Justice for Affan Kurniawan: The First Civilian Casualty of the Remilitarization of Indonesia

A collection of documents introduced and translated by

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Justice for Affan Kurniawan: The First Civilian Casualty of the Remilitarization of Indonesia

Memories of the sounds of authoritarian violence still echo across the streets of Jakarta: the clattering of shields knocking in cadence, the oversized tires of armored vehicles rolling across pavement, the whiz of tear gas cannisters overhead as a microphone barks commands from behind an advancing line of uniforms and masked faces. For 21-year-old Affan Kurniawan, this noise faded forever when he was murdered by the Mobile Brigade of the Indonesian National Police during citizen protests outside the parliament building on Thursday, 28 August 2025 . But for the rest of Indonesia, the cries of anguish from Affan's family when he died that night hearkened back to the routine state violence against civilians under Suharto's New Order government—the military dictatorship that ruled the country from 1966 to 1998. As the remilitarization of Indonesian society under President Prabowo Subianto has steadily progressed, Affan Kurniawan became the first casualty of the state's policy of putting steel on the streets to clamp down on protests, ushering in the return to a time when ordinary citizens paid with their lives for the audacity of demanding human dignity.[1]

The violent response to civilian protests began on Monday, 25 August, when crowds gathered in person around the Indonesian parliament building in Senayan, Jakarta after weeks of protesting online to push back against a series of lavish bonuses handed out to members of the Indonesian House

[1] Only English-language, public facing, digital sources have been cited in the article to provide further repositories of information for readers who do not speak Bahasa Indonesia. An exception has been made for social media content in Bahasa Indonesia which provides video footage of events covered in the article.

of Representatives (DPR).[2] Bonuses including housing allowances, rice stipend, and travel reimbursement resulted in nearly a 35% pay increase since 2024 for the 580 members of the DPR, raising total monthly earnings potential (salary + benefits) to Rp 230 million (approximately US $14,000).[3] In comparison, provincial minimum wage in Jakarta is Rp 5.4 million per month (approximately US $383), while public school teachers across the archipelago typically earn Rp 7-11 million per month (approximately US $426-670)—both of which pale in comparison with the DPR's new housing allowance alone, set at Rp 50 million per month (approximately US $3,000).[4]

But the growing protests that erupted by the end of the week were the manifestation of outrage over far more than perks and payouts for political elites. The cost of living in Indonesia has risen dramatically in the past several years due to broad inflation and the ever-increasing price of food.[5] Despite continued talk of fiscal austerity, the Indonesian government has been spending extravagantly as part of President Prabowo Subianto's long-term plan for the remilitarization of the world's third-largest democracy—a plan that has included trillions of rupiah in military expenditures,

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[2] Niniek Karmini and Achmad Ibrahim, "Riot police clash with students protesting lawmakers' allowances in Indonesia," *AP*, 25 August 2025, https://apnews.com/article/indonesia-student-protest-parliament-49e31c7074aab8375aec06143f6b2edc.

[3] Anastasya Lavenia Yudi, "DPR Members' Monthly Earnings Could Reach Rp230 Million, Says Fitra," *Tempo*, 25 August 2025, https://en.tempo.co/read/2042830/dpr-members-monthly-earnings-could-reach-rp230-million-says-fitra.

[4] "Indonesia's Prabowo announces record US$5.21b education budget, 100% salary hike for public school teachers," *Channel News Asia*, 29 November 2024, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/indonesia-prabowo-teachers-salary-increase-budget-welfare-education-4777466.

[5] "Indonesian Food Inflation," *Trading Economics*, https://tradingeconomics.com/indonesia/food-inflation.

kickbacks for political allies, protections against crimes committed by those in uniform, and a growing push to silence critics and media outlets that speak up against these policies.

Remilitarization under the Subianto presidency may come as no surprise, as the former general rose to prominence as a platoon commander in the Indonesian Army Special Forces Command during the 1970s, when his unit took part in the bloody occupation of neighboring Timor-Leste. Subianto's role included his unit's involvement in the Kraras Massacre of several hundred unarmed civilians in 1983, just months after he married the daughter of Indonesia's military dictator, Siti Hediati Hariyadi.[6] This position of privilege attributed to Subianto's meteoric rise in the military ranks, culminating in his appointment as the head of the Army Strategic Reserve Command in March 1998. Two months later, as democratic protests broke out that ultimately toppled the Suharto dictatorship, Subianto used plainclothes troops to kidnap and torture at least nine student activists, in addition to the suspected disappearing of a dozen more.[7]

Within days of his inauguration, Subianto sent his entire cabinet to the Indonesian Military Academy in Magelang, Central Java to undergo military-style drills and training.[8] Since

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[6] Aboedprijadi Santoso, "What ever happened in Kraras, Timor Leste, 'Pak' Prabowo?," *The Jakarta Post*, 20 December 2013, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/12/20/what-ever-happened-kraras-timor-leste-pak-prabowo.html; Gerry Van Klinken, "Prabowo and human rights," *Inside Indonesia*, 27 April 2014, https://www.insideindonesia.org/editions/elections-2014/prabowo-and-human-rights.

[7] Jose Manuel Tesoro, "The Scapegoat? Among Questions that should have been asked: Was Prabowo Subianto truly the single 'mastermind'?" *Asia Now*, 3 March 2000, https://www.cnn.com/ASIANOW/asiaweek/magazine/2000/0303/cover1.html.

[8] "With green camo and combat boots, Indonesia's new cabinet kicks off army retreat," *Reuters*, 25 October 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/with-green-camo-combat-boots-indonesias-new-cabi-

this symbolic militarization of the government, his administration has pushed several reforms through an allied parliament to increase military control of the civilian bureaucracy. The most notable reform amended Law No. 34/2004 (the so-called Indonesian National Armed Forces Law) via Law No. 3/2025.[9] The 2004 legislation dismantled the Suharto-era policy of *dwifungsi*, or dual function, which placed military officers in all levels of government, including city and provincial mayors, state-owned corporations, the judiciary, ambassadorships, and Suharto's cabinet. Law No. 34/2004 confined the military to a defense and security role that adhered to democratic principles of civilian rule. Democratic advocates were rightfully alarmed when members of the DPR moved out of the parliament building to a closed-door session in the swanky Fairmont Hotel in Jakarta to discuss revising the law on 14-15 March 2025. Activists who showed up at the five-star hotel were removed from the premises.[10]

In response to the controversy, numerous politicians publicly promised that the proposed reforms would not restore military supremacy over the civilian government.[11] Yet as the Muslim-majority country readied itself for the end of the fasting month of Ramadan and the largest holiday of the year, Eid al-Fitri, the DPR rushed a vote to pass amendments that did exactly what they publicly promised not to do—usher the Indonesian military back

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net-kicks-off-army-retreat-2024-10-25/.

[9] See Translation #1 for full text of Law No. 34/2025.

[10] "Civil Society Coalition slams rushed, secret TNI Law discussions at 5-star hotel," *CNN Indonesia*, 15 March 2025, https://www.asia-pacific-solidarity.net/news/2025-03-15/civil-society-coalition-slams-rushed-secret-tni-law-discussions-5-star-hotel.html.

[11] Tria Dianti, "EXPLAINED: Why proposed revisions to Indonesia's military law alarm democracy activists," *Benar News*, 17 March 2025, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesian/why-military-law-revisions-alarm-democracy-activists-03172025142823.html.

into roles reserved for civilian governance since 2004.[12]

Specifically, Article 7 of Law No. 3/2025 expands military operations other than war to include, among other tasks, broadly framed internal operations such as "secure vital national objects of a strategic nature" (5), "carry out peacekeeping tasks" (6), "assist the implementation of government tasks" (9), and "assist the Indonesian National Police in the context of security and public order" (10). Of note, most of Article 7's clauses covering military operations other than war can be further regulated by government regulation or presidential regulation, except for clause 10, which allows the military to undertake internal policing duties—a clause which grants the armed forces unmitigated, sweeping power to use force against the Indonesian population.

Article 47 permits active-duty soldiers to hold positions in 14 civilian ministries and agencies, including the Attorney General's Office, State Secretariat, State Intelligence Agency, national defense bodies, and even the Indonesian Supreme Court.[13] Article 53 raises military retirement ages, allowing Suharto-era officers to maintain their hold on power. Of grave concern, Law No. 3/2025 does not alter previous criminal jurisdiction set by Law No. 31/1997. Under the Military Tribunal Law of 1997, military personnel implicated in crimes are investigated by military authorities and tried in

[12] "New Indonesian Military Law sparks concerns about human rights and democracy," *Human Rights Monitor*, 20 March 2025, https://humanrightsmonitor.org/news/new-indonesian-military-law-sparks-concerns-about-human-rights-and-democracy/.

