, and the "escape" of captured comrades. Had we seriously addressed this problem, we would have been able to investigate and study and have a clear idea behind the "mysterious" events happening in the barrio and nip the infiltration plot in the bud.

3. We were too liberal in promoting activists to the rank of cadres and red fighters. Many of these infiltrators were promoted to these positions with the help and recommendation of the cadre corps and the barrio Party branch. The district committee's problem was its failure to conduct an in-depth profiling of the political record of those who wanted to go full-time.

Apart from being former (military) trainees, some were relatives of the military, who were lumpen elements and drunks in the barrio. Again, if we could have only anticipated these problems, they would not have passed the KIA's requirements to go full-time. Henceforth we must focus on promoting members of the basic masses who have impressive political records and are respected members of the barrio.

Some were promoted based on nary a criterion. They became full-time members because

they were supposedly “hot in the enemy’s list.” The military devised a ruse to make it appear like they were after these agents, like raiding their houses, labeling them as NPA commanders, and having these agents “escape” from the military’s custody and seize military firearms.

We must remind ourselves that the foundation of our revolutionary commitment is a revolutionary practice. The latter, in turn, is based on a correct and time-tested approach that inspires a comrade to go full-time. If a comrade has been compromised in the barrio but does not have the foundation needed to become a full-timer, it would be more appropriate to reassign her to another barrio to conduct SCM there.

We must avoid bringing those among the masses who have been compromised into an area where our cadres and fighters are operating. These are the kinds of situations that make it possible for the military to infiltrate our ranks. Moreover, it also unduly exposes the mass organizations and the barrio’s Party branch.

4. Apart from the efforts by other intelligence services of the military to infiltrate organizations in the other districts of the QBZ, the problem also spread when cadres and fighters were moved from one district to another. Infiltrators who began operations in one district were, therefore, able to spy on three more districts.

We needed to be more vigilant when assigning cadres and fighters to different areas and work. We must not assign broad and critical work to new full-timers and inexperienced comrades. As a result, spies could infiltrate two GYGs and a district’s communication staff. An infiltrator was even transferred to a Party committee in a nearby region.

We must be aware of how much time and arduous efforts that full-time guerrilla units had squan-

dered in staging tactical offensives that had been sabotaged by enemy agents inside these units. The infiltration had also endangered our primary guerrilla units to military raids.

We likewise placed our leading cadres in danger of adding these infiltrators to their central staff. They were the infiltrators' first targets.

5. We were too ready to accept any of those who claimed they could escape from the enemy. The enemy effectively took advantage of our lack of vigilance and placed infiltrators among those who escaped and those who came from other areas, to put these comrades in a compromising position. We likewise betrayed our naivete in taking in those who said they were operating or were previously organizing in other areas but had moved to ours.

We should immediately have placed those who claimed they escaped under the strict supervision of the BI or the SC. We must probe deeper into the circumstances behind their capture, what the enemy did to them, the record of their activities while under detention, and the manner of their escape. This should also be the same approach we must take when dealing with those who claimed they once operated in other areas. We will need to write to comrades in these areas to ascertain whether their comrade was indeed operating there. We must conduct our inquiries in secret and while awaiting a reply, we must keep these comrades under the tight watch of a select number of comrades in the barrio.

6. The lack of a written summary report of the past cases of military infiltration between 1976 and 1977 was a critical factor in our failure to share with everyone the lessons learned from these experiences. As a result, many of our cadres and activists were unfamiliar with the problem and consequences of infiltration as an enemy tactic to destroy us. This ignorance

gave the enemy vast space to maneuver, infiltrate, and rise through the ranks. Their efforts were made more accessible by members and cadres letting their guard down, ignoring suspicious or out-of-the-ordinary actions, and keeping their worries to themselves. Alternatively, they told themselves "To trust comrades" so as not to be further burdened by their concerns.

We must provide cadres and members of the Party and the NPA a comprehensive education about the enemy's use of infiltration to destroy us from inside the organization. This way, they will be more alert and vigilant. This summation ensures that we can address past mistakes and this need for a comprehensive understanding of infiltration.

M-Glor
February 1983

Part 3. A Conversation with a Purge Survivor

Vec Alporha: First off, please introduce yourself. Can you tell us your current affiliations and history concerning the Communist movement?