[13] The 14 agencies opened to military personnel are the Coordinating Ministry for Political and Security Affairs, Ministry of Defense, State Secretariat, State Intelligence Agency, State Cyber and Crypto Agency, National Resilience Institute, National Search and Rescue Agency, National Narcotics Agency, National Border Management Agency, Disaster Management Agency, Counterterrorism Agency, Maritime Security Agency, Attorney General's Office, and Supreme Court.

military courts, rather than civilian courts, an arrangement which entrenches a built-in impunity gap precisely as the armed forces expand into civilian roles in the government.[14]

While these reforms have opened the door for the military to retake a leading role in Indonesian governance, they have also provided the military with the capacity to surveil, police, and shape the spread of information across the archipelago and beyond. Law No. 3/2025 allows the injection of active-duty military personnel into the State Cyber and Crypto Agency, Indonesia's primary signals intelligence and cybersecurity agency, which could provide the armed forces with the capacity to monitor and regulate the online activity of Indonesian citizens. This reform comes just weeks after the promulgation of Indonesia's National Police Regulation No. 3 of 2025, which requires foreign journalists and scholars to obtain police clearance before conducting research or reporting in parts of the country.[15] Giving the police the capacity to dictate who may operate in Indonesia provides the state with the power of surveillance and censorship, curtailing foreign press and academic freedom while the military simultaneous gains the ability to censor online debate among Indonesian citizens—effectively paving the way for authoritarian control of key information channels in Indonesia.

While these draconian reforms seem to be coming in rapid succession following the 2024 presidential election, their roots stretch back nearly a decade. Former President Joko

[14] "Indonesia: Proposed Military Law Amendments Threaten Rights," *Human Rights Watch*, 19 March 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/03/19/indonesia-proposed-military-law-amendments-threaten-rights?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

[15] "APHR Denounces Indonesia's Police Clearance Rule for Foreign Journalists as a Grave Threat to Press Freedom," *ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights*, 4 April 2025, https://aseanmp.org/publications/post/aphr-denounces-indonesias-police-clearance-rule-for-foreign-journalists-as-a-grave-threat-to-press-freedom/.

Widodo, who defeated Subianto in the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections, turned to the military during his first term to expand his base of support beyond his political party, PDI-P (the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle). Over time, the former president, known as Jokowi, came to rely heavily on the military to advance the infrastructure and investment projects that underpinned his political agenda and re-election bid. In turn, Jokowi allowed an increasing number of active-duty and retired military officers to occupy civilian posts in the government, including the appointment of Suharto-era military officers as his Ministers of Defense—Ryamizard Ryacudu during his first term (2014-2019), and then Prabowo Subianto during his second term (2019-2024).[16] This alliance has continued to the present, with Jokowi's son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, currently holding the vice presidency under now President Subianto.

After becoming Jokowi's Minister of Defense in 2019, Subianto has systematically expanded the Indonesian military's size, strength, and role in civilian government while simultaneously dismantling old rivalries by centering the Ministry of Defense at the apex of all branches of the military. Over the past five years, the Ministry of Defense has contracted and began taking delivery tens of billions of US dollars' worth of modern military equipment, including two Scorpène submarines, five C-130J-30 Super Hercules transport aircraft, two A400M aerial tanker-transports, and state-of-the-art radar systems.[17] Topping the list is the largest single military

[16] "IPAC Report No. 87: Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia After Jokowi," *Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict*, 17 July 2023, https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/0fcbb118a-3da12db27a600506bda588b.pdf.

[17] Monty Pounder, "Commentary: Indonesia is making big moves to modernize its military – but can it sustain the shift?" *Channel News Asia*, 11 April 2025, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/commentary/indonesia-prabowo-military-tech-arms-upgrade-naval-air-power-5056951.

expenditure in Indonesian history, agreeing to pay France US$8.1 billion for 42 Rafale fighter jets.[18] Meanwhile, Indonesia has become the first confirmed Southeast Asian nation to deploy a modern ballistic missile system after purchasing Turkish-made KHAN missile systems—a state-of-the-art procurement which the Ministry of Defense has reportedly yet to hand over to the Indonesian Army.[19] During this period of lavish expenditures on military modernization, Subianto has centered the entire purchasing process within the Ministry of Defense, from planning and purchase negotiations to procurement and distribution of what equipment goes to which branch, thus allowing him to utilize massive military expenditures to forge a hierarchy within the armed forces with the Ministry of Defense positioned at the top.

Since becoming president last year, Subianto has also begun to implement long-standing plans to expand regional Army commands to every province in the country, more than doubling the total from 15 to 38 regional commands.[20] These commands were used during the Suharto-era to shadow civilian bureaucracies and project military influence over oth-

[18] Kiki Siregar, "Jets from France, missile from turkey: Indonesia races to renew ageing military hardware," *Channel News Asia*, 6 December 2022, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/indonesia-ageing-military-equipment-turkey-missiles-us-f15-3122611.

[19] "Indonesia Deploys KHAN Ballistic Missiles: Southeast Asia's Missile Race Begins," *Defence Security Asia*, 4 August 2025, https://defencesecurityasia.com/en/indonesia-khan-ballistic-missile-southeast-asia-missile-race/; Ericssen, "Indonesia's ballistic missile deployment, a first in Southeast Asia, could shift regional power balance," *Channel News Asia*, 11 August 2025, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/indonesia-turkey-ballistic-missile-khan-arms-race-southeast-asia-5287311.

[20] Giffar Rivana, Heru Andriyanto, "Indonesian Army to Establish Five New Region Commands," *Jakarta Globe*, 5 February 2025, https://jakartaglobe.id/news/indonesian-army-to-establish-five-new-regional-commands.

erwise independent government functions.[21] The first six of the planned 23 new regional commands were established on 10 August, alongside the reinstatement of the position of Indonesian National Armed Forces Deputy Commander which was abolished in 2000.[22] The Deputy Commander position serves to coordinate all three branches of the military, further bringing them into alignment with the Ministry of Defense's power structure. The Deputy Commander can even directly perform another commander's duties himself if deemed necessary. These new regional commands have been staffed via the expansion of military personnel, with 100 new battalions created since Subianto took office, and plans for the creation of an additional 400 more before the end of his first term.[23]

The restructuring of the Indonesian military's center of gravity and expansion of the armed forces' role in the civilian administration have been in the making long before the DPR's passage of Law No. 3/2025. According to one human rights organization, approximately 2,500 active-duty military personnel were already illegally holding civilian posts by 2023.[24] Thus, the DPR's secretive, rushed reforms earlier this year

[21] Virdika Rizky Utama, "What does the military's new regional command structure mean for Indonesia?" *Indonesia at Melbourne*, 22 March 2024, https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/what-does-the-militarys-new-regional-command-structure-mean-for-indonesia/.

[22] "Prabowo launches 6 new regional army commands in major military shake-up," *Channel News Asia*, 11 August 2025, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/indonesia-prabowo-subianto-military-restructuring-deputy-commander-army-5288486.

[23] Kate Lamb and Ben Doherty, "In Prabowo's Indonesia, the military is quietly creeping back into civilian life," *The Guardian*, 27 August 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/aug/28/indonesia-president-prabowo-subianto-military-civilian-affairs.

[24] "Rights watchdog reveals around 2,500 active TNI officers in civilian posts," *CNN Indonesia*, 4 March 2025, https://www.indoleft.org/news/2025-03-04/rights-watchdog-reveals-around-2500-active-tni-officers-in-civilian-posts.html.

did not change how the military was operating—they simply made it legal. And as a reward for passing these reforms, members of the Indonesian parliament received a cushy kickback by way of a 35% increase in their annual compensation. These kickbacks are part of the larger project to concentrate power. By supporting the personal profiteering of civilian politicians, Subianto has forged the legislative alliance necessary to enable the trio of extraordinary military expenditures, safeguarding legal impunity to those in uniform, and injection of the armed forces into the civilian bureaucracy that is returning Indonesia the Suharto-era system of governance.

The public outbursts of discontent across Indonesia over the past week have not simply been in protest against politicians awarding themselves benefits worth many times more than the average worker's salary. The anger stems from a deeper fear that Indonesia's hard-fought democracy is crumbling as remilitarization revives memories of Suharto's New Order and its violent authoritarianism. As Subianto's government spends tens of billions of dollars on military procurements and political kickbacks to center the new power structure on the Ministry of Defense, the people are standing up against the destruction of democratic principles and return of draconian policies under military rule. While the diverse groups of protestors may seem to have differing motivations at a glance, in actuality they converge on a singular question: why spend so much money to undermine civilian governance rather than to improve public welfare?

As Indonesian citizens have taken to the streets to demand answers to those questions, they have been met with violence perpetrated by the very people who are meant to protect them. Amid the violence on Thursday, as police shot tear gas into crowds and beat protesters with batons, a Barracuda armored personnel carrier driven by the Mobile Brigade of the Indonesian National Police sped through the crowds and slammed into Affan Kurniawan, an unarmed,

innocent worker who was simply trying to deliver food that night to support his family. As Affan lay on the ground, motionless in front of the 12-ton armored vehicle, its driver hesitated for a moment, then callously decided to drive over Affan's body, dragging him down the street to his death.[25]

The Indonesian government and police have offered little more than an empty apology to Affan's family and the people as a whole. Promises to conduct a transparent investigation have resulted in the government claiming that the operators of the armored vehicle were acting in self-defense, despite the military-grade armored vehicle being in no danger from unarmed civilian protesters and recordings surfacing that appear to capture police urging the driver to "just run over" Affan. Instead of holding those involved accountable, the National Police will simply put them on "Special Placement" for 20 days, which essentially amounts to being put on desk duty for three weeks while the situation blows over.

Meanwhile, the National Police head of public relations has called on the public to stop live-streaming protests on social media, and the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission has barred Indonesian media outlets from airing protest coverage that contains "excessive violence" or could be deemed as "provocative, exploitative or escalates public anger."[26] Throughout this process, the government and media have repeatedly used the term *tertabrak* to describe what happened, a passive form of "to be struck by a car" that indicates accidental cause, instead of the more active, purposeful *dita-*

[25] Footage of Affan Kurniawan's murder have been shared widely across social media platforms: https://www.instagram.com/reel/DN-58LcpAfZE/?igsh=MWNoNHF5eTU2bTJxMg%3D%3D; https://www.instagram.com/p/DN590gJEiJl/; https://x.com/hobinyaNgayal/status/1961256540809449682.

[26] See Translation #2 for full text of the leaked document sent to media station by the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission.

brak. It is a meaningful choice of wording to diminish the intent and agency around Affan's murder. That choice of wording has not been lost on many Indonesians, as video footage clearly shows that Affan was ***di****tabrak*—not once, but twice.

Thousands of fellow delivery drivers accompanied Affan Kurniawan's body to his final resting place on Friday, 29 August, as many more gathered to hold protests outside the Mobile Brigade Police station in Central Jakarta.[27] Across social media, #PolisiPembunuh (Police Are Killers) and #JusticeForAffan hashtags are trending as protesters are arrested and journalists suppressed.[28] Meanwhile, on the ground in Jakarta, Article 7 of Law No. 3/2025 is already being cited to justify military support of the police to suppress of the protests. As reports spread across social media sites of more Indonesian civilians following Affan Kurniawan to the grave, it has become clear that the military's creeping, previously bloodless coup of Indonesian democracy has turned bloody this week as Law No. 3/2025 is put into action. As more and more people take to the streets to demand justice for Affan Kurniawan, the world watches and waits to see if humans still have rights in Prabowo Subianto's Indonesia.

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The accompanying documents and translations of Law No. 3/2025 (Translation #1) and the recently leaked directive from the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission to Jakarta-area media outlets (Translational #2) provide further in-

[27] https://www.instagram.com/p/DN7KoGEEnqU/; https://www.instagram.com/p/DN7tMJ6kd31/; https://www.instagram.com/p/DN7tMJ6kd31/; https://x.com/ilhampid/status/1961301457635844228.

[28] https://x.com/hashtag/PolisiPembunuh; https://x.com/hashtag/JusticeForAffan; https://www.instagram.com/explore/search/keyword/?q=%23justiceforaffan; https://www.instagram.com/explore/search/keyword/?q=%23polisipembunuh.

sight into the rise of military authoritarianism that is shaking Indonesia. Law No. 3/2025 provides the legal framework for political ascendency of the armed forces, including articles which authorize direct military assistance to the National Police to secure public order—legal justification for the military to be deployed against civilians. The leaked directive from the Indonesian Broadcasting Corporation lends insight into one aspect of the state's effort to control the narrative and censor information about the protests.

Christopher Hulshof
29 August 2025

The Documents

#1

Law No. 3/2025

SALINAN

PRESIDEN
REPUBLIK INDONESIA

UNDANG-UNDANG REPUBLIK INDONESIA

NOMOR 3 TAHUN 2025

TENTANG

PERUBAHAN ATAS UNDANG-UNDANG NOMOR 34 TAHUN 2004
TENTANG TENTARA NASIONAL INDONESIA

DENGAN RAHMAT TUHAN YANG MAHA ESA

PRESIDEN REPUBLIK INDONESIA,

Menimbang :

a. bahwa tujuan nasional Indonesia adalah untuk melindungi segenap bangsa dan seluruh tumpah darah Indonesia, memajukan kesejahteraan umum, mencerdaskan kehidupan bangsa, dan ikut serta melaksanakan ketertiban dunia yang berdasarkan kemerdekaan, perdamaian abadi, dan keadilan sosial;

b. bahwa pertahanan negara adalah segala usaha untuk menegakkan kedaulatan negara, mempertahankan keutuhan wilayah Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia, dan keselamatan segenap bangsa dari ancaman militer serta ancaman bersenjata terhadap keutuhan bangsa dan negara;

c. bahwa Tentara Nasional Indonesia sebagai alat pertahanan Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia, bertugas melaksanakan kebijakan pertahanan negara untuk menegakkan kedaulatan negara, mempertahankan keutuhan wilayah, melindungi keselamatan bangsa, menjalankan operasi militer untuk perang dan operasi militer selain perang, serta ikut secara aktif dalam tugas memelihara perdamaian dunia;

d. bahwa Tentara Nasional Indonesia dibangun dan dikembangkan secara profesional sesuai kepentingan politik negara, mengacu pada nilai dan prinsip demokrasi, supremasi sipil, hak asasi manusia, ketentuan hukum nasional, dan ketentuan hukum internasional yang telah disahkan, dengan dukungan anggaran belanja negara yang dikelola secara transparan dan akuntabel;

e. bahwa . . .

e. bahwa beberapa ketentuan dalam Undang-Undang Nomor 34 Tahun 2004 tentang Tentara Nasional Indonesia perlu disesuaikan dengan perkembangan organisasi dan kelembagaan serta peraturan perundang-undangan;

f. bahwa berdasarkan pertimbangan sebagaimana dimaksud dalam huruf a, huruf b, huruf c, huruf d, dan huruf e, perlu membentuk Undang-Undang tentang Perubahan atas Undang-Undang Nomor 34 Tahun 2004 tentang Tentara Nasional Indonesia;

Mengingat : 1. Pasal 20, Pasal 21, Pasal 30 ayat (2), ayat (3), dan ayat (5) Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945;

2. Undang-Undang Nomor 3 Tahun 2002 tentang Pertahanan Negara (Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 2002 Nomor 3, Tambahan Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Nomor 4169);

3. Undang-Undang Nomor 34 Tahun 2004 tentang Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 2004 Nomor 127, Tambahan Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Nomor 4439);

Dengan Persetujuan Bersama

DEWAN PERWAKILAN RAKYAT REPUBLIK INDONESIA

dan

PRESIDEN REPUBLIK INDONESIA

MEMUTUSKAN:

Menetapkan : UNDANG-UNDANG TENTANG PERUBAHAN ATAS UNDANG-UNDANG NOMOR 34 TAHUN 2004 TENTANG TENTARA NASIONAL INDONESIA.

Pasal I

Beberapa ketentuan dalam Undang-Undang Nomor 34 Tahun 2004 tentang Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 2004 Nomor 127, Tambahan Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Nomor 4439) diubah sebagai berikut:

1. Ketentuan . . .

1. Ketentuan ayat (2) Pasal 3 diubah sehingga berbunyi sebagai berikut:

Pasal 3

(1) Dalam pengerahan dan penggunaan kekuatan militer, TNI berkedudukan di bawah Presiden.

(2) Kebijakan dan strategi pertahanan serta dukungan administrasi yang berkaitan dengan aspek perencanaan strategis TNI, berada di dalam koordinasi Kementerian Pertahanan.

2. Ketentuan Pasal 7 diubah sehingga berbunyi sebagai berikut:

Pasal 7

(1) Tugas pokok TNI adalah menegakkan kedaulatan Negara, mempertahankan keutuhan Wilayah Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia yang berdasarkan Pancasila dan Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945, serta melindungi segenap bangsa dan seluruh tumpah darah Indonesia dari Ancaman dan gangguan terhadap keutuhan bangsa dan Negara.

(2) Tugas pokok sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (1) dilakukan dengan:
   a. operasi militer untuk perang;
   b. operasi militer selain perang, yaitu untuk:
      1. mengatasi gerakan separatis bersenjata;
      2. mengatasi pemberontakan bersenjata;
      3. mengatasi aksi terorisme;
      4. mengamankan Wilayah perbatasan;
      5. mengamankan objek vital nasional yang bersifat strategis;
      6. melaksanakan tugas perdamaian dunia sesuai dengan kebijakan politik luar negeri;
      7. mengamankan Presiden dan Wakil Presiden beserta keluarganya;
      8. memberdayakan Wilayah pertahanan dan kekuatan pendukungnya secara dini sesuai dengan sistem pertahanan semesta;

9. membantu . . .

9. membantu tugas pemerintahan di daerah;
10. membantu Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia dalam rangka tugas keamanan dan ketertiban masyarakat yang diatur dalam Undang-Undang;
11. membantu mengamankan tamu negara setingkat kepala negara dan perwakilan pemerintah asing yang sedang berada di Indonesia;
12. membantu menanggulangi akibat bencana alam, pengungsian, dan pemberian bantuan kemanusiaan;
13. membantu pencarian dan pertolongan dalam kecelakaan;
14. membantu Pemerintah dalam pengamanan pelayaran dan penerbangan terhadap pembajakan, perompakan, dan penyelundupan;
15. membantu dalam upaya menanggulangi Ancaman pertahanan siber; dan
16. membantu dalam melindungi dan menyelamatkan Warga Negara serta kepentingan nasional di luar negeri.

(3) Pelaksanaan operasi militer untuk perang sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (2) huruf a dilaksanakan berdasarkan kebijakan dan keputusan politik Negara.

(4) Pelaksanaan operasi militer selain perang sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (2) huruf b diatur lebih lanjut dengan Peraturan Pemerintah atau Peraturan Presiden, kecuali untuk ayat (2) huruf b angka 10.