Robert Francis Garcia: My full name is Robert Francis Garcia, and my nickname is Bobby. Current affiliation is with GoJUST, GoJUST-Human Rights. This is the development assistance of the European Union and the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation to strengthen human rights in the Philippines. The focus of the support is on the Commission on Human Rights (CHR). We are a part of the technical assistance team that directly supports CHR. I have been

with the CHR for quite some time, but the current work that I am doing is relatively recent. Previously, I was a consultant for transitional justice during the time of the late CHR Chairman Chito Gascon. I mainly worked in civil society, and at a certain point, I also worked with the government. I worked with Ox-fam, the Institute for Popular Democracy, Popular Education for People's Empowerment, Education for Life Foundation, and many others. I also worked with the United Nations and the Association for Southeast Asian Nations. As mentioned, I also worked in the government. I was with the Office of the President during the time of President Noynoy Aquino. I was undersecretary at the Office of the Political Adviser. I was also faculty at the University of the Philippines College of Social Work and Community Development in the 1990s. I have written several books, one of which is *To Suffer Thy Comrades*, which is the topic of this interview.

VA: So your personal history with the movement is well narrated in *To Suffer Thy Comrades*, but for this interview, please tell us about your experiences with the Communist Party of the Philippines, especially with the anti-deep penetration agents campaign.

RFG: This is a long story so just let me share the highlights of my experiences in the movement. I started as a student activist in the 1980s, and as an activist, I became a revolutionary. I believed in the call for an armed revolution against the Philippine state. So as a revolutionary, I initially worked with the student and other sectors, but eventually, I decided to go to the hills and join the armed rebellion in the late 1980s. So, it was there that I experienced what probably was the darkest period in the history of the revolutionary movement.

It was when the Party implemented anti-infiltration operations where suspected comrades were arrested, tortured, and eventually killed on suspicion of being deep penetration agents. I was one of the victims. Many of my co-

victims did not survive; fortunately, I was one of the few survivors of the carnage.

VA: In your book, *To Suffer thy Comrades*, you used the memo from the Melito Glor command of the Party entitled “Mga Aral sa Nangyaring Impiltrasyon sa Hangganang Quezon-Bicol,” dated 1983. Before anything else, can you share what you know about the Melito Glor command?

RFG: The Melito Glor Command is the New People’s Army’s formation in Southern Tagalog. It was a company-sized formation. So military formations are usually like that. They are divided into groups: squad, platoon, company, battalion, division, and brigade. So, when you say company formation in the NPA, that will be around 60 to 100 armed guerillas. And this is quite big comparatively. There were a few other company-sized formations in the Philippines, including Southern Tagalog. There is also one in Samar, in the Cordillera, and there might also be another in Mindanao. The NPA’s practice is that their regional formations are named after those they consider revolutionary martyrs. In the case of Southern Tagalog, the Melito Glor Command was named after Melito Glor, a student from the University of the Philippines. He became a student activist and then a revolutionary. He died as a revolutionary, so the formation of Southern Tagalog was named after him.⁸ The same was done in regions like the

8 Editors’ Note: Melito Tierra Glor was also a member of the oldest fraternity Upsilon Sigma Phi. The latter was quite unusual because the Upsilon was “the most ‘bourgeois’ fraternity in campus, having as its most prominent alumni, President Ferdinand Marcos (who ruled the country as a dictator from 1972 to 1986, was forced to flee to the United States and died in Hawaii in 1989), and his political rival Senator Benigno Aquino (imprisoned by Marcos in 1972, exiled to the United States in 1980, and assassinated on the Manila airport tarmac in 1983). A fraternity brother (brod) described him as “the campus James Dean” who was also a “thinker,” with a “polished manner, but...bold and daring and..had an aura of danger and mystery” (Lagman 2022). Lagman went underground when Marcos declared martial law and joined an NPA logistical unit operating out of the Southern Tagalog region (see map). He would die in an ambush sometime on December 5, 1974 in Capalonga municipality located on the border of Quezon and Bicol

Charlie Molintas Command in the Cordillera.

The company-sized formation was mainly responsible for the attacks against the enemies, in this case, the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police. These attacks take the form of raids or ambushes mainly. Sometimes unintended encounters also happen in the countryside. Aside from the fighting unit, there were also smaller formations, usually squad-sized formations composed of five to seven people. They were also armed, but attacks were not their primary mode of work but organizing. These NPA formations roamed the countryside to organize the people, primarily peasants, and indigenous peoples, to bring them into the fold. So basically, this was the main work of the Melito Glor Command as a fighting and as an organizing unit. Its purpose was to develop strength in the countryside until they could already consider that they had enough strength in the countryside to encircle the cities and eventually seize the state power. So that was the logic of the revolution.