3. Ketentuan Pasal 8 diubah sehingga berbunyi sebagai berikut:

Pasal 8

(1) Angkatan Darat bertugas:

a. melaksanakan tugas TNI matra darat di bidang pertahanan;

b. melaksanakan . . .

b. melaksanakan tugas TNI dalam menjaga Wilayah pertahanan di darat termasuk perbatasan dengan negara lain;

c. melaksanakan tugas TNI dalam pembangunan dan pengembangan kekuatan matra darat; dan

d. melaksanakan pemberdayaan Wilayah pertahanan di darat.

(2) Ketentuan lebih lanjut mengenai tugas Angkatan Darat sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (1) diatur dengan Peraturan Pemerintah.

4. Ketentuan Pasal 9 diubah sehingga berbunyi sebagai berikut:

Pasal 9

(1) Angkatan Laut bertugas:

a. melaksanakan tugas TNI matra laut di bidang pertahanan;

b. menegakkan hukum dan menjaga keamanan di Wilayah laut sesuai dengan ketentuan hukum nasional dan hukum internasional yang telah disahkan;

c. melaksanakan tugas diplomasi Angkatan Laut dalam rangka mendukung kebijakan politik luar negeri yang ditetapkan oleh Pemerintah;

d. melaksanakan tugas TNI dalam pembangunan dan pengembangan kekuatan matra laut; dan

e. melaksanakan pemberdayaan Wilayah pertahanan laut.

(2) Ketentuan lebih lanjut mengenai tugas Angkatan Laut sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (1) diatur dengan Peraturan Pemerintah.

5. Ketentuan Pasal 10 diubah sehingga berbunyi sebagai berikut:

Pasal 10

(1) Angkatan Udara bertugas:

a. melaksanakan tugas TNI matra udara di bidang pertahanan;

b. menegakkan . . .

b. menegakkan hukum dan menjaga keamanan di ruang udara sesuai dengan ketentuan hukum nasional dan hukum internasional yang telah disahkan;

c. melaksanakan tugas TNI dalam pembangunan dan pengembangan kekuatan matra udara; dan

d. melaksanakan pemberdayaan Wilayah pertahanan udara.

(2) Ketentuan lebih lanjut mengenai tugas Angkatan Udara sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (1) diatur dengan Peraturan Pemerintah.

6. Ketentuan Pasal 47 diubah sehingga berbunyi sebagai berikut:

Pasal 47

(1) Prajurit dapat menduduki jabatan pada kementerian/lembaga yang membidangi koordinator bidang politik dan keamanan negara, pertahanan negara termasuk dewan pertahanan nasional, kesekretariatan negara yang menangani urusan kesekretariatan presiden dan kesekretariatan militer presiden, intelijen negara, siber dan/atau sandi negara, lembaga ketahanan nasional, pencarian dan pertolongan, narkotika nasional, pengelola perbatasan, penanggulangan bencana, penanggulangan terorisme, keamanan laut, Kejaksaan Republik Indonesia, dan Mahkamah Agung.

(2) Selain menduduki jabatan pada kementerian/ lembaga sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (1), Prajurit dapat menduduki jabatan sipil lain setelah mengundurkan diri atau pensiun dari dinas aktif keprajuritan.

(3) Prajurit yang menduduki jabatan tertentu sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (1) didasarkan atas permintaan pimpinan kementerian/lembaga serta tunduk pada ketentuan administrasi yang berlaku dalam lingkungan kementerian dan lembaga.

(4) Pengangkatan dan pemberhentian jabatan tertentu bagi Prajurit sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (1) dilakukan sesuai kebutuhan organisasi kementerian dan lembaga.

(5) Pembinaan . . .

(5) Pembinaan karir Prajurit yang menduduki jabatan tertentu sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (1) dilaksanakan oleh Panglima melalui koordinasi dengan pimpinan kementerian dan lembaga.

(6) Ketentuan lebih lanjut mengenai Prajurit yang menduduki jabatan tertentu pada kementerian dan lembaga sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (1), ayat (3), dan ayat (4) diatur dengan Peraturan Pemerintah.

7. Ketentuan Pasal 53 diubah sehingga berbunyi sebagai berikut:

Pasal 53

(1) Prajurit melaksanakan dinas keprajuritan sampai dengan batas usia pensiun.

(2) Batas usia pensiun Prajurit sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (1) diatur dengan ketentuan sebagai berikut:

a. bintara dan tamtama paling tinggi 55 (lima puluh lima) tahun;

b. perwira sampai dengan pangkat kolonel paling tinggi 58 (lima puluh delapan) tahun;

c. perwira tinggi bintang 1 (satu) paling tinggi 60 (enam puluh) tahun;

d. perwira tinggi bintang 2 (dua) paling tinggi 61 (enam puluh satu) tahun; dan

e. perwira tinggi bintang 3 (tiga) paling tinggi 62 (enam puluh dua) tahun.

(3) Khusus bagi Prajurit yang menduduki jabatan fungsional dapat melaksanakan masa dinas keprajuritan yang ditetapkan dengan peraturan perundang-undangan.

(4) Khusus untuk perwira tinggi bintang 4 (empat), batas usia pensiun paling tinggi 63 (enam puluh tiga) tahun dan dapat diperpanjang maksimal 2 (dua) kali sesuai dengan kebutuhan yang ditetapkan dengan Keputusan Presiden.

(5) Ketentuan . . .

(5) Ketentuan mengenai perpanjangan sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (4) yaitu 1 (satu) kali perpanjangan untuk 1 (satu) tahun.

(6) Khusus bagi perwira yang telah memasuki usia pensiun dan memenuhi persyaratan dapat direkrut sebagai perwira komponen cadangan dalam rangka mobilisasi.

(7) Ketentuan lebih lanjut mengenai masa dinas keprajuritan dan perekrutan perwira yang telah memasuki usia pensiun untuk menjadi perwira komponen cadangan sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (1) sampai dengan ayat (6) diatur dengan Peraturan Pemerintah.

Pasal II

1. Pada saat Undang-Undang ini mulai berlaku, ketentuan tentang usia pensiun sebagaimana dimaksud dalam Pasal 53 diatur sebagai berikut:

   a. bintara dan tamtama:

      1) yang berusia 52 (lima puluh dua) tahun baginya diberlakukan masa dinas keprajuritan sampai dengan usia paling tinggi 53 (lima puluh tiga) tahun;

      2) yang berusia 51 (lima puluh satu) tahun baginya diberlakukan masa dinas keprajuritan sampai dengan usia paling tinggi 54 (lima puluh empat) tahun; dan

      3) yang belum berusia 51 (lima puluh satu) tahun baginya diberlakukan masa dinas keprajuritan sampai dengan usia paling tinggi 55 (lima puluh lima) tahun;

   b. perwira tinggi bintang 1 (satu):

      1) yang berusia 57 (lima puluh tujuh) tahun baginya diberlakukan masa dinas keprajuritan sampai dengan usia paling tinggi 58 (lima puluh delapan) tahun;

2) yang . . .

2) yang berusia 56 (lima puluh enam) tahun baginya diberlakukan masa dinas keprajuritan sampai dengan usia paling tinggi 59 (lima puluh sembilan) tahun; dan

3) yang belum berusia 56 (lima puluh enam) tahun baginya diberlakukan masa dinas keprajuritan sampai dengan usia paling tinggi 60 (enam puluh) tahun;

c. perwira tinggi bintang 2 (dua):

1) yang berusia 57 (lima puluh tujuh) tahun baginya diberlakukan masa dinas keprajuritan sampai dengan usia paling tinggi 58 (lima puluh delapan) tahun;

2) yang berusia 56 (lima puluh enam) tahun baginya diberlakukan masa dinas keprajuritan sampai dengan usia paling tinggi 59 (lima puluh sembilan) tahun; dan

3) yang belum berusia 56 (lima puluh enam) tahun baginya diberlakukan masa dinas keprajuritan sampai dengan usia paling tinggi 61 (enam puluh satu) tahun; dan

d. perwira tinggi bintang 3 (tiga):

1) yang berusia 57 (lima puluh tujuh) tahun baginya diberlakukan masa dinas keprajuritan sampai dengan usia paling tinggi 60 (enam puluh) tahun;

2) yang berusia 56 (lima puluh enam) tahun baginya diberlakukan masa dinas keprajuritan sampai dengan usia paling tinggi 60 (enam puluh) tahun; dan

3) yang belum berusia 56 (lima puluh enam) tahun baginya diberlakukan masa dinas keprajuritan sampai dengan usia paling tinggi 62 (enam puluh dua) tahun.

2. Undang-Undang ini mulai berlaku pada tanggal diundangkan.

Agar . . .

Agar setiap orang mengetahuinya, memerintahkan pengundangan Undang-Undang ini dengan penempatannya dalam Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia.

Disahkan di Jakarta
pada tanggal 26 Maret 2025
PRESIDEN REPUBLIK INDONESIA,

ttd.

PRABOWO SUBIANTO

Diundangkan di Jakarta
pada tanggal 26 Maret 2025
MENTERI SEKRETARIS NEGARA
REPUBLIK INDONESIA,

ttd.