VA: So when you decided to go to the hills, you were with the M-Glor Command.

RFG: Yes. I was designated in that command.

provinces (Bantayog, n.d.). The NPA unit in the area was subsequently named the Melito Glor Command, and was portrayed as one of the more successful companies. Its fame grew especially after it granted media access to its charismatic leader Gregorio Rosal. Ka (Comrade) Roger would eventually become the NPA's official spokesman (Olea, 2011).

Sometime in the early 1980s, word reached the Party that the military was once again trying to infiltrate the Quezon-Bicol regional organization for a repeat of its successful operation in 1977. The Melito Glor Command responded by releasing a set of guidelines that included ways of spotting and exposing spies inside the Party's organizations, the procedures to follow upon arresting and interrogating the suspects, and the penalties that could be meted out to those found guilty. The guideline would later evolve into the memorandum "Mga Aral Mula sa Naganap na Impiltrasyon sa Hanganang Quezon-Bikol," and became the standard that other NPA units would follow. But as we pointed in the introduction the document could not prevent the conflagration that would destroy much of the Party from within.

VA: So, in what year did you go to the countryside? Was it after the EDSA Revolution already?

RFG: Yes. It was already after EDSA. I went full-time in 1988.

VA: And this M-Glor document was released in 1983. The document was a guideline on the conduct of anti-DPA operations based on earlier deep penetrations that occurred in the late 1970s. So, this was released a few years before your experience in the Party's anti-DPA campaigns. Based on your personal experience and the studies you have done, how did the M-Glor memo influence the anti-DPA operations of the Party from Kampanyang Ahos in Mindanao to OPML and Olympia? So how did the document guide later anti-DPA operations?

RFG: Yes. So the documents became a basis for the Party's practice in implementing anti-infiltration operations nationwide. Meaning it was implemented in different regions in the Philippines.

VA: Was the document sufficient as a guideline?

RFG: I can say that it was not only insufficient, but it was also erroneous. Their basis was their operation in 1983, which they deemed a success. But looking back, they also realized that it was also excessive. There were a lot of faults, accusations, and many comrades were also punished for the wrong assumptions that they were enemies. The pattern was only recognized much later when they looked at the different regions' operations. There they witnessed accusations, followed by investigations where the premise was the presumption of the person's guilt and a predetermined punishment. So torture was used to extract confessions that turned out to be false. Then the manner of punishment was almost always execution. So it was not only

insufficient, it was erroneous.

VA: There were several discrepancies when we read the M-Glor memorandum alongside your book. For example, the M-Glor document clearly defined neutralization as rehabilitation of the supposed DPA after a period of interrogation. But in your book, it appears that rehabilitation meant execution. So, where does this disconnect between the Party guidelines and the actual practice come from?

RFG: There were several disconnects in the document. First, the assessment of the record of the 1983 experience in the Quezon-Bicol zone was successful, with only little excesses. So, when they produced the memo, they were unaware that they had committed a colossal error in the Quezon-Bicol zone. Second, the document still contains full punishment policies. There were even mentions of prepared grave sites for those who were executed. The most appropriate description of the practice was its widespread reach and expansion (*umalagwa*). So, a guideline prescribed them to be meticulous in the process. Still, in actual practice, they have far exceeded what was prescribed in the document. That would include the injunction against the practice of torture. In actual practice, torture was the standard and not the exception. The execution also became an SOP for everyone. Once the investigation of a specific individual was consummated, death would automatically follow.

VA: In hindsight, after you have survived the torture and investigation and were spared execution, what do you think went fundamentally wrong in what was happening that led to the excessive punishments of suspected DPA?

RFG: It is hard to pinpoint a single factor. My argument has always been that it was a perfect storm. Various factors converged in a single period, and it spiraled out of control. So, there was the directive from the center to conduct investiga-

tions, the inherent paranoia within the movement, then the cruelty as a policy. The refusal to treat the enemy as a human being became a policy. So, the kind of treatment they were accorded was severe. It was an extreme form of othering, treating others not as humans but as enemies and hence did not deserve humane treatment. The clandestine character of the operation was also a factor. It was vulnerable to fears of being invaded by the enemy from within, so paranoia was an essential factor—also, the inherent violence of the movement itself. Violence was justified and was employed as the mode of practice to change society. So, it was not unusual to use violence against the perceived enemies from within.