PRASETYO HADI

LEMBARAN NEGARA REPUBLIK INDONESIA TAHUN 2025 NOMOR 35

Salinan sesuai dengan aslinya
KEMENTERIAN SEKRETARIAT NEGARA
REPUBLIK INDONESIA
Deputi Bidang Perundang-undangan
dan Administrasi Hukum,

Lydia Silvanna Djaman

SK No 255667 A

PRESIDEN
REPUBLIK INDONESIA

PENJELASAN
ATAS
UNDANG-UNDANG REPUBLIK INDONESIA
NOMOR 3 TAHUN 2025
TENTANG
PERUBAHAN ATAS UNDANG-UNDANG NOMOR 34 TAHUN 2004
TENTANG TENTARA NASIONAL INDONESIA

I. UMUM

Untuk mewujudkan tujuan nasional sebagai amanat Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945 diperlukan upaya bersama segenap bangsa Indonesia dalam mempertahankan kelangsungan hidup berbangsa dan bernegara. Upaya bersama dimaksud diwujudkan dalam peran, fungsi, dan tugas tiap-tiap komponen bangsa serta dilaksanakan secara sungguh-sungguh untuk Pertahanan Negara.

Pertahanan Negara merupakan salah satu bentuk upaya bangsa Indonesia dalam mencapai tujuan nasional. Hakikat Pertahanan Negara adalah keikutsertaan tiap-tiap Warga Negara sebagai perwujudan hak dan kewajiban dalam usaha Pertahanan Negara. Usaha Pertahanan Negara juga dilaksanakan melalui sistem pertahanan dan keamanan rakyat semesta, yaitu TNI sebagai kekuatan utama dan rakyat sebagai kekuatan pendukung. TNI sebagai kekuatan utama bertugas mempertahankan, melindungi, dan memelihara keutuhan dan kedaulatan Negara.

Dalam menghadapi kompleksitas tantangan Pertahanan Negara seperti tantangan geopolitik, stabilitas pertahanan nasional dan internasional, Ancaman Militer, nonmiliter, dan hibrida (terorisme dan perang siber) perlu dilakukan penguatan terhadap tugas dan fungsi TNI. Selain itu, dalam rangka mendukung optimalisasi pencapaian tugas dan fungsi, kementerian/lembaga tertentu dapat melibatkan Prajurit sesuai dengan kekhususannya. Selanjutnya, dalam rangka pemenuhan kebutuhan organisasi TNI perlu dilakukan peninjauan terhadap batas usia pensiun Prajurit yang merupakan tindak lanjut Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 62/PUU-XIX/2021 tentang Pengujian Undang-Undang Nomor 34 Tahun 2004 tentang Tentara Nasional Indonesia terkait masa dinas Prajurit TNI.

Untuk itu, Undang-Undang Nomor 34 Tahun 2004 tentang Tentara Nasional Indonesia perlu dilakukan perubahan, khususnya terhadap substansi yang mengatur:

1. kedudukan TNI;
2. tugas TNI;
3. penempatan Prajurit pada kementerian/lembaga; dan
4. usia masa dinas keprajuritan TNI.

Perubahan . . .

Perubahan Undang-Undang Nomor 34 Tahun 2004 tentang Tentara Nasional Indonesia tersebut tetap mengacu pada nilai dan prinsip demokrasi, supremasi sipil, hak asasi manusia, ketentuan hukum nasional, dan ketentuan hukum internasional yang telah disahkan.

II. PASAL DEMI PASAL

Pasal I

Angka 1

Pasal 3

Ayat (1)

Yang dimaksud dengan "berkedudukan di bawah Presiden" adalah keberadaan TNI di bawah kekuasaan Presiden.

Ayat (2)

Yang dimaksud dengan "berada di dalam koordinasi Kementerian Pertahanan" adalah segala sesuatu yang berkaitan dengan perencanaan strategis TNI yang meliputi aspek pengelolaan Pertahanan Negara, kebijakan penganggaran, pengadaan, pemeliharaan, dan/atau perawatan, perekrutan, pengelolaan sumber daya nasional, serta pembinaan teknologi industri pertahanan yang diperlukan oleh TNI dan komponen pertahanan lainnya. Adapun pembinaan kekuatan TNI yang berkaitan dengan pendidikan, latihan, penyiapan kekuatan, dan doktrin militer berada pada Panglima dengan dibantu Kepala Staf Angkatan.

Angka 2

Pasal 7

Ayat (1)

Yang dimaksud dengan "menegakkan kedaulatan Negara" adalah mempertahankan kekuasaan Negara untuk melaksanakan pemerintahan sendiri yang bebas dari Ancaman.

Yang dimaksud dengan "mempertahankan keutuhan Wilayah" adalah menjaga kesatuan Wilayah kekuasaan Negara dengan segala isinya, di darat, laut, dan udara yang batas-batasnya ditetapkan dengan Undang-Undang.

Yang . . .

Yang dimaksud dengan "melindungi segenap bangsa dan seluruh tumpah darah" adalah melindungi jiwa, kemerdekaan, dan harta benda setiap Warga Negara.

Ancaman dan gangguan terhadap keutuhan bangsa dan Negara, antara lain:

a. agresi berupa penggunaan kekuatan bersenjata oleh negara lain terhadap kedaulatan Negara, keutuhan Wilayah, dan keselamatan segenap bangsa atau dalam bentuk dan cara, antara lain:
   1. invasi berupa kekuatan bersenjata;
   2. bombardemen berupa penggunaan senjata lainnya;
   3. blokade pelabuhan, pantai, ruang udara, atau seluruh Wilayah Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia;
   4. serangan bersenjata negara lain terhadap unsur satuan darat, laut, dan udara;
   5. keberadaan atau tindakan unsur kekuatan bersenjata asing dalam Wilayah Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia yang bertentangan dengan ketentuan atau perjanjian yang telah disepakati;
   6. tindakan suatu Negara yang mengijinkan penggunaan wilayahnya oleh negara lain untuk melakukan agresi atau invasi terhadap Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia;
   7. pengiriman kelompok bersenjata atau tentara bayaran untuk melakukan tindakan kekerasan di Wilayah Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia; dan
   8. Ancaman lain yang ditetapkan oleh Presiden;
b. pelanggaran Wilayah yang dilakukan oleh negara lain;
c. pemberontakan bersenjata, yaitu suatu gerakan bersenjata yang melawan Pemerintah yang sah;
d. sabotase dari pihak tertentu untuk merusak instalasi penting dan objek vital nasional;

e. spionase . . .

e. spionase yang dilakukan oleh negara lain untuk mencari dan mendapatkan rahasia militer;

f. aksi teror bersenjata yang dilakukan oleh teroris internasional atau bekerja sama dengan teroris dalam negeri atau oleh teroris dalam negeri;

g. Ancaman keamanan di Wilayah laut atau ruang udara, yang dilakukan pihak tertentu, dapat berupa:

   1. pembajakan atau perompakan;
   2. penyelundupan senjata, amunisi, dan bahan peledak atau bahan lain yang dapat membahayakan keselamatan bangsa; dan
   3. penangkapan ikan secara ilegal atau pencurian kekayaan di laut; dan

h. konflik komunal yang terjadi antarkelompok masyarakat yang dapat membahayakan keselamatan bangsa.

Ayat (2)

Huruf a

Yang dimaksud dengan "operasi militer untuk perang" adalah segala bentuk pengerahan dan penggunaan kekuatan TNI, untuk melawan kekuatan militer negara lain yang melakukan agresi terhadap Indonesia, dan/atau dalam konflik bersenjata dengan suatu negara lain atau lebih, yang didahului dengan adanya pernyataan perang dan tunduk pada hukum perang internasional.

Huruf b

Angka 1

Dalam ketentuan ini, Pemerintah menginformasikan kepada Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat terkait rencana awal dalam mengatasi separatis bersenjata.

Angka 2

Dalam ketentuan ini, Pemerintah menginformasikan kepada Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat terkait rencana awal dalam mengatasi pemberontakan bersenjata.

Angka 3 . . .

Angka 3

Cukup jelas.

Angka 4

Cukup jelas.

Angka 5

Yang dimaksud dengan "objek vital nasional yang bersifat strategis" adalah objek yang menyangkut hajat hidup orang banyak, harkat dan martabat bangsa, serta kepentingan nasional yang ditentukan oleh keputusan Pemerintah.

Angka 6

Cukup jelas.

Angka 7

Cukup jelas.

Angka 8

Yang dimaksud dengan "memberdayakan Wilayah pertahanan" adalah:

a. membantu Pemerintah menyiapkan potensi nasional menjadi kekuatan pertahanan yang dipersiapkan secara dini meliputi Wilayah pertahanan beserta kekuatan pendukungnya, untuk melaksanakan operasi militer untuk perang, yang pelaksanaannya didasarkan pada kepentingan Pertahanan Negara sesuai dengan sistem pertahanan semesta;

b. membantu Pemerintah menyelenggarakan pelatihan dasar kemiliteran secara wajib bagi Warga Negara sesuai dengan peraturan perundang-undangan; dan

c. membantu Pemerintah memberdayakan rakyat sebagai kekuatan pendukung.

Angka 9 . . .

Angka 9

Yang dimaksud dengan "membantu tugas pemerintahan di daerah" adalah membantu pelaksanaan fungsi Pemerintah dalam situasi dan kondisi yang memerlukan sarana, alat, dan kemampuan TNI untuk menyelesaikan permasalahan yang sedang dihadapi, antara lain membantu mengatasi akibat bencana alam, merehabilitasi infrastruktur, serta mengatasi masalah akibat pemogokan dan konflik komunal.

Angka 10

Cukup jelas.

Angka 11

Cukup jelas.

Angka 12

Cukup jelas.

Angka 13

Cukup jelas.

Angka 14

Cukup jelas.

Angka 15

Yang dimaksud dengan "membantu dalam upaya menanggulangi Ancaman pertahanan siber" adalah TNI berperan serta dalam upaya menanggulangi Ancaman siber pada sektor pertahanan (*cyber defense*).

Angka 16

Yang dimaksud dengan "membantu" adalah TNI berperan serta.

Ayat (3)

Cukup jelas.

Ayat (4)

Cukup jelas.

Angka 3 . . .

Angka 3

Pasal 8

Ayat (1)

Huruf a

Cukup jelas.

Huruf b

Yang dimaksud dengan "menjaga Wilayah pertahanan di darat" adalah segala upaya, pekerjaan, dan kegiatan untuk menjamin tegaknya kedaulatan Negara, keutuhan Wilayah, dan keselamatan bangsa dari segala bentuk Ancaman, dan gangguan dari dan/atau di Wilayah darat.

Huruf c

Cukup jelas.

Huruf d

Cukup jelas.

Ayat (2)

Cukup jelas.

Angka 4

Pasal 9

Ayat (1)

Huruf a

Cukup jelas.

Huruf b

Yang dimaksud dengan "menegakkan hukum dan menjaga keamanan di Wilayah laut" adalah segala bentuk kegiatan yang berhubungan dengan penegakan hukum di laut sesuai dengan kewenangan TNI Angkatan Laut (*constabulary function*) yang berlaku secara universal dan sesuai dengan ketentuan perundang-undangan yang berlaku untuk mengatasi Ancaman tindakan kekerasan, Ancaman navigasi, serta pelanggaran hukum di Wilayah laut.

Menegakkan . . .

Menegakkan hukum yang dilaksanakan oleh TNI Angkatan Laut di laut, terbatas dalam lingkup pengejaran, penghentian, penangkapan, penyelidikan, dan penyidikan perkara yang selanjutnya diserahkan kepada Kejaksaan Republik Indonesia.

Penegakan hukum di laut dilakukan oleh kapal perang Republik Indonesia dan kapal Angkatan Laut serta kewenangannya dilakukan oleh perwira TNI Angkatan Laut sesuai dengan ketentuan peraturan perundang-undangan.

Huruf c

Yang dimaksud dengan "diplomasi Angkatan Laut" adalah fungsi diplomasi sesuai dengan kebijakan politik luar negeri yang melekat pada peran Angkatan Laut secara universal sesuai dengan kebiasaan internasional, serta sudah menjadi sifat dasar dari setiap kapal perang suatu negara yang berada di negara lain memiliki kekebalan diplomatik dan kedaulatan penuh.

Huruf d

Cukup jelas.

Huruf e

Cukup jelas.

Ayat (2)

Cukup jelas.

Angka 5

Pasal 10

Ayat (1)

Huruf a

Cukup jelas.

Huruf b

Yang dimaksud dengan "menegakkan hukum dan menjaga keamanan di ruang udara" adalah segala upaya dan kegiatan untuk menjamin terciptanya kondisi ruang udara yang aman serta bebas dari Ancaman kekerasan, Ancaman navigasi, serta pelanggaran hukum di ruang udara.

Huruf c . . .

Huruf c

Cukup jelas.

Huruf d

Cukup jelas.

Ayat (2)

Cukup jelas.

Angka 6

Pasal 47

Ayat (1)

Yang dimaksud dengan "jabatan pada Kejaksaan Republik Indonesia" adalah jabatan pada Kejaksaan Republik Indonesia di bidang pidana militer.

Ayat (2)

Cukup jelas.

Ayat (3)

Cukup jelas.

Ayat (4)

Cukup jelas.

Ayat (5)

Cukup jelas.

Ayat (6)

Cukup jelas.

Angka 7

Pasal 53

Cukup jelas.

Pasal II

Cukup jelas.

TAMBAHAN LEMBARAN NEGARA REPUBLIK INDONESIA NOMOR 7104

LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

NUMBER 3 OF 2025 ON

AMENDMENT TO LAW NUMBER 34 OF 2004

ON THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL ARMED FORCES

BY THE GRACE OF GOD ALMIGHTY

THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA,

Considering:

a. that the national goals of Indonesia are to protect the whole people and the entire homeland of Indonesia, to advance the general welfare, to educate the life of the nation, and to participate in the implementation of a world order based on freedom, lasting peace, and social justice;

b. that national defense is every effort to uphold state sovereignty, to maintain the integrity of the territory of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, and to ensure the safety of the entire people from military threats and armed threats against the integrity of the nation and the state;

c. that the Indonesian National Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, hereinafter "TNI") as an instrument of defense of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia is tasked with implementing defense policy to uphold state sovereignty, maintain territorial integrity, protect the safety of the nation, conduct military operations for war and military operations other than war, and actively participate in the task of maintaining world peace;

d. that the TNI is built and developed professionally in accordance with the political interests of the state, referring

to democratic values and principles, civilian supremacy, human rights, national law, and ratified international law, with support from the state budget managed in a transparent and accountable manner;

e. that several provisions in Law Number 34 of 2004 on the Indonesian National Armed Forces need to be adjusted to developments of the organization and institutions as well as legislation; and

f. that based on the considerations referred to in letters a, b, c, d, and e, it is necessary to enact a Law on the Amendment to Law Number 34 of 2004 on the Indonesian National Armed Forces;

Noting:

1. Article 20, Article 21, Article 30 paragraph (2), paragraph (3), and paragraph (5) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia;
2. Law Number 3 of 2002 on National Defense (The State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia of 2002 Number 3, Supplement to the State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia Number 4169);
3. Law Number 34 of 2004 on the Indonesian National Armed Forces (The State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia of 2004 Number 127, Supplement to the State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia Number 4439);

With the Joint Approval of

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

and

THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

HAS DECIDED:

To enact:

LAW ON AMENDMENT TO LAW NUMBER 34 OF 2004 ON THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL ARMED FORCES.

Article I

Several provisions of Law Number 34 of 2004 on the Indonesian National Armed Forces (State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia of 2004 Number 127, Supplement to the State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia Number 4439) are amended as follows:

1. Article 3, paragraph (2) is amended so that it reads as follows:

Article 3

(1) In the deployment and use of military force, the TNI is under the President.

(2) Defense policy and strategy, as well as administrative support relating to aspects of the TNI's strategic planning are under the coordination of the Ministry of Defense.

2. Article 7 is amended so that it reads as follows:

Article 7

(1) The principal task of the TNI is to uphold state sovereignty, defend the integrity of the territory of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila and

the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, and protect the whole people and the entire homeland of Indonesia from threats and disturbances to the integrity of the nation and the state.

(2) The principal task as referred to in paragraph (1) is carried out by:

a. military operations for war; and

b. military operations other than war, namely to:

1) overcome armed separatist movements;

2) overcome armed rebellion;

3) counter acts of terrorism;

4) secure border areas;

5) secure vital national objects of a strategic na ture;

6) carry out peacekeeping tasks in accordance with foreign policy;

7) safeguard the President and Vice President and their families;

8) empower defense areas and their supporting strengths at an early stage in accordance with the total defense system;

9) assist the implementation of government tasks in the regions;

10) assist the Indonesian National Police in the

context of security and public order as regulat ed by law;

11) assist state guests at the level of head of state and representatives of foreign governments present in Indonesia;

12) assist in the aftermath of natural disasters, the displacement of people, and the provision of humanitarian aid;

13) assist in search and rescue in accidents;

14) assist the Government in securing shipping and aviation against hijacking, piracy, and smuggling;

15) assist in efforts to address cyber-defense threats; and

16) assist in protecting and evacuating Indonesian citizens and national interests abroad.

(3) The implementation of military operations for war as referred to in paragraph (2) letter a is carried out based on state policy and political decisions.

(4) The implementation of military operations other than war as referred to in paragraph (2) letter b, shall be further regulated by a Government Regulation or a Presidential Regulation, except for paragraph (2) letter b number 10.

3. Article 8 is amended so that it reads as follows:

Article 8

(1) The Army is tasked to:

a. carry out the TNI's land-force duties in the field of defense;

b. carry out the TNI's duties in securing the defense area on land, including borders with other countries;

c. carry out the TNI's duties in building and developing land-force capability; and

d. carry out the empowerment of the land defense area.

(2) Further provisions regarding the duties of the Army as referred to in paragraph (1) are regulated by a Government Regulation.

4. Article 9 is amended so that it reads as follows:

Article 9

(1) The Navy is tasked to:

a. carry out the TNI's naval-force duties in the field of defense;

b. enforce the law and maintain security in the sea area in accordance with national law and ratified international law;

c. carry out naval diplomacy in order to support foreign policy determined by the Government;

d. carry out the TNI's duties in building and developing naval capability; and

e. carry out the empowerment of the sea defense area.

(2) Further provisions regarding the duties of the Navy as

referred to in paragraph (1) are regulated by a Government Regulation.