VA: In your book, you mentioned that government soldiers who were captured and were eventually released by the NPA recounted that they were treated as human beings. They did not undergo torture, for example. We know that if it was the other way around, like if it were the revolutionaries captured by the military under Marcos, it was highly probable that they would be tortured. So, suppose the NPA could humanely treat the government soldiers, who they were sure of as real enemies. What motivated them to treat their suspected comrades differently?

RFG: That was one of the supreme ironies that I have mentioned in what happened. But I think one crucial factor was the propaganda value of having captive government soldiers and telling the public that they were being treated humanely. And they used it. When they had captive government soldiers or prisoners of war, they frequently held press conferences where they projected themselves as a humane movement. But in our case, we did not have any propaganda purpose. The operation was concealed and was not supposed to come out. So, having a humane image was not a consideration in the anti-DPA operations. That spelled the difference between how they treated captive government soldiers and suspected infiltrators.

VA: Deploying DPA agents was a practice of the military. So, there could be a more justifiable way of combating this military tactic. What do you think could have made the anti-DPA campaign better? Could we have avoided this kind of extreme violence?

RFG: One way would be not to treat it as a campaign. When you refer to something as a campaign, it implies a mass character to the operations. So, if there were instances of suspected infiltration, then a thorough, meticulous, and professional investigation should be undertaken. The investigators' competence and capacities are significant aspects of that. And the due process should be preserved even when operating within the movement because that is your only safety net. Imperfect as it is, any other modality or methodology is worse than due process. So due process was not only expected from the state, but the movement claiming a stake in ruling society should also practice that. Due process would include rules of evidence, presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and the recognition and respect of human rights. Regardless of who the person is, his human rights are inviolable.

VA: Based on your experiences, which parts of the operations were taken for granted?

RFG: They were indeed incompetent and complacent. They had a presumption of guilt rather than a presumption of innocence. This manifested in the line of interrogation: "When did you become an infiltrator?" rather than "Are you an infiltrator?" Moreover, emanating from this presumption was the deployment of a methodology to extract their assumed truth, whatever it took, hence torture. Since they were determined to let their assumed truth come out, they squeezed the suspect into interrogation until he eventually implicated himself in a confession that the interrogators wanted to hear.

This was the root cause. They forced the captives into false confessions that they assumed to be true. Likewise, the belief was that such a method was justified because the prisoner was an enemy, and they were in the right.

VA: In your book, you have recounted different ways of interrogation and torture, from physical to mental torture. Do you think they had a standard procedure or was this done according to the whims of the interrogator?

RFG: In my own experience and research, torture was the rule rather than the exception. Cruel treatment was done, not only in Southern Tagalog but in other regions as well. We were able to perceive a pattern. Nobody was spared of the mental torture, and a majority of the suspects experienced physical torture. Others might not have been beaten up physically but were mentally tortured.

VA: But the specific methods of torture, was that also standard? Or was it done according to the individual discretion of the interrogators?

RFG: It was done according to their individual "creativities." But it seemed like the most common one employed was hanging the prisoners by the wrist.

VA: Your book mentioned that NPA did not have many records on employing torture on prisoners, so where do you think they picked up their specific ways of torturing the suspected infiltrators?

RFG: Well, we cannot state that for a fact. We may need a more in-depth study regarding that. We do not know that torture was not standard practice within the NPA. We only know that high-profile hostages and prisoners of war brought before the media were treated humanely. But we don't know what happened in the communities where they operated or

among the soldiers they captured who were not brought to the limelight. They had this practice of cleansing operations in communities as their brand of justice. Here they target those they consider “bad elements.” They regarded as bad elements those who were criminals and anti-social people in the community and those who were either suspected or known as carabao rustlers, rapists, thieves, etc. Those people were usually taken down directly without any due process. But on their practice of torture, we would need to probe deeper into that. Most were possibly summarily executed, but we cannot conclusively state that the NPA committed no torture outside the anti-infiltration operations. Some information has reached us about how they deal with leaders of indigenous peoples who were no longer sympathetic to their cause. Another subject of study should be the practice of torture within rebel organizations in relation to their operations outside the anti-DPA operation.

VA: Since publishing your book in 2001 and its second edition in 2017, groups and alliances like PATH (Peace Advocates for Truth and Healing) were formed. What are the concerns of these groups?

RFG: PATH was mentioned in the re-introduction of the book’s second edition. It is an organization for the survivors and the families and supporters of the victims. It works to bring up the issue of the purges in the revolutionary movement.

VA: What are the developments among the survivors and the families of the victims who did not survive?