5. Article 10 is amended so that it reads as follows:

Article 10

(1) The Air Force is tasked to:

a. carry out the TNI's air-force duties in the field of defense;

b. enforce the law and maintain security in the airspace in accordance with national law and ratified international law;

c. carry out the TNI's duties in building and developing air-force capability; and

d. carry out the empowerment of air defense.

(2) Further provisions regarding the duties of the Air Force as referred to in paragraph (1) are regulated by a Government Regulation.

6. Article 47 is amended so that it reads as follows:

Article 47

(1) Soldiers may occupy positions in ministries/agencies that handle coordination in the field of politics and national security, national defense including the National Defense Council, the State Secretariat that handles presidential secretariat affairs and the presidential military secretariat, state intelligence, cyber and/or cryptography, the national defense agency, search and rescue, national narcotics control, border management, disaster management, counterterrorism, mar-

itime security, the Attorney General's Office of the Republic of Indonesia, and the Supreme Court.

(2) In addition to occupying positions in the ministries/agencies as referred to in paragraph (1), soldiers may occupy other civil positions after resigning from or retiring from active military service.

(3) Soldiers who occupy certain positions as referred to in paragraph (1) shall be based on the request of the head of the relevant ministry/agency and shall be subject to the administrative regulations applicable within that ministry/agency.

(4) The appointment to and dismissal from the certain positions for soldiers as referred to in paragraph (1) shall be carried out according to the organizational needs of the relevant ministries/agencies.

(5) Promotions for soldiers who occupy certain positions as referred to in paragraph (1) shall be carried out by the Commander (of the TNI) through coordination with the heads of the relevant ministries/agencies.

(6) Further provisions regarding soldiers who occupy certain positions in ministries/agencies as referred to in paragraph (1), paragraph (3), and paragraph (4) shall be regulated by a Government Regulation.

7. Article 53 is amended so that it reads as follows:

Article 53

(1) Soldiers shall serve until the statutory retirement age.

(2) The retirement age for soldiers as referred to in para-

graph (1) is stipulated as follows:

a. non-commissioned officers and enlisted personnel: up to 55 (fifty-five) years;

b. officers up to the rank of colonel: up to 58 (fifty-eight) years;

c. one-star general/flag officers: up to 60 (sixty) years;

d. two-star general/flag officers: up to 61 (sixty-one) years; and

e. three-star general/flag officers: up to 62 (sixty-two) years.

(3) Specifically for soldiers who hold functional positions, their period of military service may be carried out in accordance with statutory regulations.

(4) Specifically for four-star general/flag officers, the retirement age is up to 63 (sixty-three) years and may be extended a maximum of two (2) times as needed, as determined by Presidential Decree.

(5) The provisions concerning the extension as referred to in paragraph (4) are one (1) extension for one (1) year.

(6) Specifically for officers who have reached retirement age and meet the requirements, they may be recruited as officers of the reserve component in the context of mobilization.

(7) Further provisions regarding the period of military service and the recruitment of officers who have reached retirement age to become officers of the reserve component, as referred to in paragraphs (1) through (6), shall be regulated by a Government Regulation.

Article II

1. At the time this Law comes into force, the provisions concerning retirement age as referred to in Article 53 are stipulated as follows:

a. non-commissioned officers and enlisted personnel:

1) those aged 52 (fifty-two) years shall have a period of military service up to a maximum of 53 (fifty-three) years of age;

2) those aged 51 (fifty-one) years shall have a period of military service up to a maximum of 54 (fifty-four) years of age; and

3) those who have not yet reached 51 (fifty-one) years shall have a period of military service up to a maximum of 55 (fifty-five) years of age;

b. one-star general/flag officers:

1) those aged 57 (fifty-seven) years shall have a period of military service up to a maximum of 58 (fifty-eight) years of age;
2) those aged 56 (fifty-six) years shall have a peri od of military service up to a maximum of 59 (fifty-nine) years of age; and
3) those who have not yet reached 56 (fifty-six) years shall have a period of military service up to a maximum of 60 (sixty) years of age;

c. two-star general/flag officers:

1) those aged 57 (fifty-seven) years shall have a

period of military service up to a maximum of 58 (fifty-eight) years of age;

2) those aged 56 (fifty-six) years shall have a period of military service up to a maximum of 59 (fifty-nine) years of age; and

3) those who have not yet reached 56 (fifty-six) years shall have a period of military service up to a maximum of 61 (sixty-one) years of age; and

d. three-star general/flag officers:

1) those aged 57 (fifty-seven) years shall have a period of military service up to a maximum of 60 (sixty) years of age;

2) those aged 56 (fifty-six) years shall have a peri od of military service up to a maximum of 60 (sixty) years of age; and

3) those who have not yet reached 56 (fifty-six) years shall have a period of military service up to a maximum of 62 (sixty-two) years of age.

2. This Law shall come into force on the date of its promulgation.

To ensure that everyone is informed, the promulgation of this law is ordered to be published in the State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia.

Enacted in Jakarta

On 26 March 2025

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA,

[signed]

PRABOWO SUBIANTO

Promulgated in Jakarta

On 26 March 2025

MINISTER/STATE SECRETARY

OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

[signed]

PRASETYO HADI

Registered: State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia of 2025 Number 35

Copy true to original

MINISTRY OF STATE SECRETARIAT OF

THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

Deputy for Legislation and Legal Administration,

[signed]

[stamped]

Lydia Silvanna Djaman

Decree No 255677 A

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

ON

LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

NUMBER 3 OF 2025

ON AMENDMENT TO LAW NUMBER 34 OF 2004

ON THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL ARMED FORCES

I. General

To achieve the national goals mandated by the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, the Indonesian people must make a concerted effort to maintain the continuity of national and state life. These efforts are realized in the roles, functions, and tasks of each component of the nation and are implemented earnestly for national defense.

National defense is one of the means by which the Indonesian nation attains its national goals. The essence of national defense is the participation of each citizen as the manifestation of rights and obligations in the endeavor of national defense. National defense efforts are also carried out through a universal people's defense and security system, namely the TNI as the principal force and the people as the supporting force. As the principal force, the TNI is tasked with maintaining, protecting, and preserving the integrity and sovereignty of the State.

In facing the complexity of challenges to national defense—such as geopolitical challenges, national and international defense stability, and military, non-military, and hybrid threats (terrorism and cyber warfare) it is necessary to strengthen the tasks and functions of the TNI. In addition, to

support the achievement of its tasks and functions, certain ministries/agencies may involve soldiers according to their specific expertise. Furthermore, in order to meet the organizational needs of the TNI, it is necessary to review the retirement age for soldiers as a follow-up to Constitutional Court Decision Number 62/PUU-XIX/2021 concerning judicial review of Law Number 34 of 2004 regarding the term of service of TNI soldiers.

Therefore, Law Number 34 of 2004 on the Indonesian National Armed Forces needs to be amended, particularly with respect to the substance regulating:

(1) the status of the TNI;

(2) the tasks of the TNI;

(3) the placement of soldiers in ministries/agencies; and

(4) the retirement age for TNI service.

Amendments to Law Number 34 of 2004 on the Indonesian National Armed Forces continue to refer to democratic values and principles, civilian supremacy, human rights, national law, and ratified international law.

II. Article-by-Article

Article I

Point 1

Article 3

Paragraph (1)

"under the President" means that the TNI is under the authority of the President.

Paragraph (2)

"under the coordination of the Ministry of Defense" means all matters related to the TNI's strategic planning, which covers aspects of national defense management, budget policy, procurement, maintenance and/or repair, recruitment, management of national resources, and the development of defense industry technology required by the TNI and other defense components coordinated under the Ministry of Defense. Meanwhile, the development of TNI power re lated to education, training, force preparation, and military doctrine is under the Commander, assisted by the Chiefs of Staff of the services.

Point 2

Article 7

Paragraph (1)

"upholding the state sovereignty" means maintaining the State's power to implement self-government free from threats.

"defending territorial integrity" means main taining the unity of the State's territorial power and all within it—on land, at sea, and in the air—whose boundaries are set by law.

"Protecting the whole people and the entire

homeland" means protecting the life, liberty, and property of each citizen.

Threats and disturbances to the integrity of the nation and the State include, among others:

(a) aggression by another state using armed force against state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the safety of the entire people, in forms such as:

1. invasion using armed forces;

2. bombardment using other types of weapon;

3. blockade of ports, coasts, airspace, or the whole territory of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia;

4. armed attacks by another state against land, sea, and air units;

5. the presence or actions of foreign armed elements within the territory of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia that contravene agreed provisions or treaties;

6. actions by a state allowing its territory to be used by another state to carry out aggression or invasion against Indo nesia;

7. the dispatch of armed groups or merce naries to commit acts of violence in

Indonesia; and

8. other threats as determined by the President;

(b) violations of territory by other states;

(c) armed rebellion, namely an armed movement against the legitimate Government;

(d) sabotage by certain parties to damage critical installations and national vital objects;

(e) espionage by other states to obtain military secrets;

(f) armed terror actions by international terrorists or in cooperation with domestic ter rorists or by domestic terrorists;

(g) security threats at sea or in airspace by cer tain parties, including

1. hijacking or piracy;

2. smuggling of weapons, ammunition, explosives, or other materials that en danger national safety, and

3. illegal fishing or theft of marine resources; and

(h) communal conflicts between groups in society that endanger public safety.