RFG: Our call has always been for more extensive support for transitional justice in the Philippines, which is a part of the peace agenda. This means that all of the past unresolved issues, specifically the violations committed by both sides during the armed conflict, should be seriously considered in terms of accountability—truth, accountability, and justice.

If we want lasting peace, everyone should be given proper closure. This means a full accounting of everything that took place, and no one should be considered a sacred cow. Those who were responsible for committing violations should be established. There should be a consensus or an agreement on the level of society. This is not impossible. We have a good number of transitional justice experiences in other countries. They may be imperfect but at least a measurable level of justice was attained. This has been done in South Africa and various Latin American countries like Guatemala, El Salvador, and Peru. Peru's case with the Sendero Luminoso or the Shining Path was grave. This armed communist organization committed the majority of the violations. They massacred entire indigenous communities. They committed far worse atrocities comparable, albeit on a smaller scale, to what was committed by the Khmer Rouge.

VA: So the Sendero Luminoso was also not holding state power? Some scholars mentioned that the CPP's anti-DPA purges were rare because the Party did it before winning the revolution.

RFG: Well, it may also have happened in other revolutionary movements but was not given as much attention because the violence committed by the state and the military was more worthy of attention since they have greater forces and capacities to commit large-scale violence. However, some resistance groups also commit human rights violations. In South Africa, for example, the African National Congress are the "good guys." Still, they also have a record of torturing and killing their comrades. Perhaps at a much lesser scale than those committed by the white apartheid state, but there were some cases.

VA: Several scholars who studied the CPP and the NPA appraised the anti-DPA purges as among the lowest points in the history of the Party. How do the purges affect or still

affect the revolutionary movement?

RFG: It is a significant blemish on the record of the Party. The CPP insists that this issue is already resolved, but it is not. This occurrence would always haunt them because it is not true that this issue is already a closed book, as they claim it to be. Until now, there is no full accounting yet of the actual number and identities of the victims. Were the families of the victims informed about what happened? And most importantly, were they able to bring back the remains of the executed suspects to their families? As long as these things remain undone, the Party cannot claim that the issue is already resolved.

VA: So I will dovetail from this for my last question. As a former member of the CPP and survivor of the anti-DPA purges that happened more than three decades ago, what do you think are the things that the CPP should do at present regarding these excesses in the past? And do you think, at this time, is it still relevant to bring this issue into the lime-light?

RFG: Yes. In the same way that it remains relevant to talk about the human rights violations committed by the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos Sr. As I have mentioned earlier, if we are to have a long-lasting peace between the victims and the perpetrators, then there should be a full accounting of the operations through a thoroughgoing process of transitional justice, where significant violations committed by both the security forces and the rebel groups would be brought out to the open. We are not going after the conviction and imprisonment of everyone participating in these operations. That is not possible. Instead, transitional justice, as an approximation of justice, seeks a well-defined process of closure and resolution. This is why full accounting is of utmost importance. This would also consider the big questions regarding our history, like who was responsible for the bombing of the Plaza Miranda? These things are all part

of truth-seeking and finding closure in society. So, the current party leadership should say everything they know, including the identification of the victims, the gravesite, admission of their acts, and the issuance of apologies. If we ask for apologies from the Marcoses and demand the return of their stolen wealth, then we should apply this to the Party.

VA: Thank you for sharing your personal history and insights about the anti-DPA operation of the CPP. Is there anything else that you would like to share about this issue?

RFG: We should continue seeking justice and healing. The next steps in pursuing peace and justice should take transitional justice as the framework. #

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About the Author and the Translators

The Melito Glor Command of the Communist Party of the Philippines' New People's Army operates in the border of Quezon Province and the Bicol Region, southeast of Manila.

Veronica Alporha is a PhD student at the Department of History, University of Hawaii-Manoa (UH-Manoa). Before coming to UH-Manoa she taught Philippine History at the University of the Philippines-Los Baños. She acquired her MA in History at the University of the Philippines-Diliman where she wrote about the education program of the Communist Party of the Philippines.

Website : <https://www.podkas.org>

Email : valporha@hawaii.edu

Patricio N. Abinales is a professor at the Department of Asian Studies, University of Hawaii-Manoa. He co-wrote *State and Society in the Philippines* (Rowman and Littlefield, 2017) with Donna J. Amoroso and his latest book is *Modern Philippines* (ABC-Clio: 2022). He also earned his B.A., in History from the University of the Philippines-Diliman.

Email: abinales@hawaii.edu