Paragraph (2)

Letter a

"Military operations for war" means all forms of deployment and use of the TNI's power to fight the military power of another state that commits aggression against Indonesia and/or in armed conflict with one or more states, preceded by a declaration of war and subject to international law of war.

Letter b.

Number 1

Under this provision, the Government informs the House of Representatives of its initial plan to address armed separatist movements.

Number 2

Under this provision, the Government informs the House of Representatives of its initial plan to address armed rebellion.

Number 3

Sufficiently clear.

Number 4

Sufficiently clear.

Number 5

"National vital objects of a strategic nature"

refer to objects that concern the livelihood of the people, the dignity and honor of the nation,cand national interests determined by government decisions.

Number 6

Sufficiently clear.

Number 7

Sufficiently clear.

Number 8

"Empowering the defense area" means:

(a) assisting the Government to prepare national potential to become defense power at an early stage, including the defense area and its supporting strength to carry out military operations for war, based on national defense interests in accordance with the total defense system;

(b) assisting the Government to organize compulsory basic military training for citizens in accordance with statutory regulations; and

(c) assisting the Government to empower the people as a supporting force.

Number 9

"Assisting government tasks in the regions" refers to supporting the performance of

Government functions in situations and conditions that require the TNI's means, tools, and capabilities to resolve problems, including assisting in the aftermath of natural disasters, rehabilitating infrastructure, and addressing is sues arising from strikes and communal conflicts.

Number 10

Sufficiently clear.

Number 11

Sufficiently clear.

Number 12

Sufficiently clear.

Number 13

Sufficiently clear.

Number 14

Sufficiently clear.

Number 15

"Assisting efforts to address cyber-defense threats" means the TNI participates in efforts to address cyber threats in the defense sector (cyber defense).

Number 16

"Assist" means the TNI participates.

Paragraph (3)

Sufficiently clear.

Paragraph (4)

Sufficiently clear.

Point 3

Article 8

Paragraph (1)

Letter a

Sufficiently clear.

Letter b

"Securing the defense area on land" means all efforts, work, and activities to ensure the upholding of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the safety of the people from all forms of threats and disturbances from and/or within the land territory.

Letter c

Sufficiently clear.

Letter d

Sufficiently clear.

Paragraph (2)

Sufficiently clear.

Point 4

Article 9

Paragraph (1)

Letter a

Sufficiently clear.

Letter b

"Enforcing the law and maintaining security in the sea area" means all activities related to law enforcement at sea within the TNI Navy's authority (constabulary function) as universally applicable and in accordance with prevailing laws and regulations to address violent threats, threats to navigation, and law violations at sea.

Law enforcement at sea by the TNI Navy is limited to pursuit, interdiction, arrest, investigation, and inquiry into cases, which are subsequently handed over to the Attorney General's Office of the Republic of Indonesia.

Law enforcement at sea is carried out by the Republic of Indonesia's warships and naval vessels, and by officers of the TNI Navy in accordance with statutory regulations.

Letter c

"Naval diplomacy" is the diplomacy function adhered to foreign policy which attached to the universal role of navies under international practice, as it has become the inherent nature of every state's warship when in another state to have diplomatic immunity and full sovereignty.

Letter d

Sufficiently clear.

Letter e

Sufficiently clear.

Paragraph (2)

Sufficiently clear.

Point 5

Article 10

Paragraph (1)

Letter a

Sufficiently clear.

Letter b

"Enforcing the law and maintaining security in the airspace" means all efforts and activities to ensure that the airspace remains safe and free from violent threats, threats to navigation, and legal violations in the airspace.

Letter c

Sufficiently clear.

Letter d

Sufficiently clear.

Paragraph (2)

Sufficiently clear.

Point 6

Article 47

Paragraph (1)

"positions at the Attorney General's Office of the Republic of Indonesia" means positions in the field of military criminal law.

Paragraph (2)

Sufficiently clear.

Paragraph (3)

Sufficiently clear.

Paragraph (4)

Sufficiently clear.

Paragraph (5)

Sufficiently clear.

Paragraph (6)

Sufficiently clear.

Point 7

Article 53

Sufficiently clear.

Article II

Sufficiently clear.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE STATE GAZETTE OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA NUMBER 7104

#2
Leaked Directive from the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission

KOMISI PENYIARAN INDONESIA DAERAH
PROVINSI DKI JAKARTA
Graha Mental Spiritual Lt. 7, Jl. H. Awaludin II Tanah Abang, Jakarta Pusat 10230
Telp/Fax. (021) 3911975 Email. kpidjakarta@gmail.com

Nomor : 309/KPID-DKI/VIII/2025
Sifat : Penting
Lampiran : 1
Perihal : Surat Imbauan Siaran/Liputan Pemberitaan Dalam Aksi (Demonstrasi) Massa

Jakarta, 28 Agustus 2025

Kepada Yth.
Direktur Utama Lembaga Penyiaran
Di
Jakarta

Dengan Hormat,

Menyikapi perkembangan situasi terkini ***terkait isu rencana tunjangan rumah bagi Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia (DPR RI) yang diwarnai dengan aksi unjuk rasa masyarakat*** yang merasa tidak setuju dan tidak puas dengan adanya isu kebijakan tersebut. Sebagai langkah preventif agar terus tercipta situasi dan kondisi tetap kondusif, aman dan damai di masyarakat, bahwasannya KPID Provinsi DKI Jakarta setelah mengingat;

a. Undang-Undang Nomor 32 Tahun 2002 Tentang Penyiaran
b. Pedoman Perilaku Penyiaran Pasal 22
c. Standar Program Siaran Pasal 40, Pasal 41 dan Pasal 42
d. Undang-Undang Pers Nomor 40 Tahun 1999 dan Kode Etik Jurnalistik

Memperhatikan hal tersebut diatas, KPID Provinsi DKI Jakarta perlu mengimbau kepada seluruh Lembaga Penyiaran untuk:

1. Tidak menayangkan siaran atau liputan unjukrasa yang bermuatan kekerasan secara berlebihan;
2. Menjunjung tinggi prinsip-prinsip jurnalistik, antara lain: akurat, berimbang, adil, tidak beritikad buruk, tidak menghasut dan menyesatkan, tidak mencampuradukkan fakta dan opini pribadi dan tidak menonjolkan unsur sadistis atau kekerasan.
3. Tidak menayangkan siaran atau liputan yang bernuansa provokatif, eksploitatif dan eskalatif kemarahan masyarakat;
4. Ikut serta dan aktif dalam membangun nuansa sejuk dan damai melalui siaran pemberitaan dan liputan dalam perkembangan isu terkini yang sedang terjadi ditengah aksi unjukrasa masyarakat.

Demikian surat ini kami sampaikan untuk dapat diperhatikan dan dipatuhi. Atas Perhatian dan kerjasamanya kami ucapkan terimakasih.

Hormat kami,

Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia
Daerah Provinsi DKI Jakarta

Puji Hartoyo, SE.MM
Ketua

INDONESIAN BROADCASTING COMMISSION (KPID)

OF DKI JAKARTA PROVINCE

Graha Mental Spiritual Lantai 7, Jl. Awaludin II Tanah

Abang, Jakarta Pusat 10230

Ph/fax. (021) 3911975 Email kpidjakarta@gmail.com

Jakarta, 28 August 2025

Number : 309/KPID-DKI/VIII/2025

Priority : important

Attachment : 1

Subject : Letter of Appeal for Broadcasting News coverage during Mass Actions, (Demonstrations)

To : Director of Broadcasting Institution in Jakarta

With all due respect,

In response to the current situation **regarding the planned housing allowance for members of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia (DPR RI), which has been marked with mass movements** by people who disagree and are dissatisfied with the policy. As a preventive measure to maintain a conducive, safe, and peaceful situation in the community, the DKI Jakarta Provincial KPID, after considering:

a. Law number 32 of 2002 concerning Broadcasting

b. Broadcasting Conduct Guidelines Article 22
c. Broadcasting Program Standards Article 40, 41, and 42
d. Press Act number 40 of 1999 and the Journalistic Code of Ethics

Taking into account the above, the DKI Jakarta Provincial KPID needs to appeal to all Broadcasting Institutions to:

1. Do not broadcast or report demonstrations that contain excessive violence;
2. Uphold journalistic principles, including: being accurate, balanced, fair, without ill intention, not inciting or misleading, not mixing facts with personal opinions, and not highlighting sadistic or violent elements;
3. Do not broadcast or report on anything that is provocative, exploitative, or escalates public anger;
4. Participate and be active in building a calm and peaceful atmosphere through news broadcasts and coverage of the current developments in issues that are occurring amidst public demonstrations.

We hereby submit this letter for your attention and compliance. Thank you for your attention and cooperation.

Best Regards,

Indonesian Broadcasting Commission

of DKI Jakarta Province

[stamped and signed]

Puji Hartoyo, SE.MM

Chairman

About the Translator

Christopher Hulshof is a Dissertator in the Department of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Director of Community Engagement for the Graduate Education and Training in Southeast Asia Studies (GETSEA) consortium, and sits on the Council of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR). He can be reached at chulshof@wisc.edu.